Expert Evidence and the Problem of Privilege by Murray, Andrew Stuart
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 1 
 
EXPERT EVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
PRIVILEGE 
 
 
 
ANDREW STUART MURRAY 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to fulfil the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Juridical Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sydney Law School 
The University of Sydney 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 2 
 
 
This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my 
own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes. 
I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work 
and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been 
acknowledged. 
Andrew Stuart Murray 26 February 2018 
 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 3 
 ABSTRACT  
 
The giving of admissible evidence of opinion by experts and the concept of 
‘litigation privilege’ have much in common: each developed progressively in 
England from around the middle of the sixteenth century; each occupies an 
anomalous position within our legal system; and each is thought to justify the 
anomaly it occupies as a matter of principle, namely, to promote ends desirable for 
the administration of justice that could not otherwise be redressed within the 
framework of the law as it would otherwise have stood.  
Expert evidence is evidence provided to a court to assist a judge or jury to determine 
questions of science or professional skill that lie beyond their experience or 
expertise.  It is, at heart, an exception to the rule that prohibits the adducing of 
opinion evidence and, in the case of the party-engaged expert, requires that the 
expert owe a paramount duty to the court rather than the party instructing him or 
her.   
Litigation privilege is a species of legal professional privilege (also known as ‘client 
legal privilege’) and a principle of public policy that operates to restrict the 
obligation of a party to disclose documents evidencing certain protected 
communications –– and in some cases, documents –– in response to applications 
for disclosure. It is an exception to the principle that evidence that is relevant to a 
fact in issue is admissible. 
But what of communications between a solicitor and an expert retained to give 
opinion evidence in a case? Should such communications also be subject to 
litigation privilege in light of the expert’s paramount duty to the court? Approaches 
of judges to the determination of such questions have frequently been inconsistent.  
The issue raises, at its heart, questions about the role of the solicitor in the 
preparation of expert evidence and questions about the role of the expert as an 
independent authority upon whom the courts can rely in circumstances in which a 
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party is deploying that expert to adduce evidence to its favour in adversarial 
proceedings. 
The current orthodoxy, positing as it does, a significant role for the solicitor in the 
preparation of expert evidence and, by and large, maintaining the cloak of legal 
professional privilege in relation to draft reports and communications with the 
expert, does little to alleviate the inherent tension between the principles of 
litigation privilege and expert independence.  
This thesis seeks to explore these issues and to postulate reforms that may 
ameliorate the problems that the current orthodoxy has engendered within the 
federal and New South Wales civil jurisdictions with respect to the party-engaged 
expert and the application of legal professional privilege to documents created by, 
and communications with, such an expert.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Gentlemen of the jury, there are three kinds of liars, – the common liar, the 
damned liar, and the scientific expert. 
  Judge William L. Foster (quoting an unnamed attorney) 1 
I  An Overview of the Problem 
A The Expert Witness 
Anyone involved with law reform and access to justice issues towards the end of 
the 20th century would be forgiven for thinking that something perverse and 
unprecedented had descended upon the common law world. 
In his 1991 publication Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, 
Amercian author Peter W. Huber encapsulated what he perceived to be the source 
of a nascent hysteria:  
[t]he pursuit of truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth has given way 
to reams of meaningless data, fearful speculation, and fantastic conjecture. 
Courts resound with elaborate, systematised, jargon-filled, serious-sounding 
deceptions that fully deserve the contemptuous label used by trial lawyers 
themselves: junk science.2  
Huber's thesis is that expert testimony was once constrained by the courts in a 
satisfactory manner, such that expert tesimony would only be received where it was 
‘founded on theories, methods and procedures “generally accepted” as valid among 
other scientists in the same field’. 3 However, Huber contends that this constraint 
was abandoned during the late 20th century, such that ‘[m]ost courts have slouched 
                                                        
1  William Foster, ‘Expert Testimony - Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies’ (1897) 11(3) 
Harvard Law Review 169. 
2 Peter Huber, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (Basic Books, 1991) 2. 
3 Ibid 14. 
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towards what federal judge Patrick Higginbotham dubs the let-it-all-in approach to 
testimony’, with the result that:  
[b]y the 1980s, countless courts have opened their doors wide to claims based 
on methods or theories not generally accepted as reliable by any scientific 
discipline … [a]nd so, diligent lawyers have set off in pursuit of scientific 
mystics, speculators, cranks and iconoclasts, and rushed to the waiting arms of 
the far-siders straight out of a Gary Larson cartoon.4 
Across the Atlantic, serious commentators seemed to concur. In 1994, the English 
advocates’ journal Counsel produced an elegiac editorial: 
Expert witnesses used to be genuinely independent experts. Men of 
outstanding eminence in their field. Today they are in practice hired guns: there 
is a new breed of litigation hangers on, whose main expertise is to craft reports 
which will conceal anything that might be to the disadvantage of their clients.5  
This lament was taken up by Lord Woolf, who was charged by the Lord Chancellor 
in 1994 with reviewing and reporting on the then current rules and procedures of 
the civil courts in England and Wales. In his interim report, published a year later, 
Lord Woolf commented that ‘the change in the role of experts into additional 
advocates of the parties is a phenomenon well known in the United States of 
America and one which is causing real concern in Australia’.6  
Was there such a change and was it causing real concern in Australia? Apparently 
so. A 1999 report published by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 
based on a detailed survey completed by approximately 60 per cent of trial judges 
within the Australian judiciary found that: 
…[the] tension between the expert being responsive to the party paying his or 
her fee and at the same time providing assistance to the decision-maker creates 
challenges for fact-finding in a great many cases heard in the courts…  
Sometimes the deficit identified was in the form of overt bias; on other 
occasions the partisanship in the expression of opinions was less obvious; in 
some instances it was an unwitting lack of neutrality.  However, to the concerns 
expressed by judges in answer to specific questions in the survey instrument 
were added many caustic and cynical comments from respondents about the 
                                                        
4  Ibid 17. 
5  (November/December 1994), cited in Lord Woolf, ‘Access to Justice Interim Report to the Lord 
Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales’ (June 1995) 183.  
6  Ibid 184. 
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propensity of (too many) experts to be affiliated with the side commissioning 
their reports and calling them to give evidence.7 
What had precipitated this apparent crisis?  
The concept of the expert witness is not new. English courts have made use of 
experts, in one form or another, since at least the 16th century and there is evidence 
of party-engaged expert witnesses being used since at least 1678, before becoming 
a more common feature of English civil litigation from around 1750.8 However, it 
has primarily been in the last two or so decades that, in England and Australia, 
detailed consideration of, and attempts to reform the law with respect to, expert 
evidence have become commonplace.9 Contrary to the theories of Peter Huber and 
the elegies of certain English periodicals, this does not appear to be the result of any 
recent revelation regarding the inherent unreliability of the party-engaged expert –
– judicial scepticism of such experts having been voiced since at least the mid 19th 
century.10 It is more likely that a range of factors relevant to issues such as access 
to justice, case management (including the cost of civil proceedings),11 the growth 
in complexity of fields of technological specialisation and the rise of ‘mega-
litigation’12 have resulted in a revival of scrutiny on the role of the party-engaged 
                                                        
7 Ian Freckleton, Prusana Reddy and Hugh Selby, Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: 
An Empirical Study (The Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated, 1999) 2–3.  
8  This is discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
9  See for example: Lord Woolf, above n 5; Lord Woolf, ‘Access to Justice Final Report to the Lord 
Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales’ (July 1996); Guidelines for Expert 
Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia 1998; NSW Law Reform Commission, 
‘Expert Witnesses’ (109, NSW Law Reform Commission, 2005); Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
‘Civil Justice Review Report’ (14, Victorian Law Reform Commission, March 2008) Chapter 7.  
10  This is discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
11  See for example: Justice Peter McClellan, ‘Contemporary Challenges For the Justice System - Expert 
Evidence’ (at the Australian Lawyers’ Alliance Medical Law Conference 2007, 20 July 2007) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWJSchol/2007/10.pdf>; Justice Patricia Bergin, ‘Case 
Management’ (at the National Judicial Orientation Program, Broadbeach, 3 August 2008) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWJSchol/2008/15.pdf>; Justice TF Bathurst, ‘Three 
Contemporary Issues in Civil Litigation: Expert Evidence, Discovery and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution’ (at the Annual Civil Litigation Seminar, 5 March 2015) 
<http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/2016%20Speeches/B
athurst%20CJ/Bathurst_20150305.pdf>; Peter McClellan, ‘Civil Justice Reform - What Has It 
Achieved?’ [2010] NSWJSchol 5.  
12  Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [No 37] [2001] NSWSC 838, [87]; Justice Murray 
Gleeson, ‘Valuing Courts’ <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_family.htm>; Seven Network Limited v News Limited [2007] FCA 1062, [2] to [7]; 
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 160, [70]-[73] (Dowsett and Lander JJ). 
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expert within the Australian legal system. These issues are discussed in Chapter 2 
of this thesis. 
B The Doctrine of Legal Professional Privilege 
At around the same time that the party-engaged expert witness grew in prominence 
as a tool in English litigation, the concept of ‘legal professional privilege’ –– which 
had existed in one form or another since the Roman Republic and continued to 
surface in incomplete records from time to time in England since the Norman 
conquest –– emerged as a fully formed doctrine in the various judgments emanating 
from a state trial in 1743, Annesley v Richard Earl of Anglesea.13 The trial was 
presided over by Lord Chief Baron Bowes, Baron Mountenay and Baron Dawson 
of the Court of Exchequer in Ireland. At issue was a matter of an inheritance, to be 
determined by reference to whether the late Baron of Altham (the brother of the 
Defendant), had a living son.14  
In his judgment, Baron Mounteney observed that: 
…the law hath very justly established, an inviolable secrecy to be observed by 
attornies, in order to render it safe for clients to communicate to their attornies 
all proper instructions for the carrying out on those causes which they found 
themselves under a necessity of intrusting to their care.15  
This is as succinct as any statement of the doctrine of legal professional privilege.16 
The trajectory of the development of the privilege has been one of expansion and is 
the subject of Chapter 1 of this thesis. By the mid-1800s, it was clear that legal 
professional privilege extended not only to communications between clients and 
solicitors, but between third parties, clients and solicitors made for the purpose of 
                                                        
13  Recorded in TB Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and 
Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783 (T. C Hansard, 1816) [1140]-
[1454]. 
14  Justice Paul Brereton, ‘Legal Professional Privilege’ in Historical Foundations of Australian Law 
(Federation Press, 2013) vol 2, 127, 134. Justice Brereton provides a fulsome description of the trial and 
its background. 
15  Howell, above n 13, 1242. 
16  The privilege is discussed in detail in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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litigation. One category of third party to which the doctrine applies is the expert 
witness. Therein lies the essence of the issue explored by this thesis. 
II Approach 
A The Intersection of Anomalies and the Structure of this Thesis 
Exceptions to established principle abound within Australian law. Indeed, the law’s 
inherent adaptability can, in one sense, be demonstrated by its ability to temper fast 
rules with public policy considerations. Thus, the doctrine of penalties constitutes 
an exception to parties’ freedom to contract;17 relief against forfeiture ameliorates 
the strict consequences of certain species of default;18 the rule against perpetuities 
tempers testamentary freedom;19 and the general refusal of courts to grant specific 
performance in connection with contracts for personal service or where damages 
are an appropriate remedy operates as an exception to the notion that parties will 
generally be held to the terms of their bargains.20 
Each of the exceptions referred to above is the subject of a significant body of well 
established law. However, despite the ingenuity with which courts and legislators 
devise such exceptions as a means of overcoming the tendency of a fast rule to 
engender injustice in particular instances, this thesis contends that insufficient 
regard is paid to circumstances in which legal anomalies may intersect.  
Legal professional privilege constitutes an exception within the Australian legal 
system. It is an exception to the rule that evidence relevant to a fact in issue is 
capable of being adduced in proceedings. 
Likewise, expert witnesses also constitute an exception within the Australian legal 
system. They are an exception to the rule that a person cannot give admissible 
                                                        
17  Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2012) 247 CLR 205, 216–217 (French 
CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. 
18  Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 10 (Gibbs CJ and Murphy J). 
19  Air Jamaica Limited v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399, 1408 (Lord Millett). 
20  Co-operative Insurance Society Limited v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Limited [1998] AC 1, 15–16 (Lord 
Hoffman). 
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evidence of an opinion.21 Expert witnesses have other characteristics that set them 
apart from lay witnesses, which are also discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
It is now well established that expert witnesses owe a paramount duty to the court.22 
However the expert witness is the only vehicle through which parties can adduce 
evidence of opinion.23 In the context of adversarial systems of justice such as prevail 
in England and Australia, it is contended that this creates a fundamental tension. 
Furthermore, the notion that communications and, in certain jurisdictions, 
documents, sent by lawyers and clients to experts, prepared by experts, and sent by 
experts to clients and lawyers, can be the subject of legal professional privilege and 
withheld from disclosure at the application of other parties, serves to exacerbate 
this tension.  
These issues are further complicated by discrepancies between the common law 
tests for the existence and waiver of legal professional privilege and the 
correspending tests under the Uniform Evidence Law which tests can operate side-
by-side in the same proceedings24 –– not least of which is that the former protects 
communications and the latter both communications and documents brought into 
existence for the requisite purpose.  
And overlaid above these difficulties is a fierce divergence between authorities even 
within the realms of the common law and the Uniform Evidence Law respectively. 
For example, in Interchase Corporation Limited (in liquidation) v Grosvenor Hill 
                                                        
21  See for example, section 76 of the Uniform Evidence Law. The circumstances in which lay persons can 
give evidence of opinion are tightly circumscribed –– section 77 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) states 
‘the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because it is relevant for a 
purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about which the existence of which the opinion was 
expressed’. Likewise, section 78 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) excepts from operation of the opinion 
rule, evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if the opinion is based upon that which ‘the person 
saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event’ and such evidence was necessary adequately 
to understand the person’s perception of that matter or event. A further exception (section 78A of the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)) applies to create an exception for evidence of an opinion ‘expressed by a 
member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the 
content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group’. 
22  See for example Schedule 7 to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW); Expert Evidence Practice 
Note (GPN-EXPT) 2016 Federal Court of Australia.  
23  Apart from in respect of the limited circumstances referred to in n 21. 
24  See discussion below in Chapter 3. 
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(Qld) Pty Limited (No 1),25 Thomas J of the Supreme Court of Queensland (applying 
the common law test for the existence and waiver of privilege) stated: 
[A]n expert is a third person from whom the client, represented by a solicitor, 
hopes to obtain an advantage ... The solicitor is deliberately converting the 
expert into a witness. The community has some interest in ultimately being 
able to ensure (through the courts) that this process is not abused. It is desirable 
that the rules be such that the courts, or the adversary, be able to explore fairly 
fully the circumstances of the formation of the opinion...I would hold that in 
general … documents generated by the expert and information recorded in one 
form or another by the expert in the course of forming an opinion are not a 
proper subject to a claim of legal professional privilege.26 
Whereas, in Linter Group Limited v Price Waterhouse (a firm),27 Harper J of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria, applying the same test, stated: 
Just as a Judge ought never to allow publication of a draft of a judgment, in 
part because it is necessary to preserve the freedom to change his or her mind 
on further reflection about the case, so experts should not be inhibited by fear 
of exposure of a draft from changing their minds when such change is 
warranted by the material before the expert.28 
Chapter 3 of this thesis seeks to establish the current (arguably, unsatisfactory) 
‘orthodoxy’ with respect to the existence and waiver of legal professional privilege 
in the context of expert evidence. That orthodoxy, it will be shown, requires the 
application of different criteria to the same question depending on when, in the 
timeline of proceedings, and upon whose instigation, the question arises. Chapter 3 
also surveys the failure of superior courts properly to identify and apply these 
criteria, the first attempts by legislators to remedy the differential operation of rules 
and the extent to which the courts once again misapplied the legislators’ ‘remedy’.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis considers whether the current orthodoxies with respect to 
expert witnesses and client legal privilege warrant reform. It addresses expert 
witness ‘bias’ and the phenomenon identified in Chapter 2 as ‘the paradigm of 
expert exceptionalism’ –– the tendency of opposing parties to call experts who will 
give opinions favourable to their respective cases and thereby provide the court with 
alternatives tending to the extreme (a concept manifested in the practice known as 
                                                        
25  Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Limited (No 1) (1999) 1 Qd. R 141. 
26  Ibid 162,164. 
27  Linter Group Limited v Price Waterhouse (a firm) [1999] VSC 245. 
28  Ibid [16]. 
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‘expert shopping’). The chapter also discusses the role of lawyers in the creation of 
expert evidence and the courts’ problematic reliance upon Attorney-General (NT) v 
Maurice29 to determine questions of waiver of privilege. It concludes by identifying 
a number of criteria that meaningful law reform should address, drawing upon the 
matters identified in the preceding chapters. 
The primary focus of this thesis is the identification and examination of the problem 
lying at the intersection of legal professional privilege and expert evidence. 
However, Chapter 5 is devoted to the brief consideration of four approaches that 
might best satisfy the criteria for reform identified in Chapter 4, namely: mandating 
the use of court-appointed experts; mandating the use of joint party-engaged 
witnesses; abolishing client legal privilege in the context of expert evidence (in 
whole or in part); and finally, adopting a hybrid model based upon (but with some 
critical amendments to) the approach to limiting the application of legal 
professional privilege to expert witnesses adopted by the Supreme Court of South 
Australia. Ultimately, the postulated hybrid model is put forward as most closely 
corresponding to a solution capable of satisfying the identified criteria. 
B Scope and Limitations 
About legal professional privilege, much has been written. Likewise, abundant 
literature has been generated in connection with the existence, role and problems 
associated with the party-engaged expert witness. However, lying at the intersection 
of these two exceptions is the kernel of a problem, which has not, it is contended, 
received adequate attention. 
To the extent addressing these matters, authoritative Australian texts on expert 
witnesses and the law of evidence respectively, tend to focus only upon the current 
state of the law with respect to the application of legal professional privilege to 
expert witnesses. Thus, in Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and 
                                                        
29  Attorney General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475. 
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Advocacy,30 less than 13 pages of the work relates to the issue of privilege,31 a 
significant proportion of which is devoted to an explanation of the concept of legal 
professional privilege and of the differences in application between the common 
law and the Uniform Evidence Law.32 Similarly, Cross on Evidence33 offers an even 
briefer consideration of the application of privilege to the party-engaged expert.34 
Given the broad scope of these works, these limitations are not surprising and the 
above comments are intended in no way to constitute criticism. 
Perhaps the only study squarely addressing the confluence of legal professional 
privilege and expert evidence appearing in a peer reviewed Australian publication 
is Paul Mendelow’s ‘Expert Evidence: Legal Professional Privilege and Experts’ 
Reports’ from the Australian Law Journal published in April 2001.35 Mendelow’s 
brief article, which focuses upon issues of waiver in connection with expert reports, 
offers a thorough discussion of the then current state of the law with respect to 
waiver,36 identifies a number of conflicting authorities in the area37 and provides 
some suggestions to legal practitioners as to the means through which prospects of 
inadvertant waiver of privilege may be minimised.38 The article has been referred 
to in two judgements in connection with its provision of a summary of caselaw on 
the issue39 and was described in a third as being ‘illuminating’.40  
                                                        
30  Ian Freckelton and Hugh Selby, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (Lawbook, 
5th ed, 2013). 
31  Ibid 316–327. 
32 Ibid 316–318, 324–327. 
33  LexisNexis Australia, Cross on Evidence ((loose-leaf), 2018) vol 1. 
34  Ibid [25235], [25300]. 
35  Paul Mendelow, ‘Expert Evidence: Legal Professional Privilege and Experts’ Reports’ (2001) 75 The 
Australian Law Journal 258. A number of other publications exist but are brief in nature and directed 
more towards providing legal practitioners with practical guidance as to the then current state of the law 
with respect to privilege and expert evidence –– for example: Justice Robert McDougall, ‘The Debatable 
Privilege’ (2007) 27(335) Lawyers Weekly 14; Hugh Stowe, ‘Expert Reports and Waiver of Privilege’ 
Summer 2006/2007 Journal of the NSW Bar Association 71. 
36  Mendelow, above n 35, 259–262. 
37  Ibid 262–273. 
38  Ibid 273. 
39  Lovegrove Turf Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Education [2003] WASC 213, 17; Spassked Pty Ltd v 
Commissioner of Taxation (No 4) (2002) 50 ATR 70, [14].  
40  Lampson & Ors v McKendry [2001] NSWSC 373, [13] (Harrison M). 
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However, Mendelow’s article is now more than 15 years old and is a work very 
much focussed upon the practical consequences of then recent caselaw41 in terms of 
the issue of waiver of privilege in expert reports. It does not (nor does it purport to) 
trace the historical background to the concepts of legal professional privilege and 
expert evidence and their intersection. Nor does it deal with the problems of the 
party-engaged expert or consider options for reform. 
Issues relating to legal professional privilege in the context of expert witnesses have 
also, it is contended, received scant attention in law reform reports. These matters 
are taken up in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. However, by way of example, the 
detailed report on ‘Expert Witnesses’ produced by the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission in 200542 in response to extremely broad terms of reference43 
spent only seven pages considering amendments to rules and procedures regarding 
disclosure to improve transparency of expert evidence.44 It concluded that the 
existing provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules45 ‘are appropriate in 
relation to disclosure and other measures to increase transparency’.46       
There is, it is contended in this thesis, a considerable gap in the literature with 
respect to the particular issues engendered by the interaction between legal 
professional privilege and expert evidence. The gap is all the more surprising given 
the extensive amount of research undertaken into expert evidence and the problems 
it raises within adversarial systems of justice such as those found in England and 
Australia –– legal professional privilege operating as a cloak, as it were, obscuring 
from scrutiny communications between experts and those who engage them. 
Reforming the operation of that privilege (whether ultimately desirable or not) is 
one means of returning this problem, created by the adversarial system, to the 
adversarial system for resolution by allowing opposing litigants to access, evaluate 
                                                        
41  Namely, Esso Australia Resources v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 
201 CLR 49 (‘Esso v FCT’); and Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1. 
42  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9. 
43  Namely, ‘To inquire into and report on the operation and effectiveness of the rules and procedures 
governing expert witnesses in New South Wales’. Ibid 2. 
44  Ibid 86–92. 
45  2005 (NSW). 
46  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 86, 92. 
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and raise for consideration by the relevant trier of fact, such communications as 
may be appropriate and relevant in the circumstances. This thesis attempts to bridge 
this gap in the literature by providing both a backward and forward-looking 
assessment of these issues and identifying potential, practical options for reform 
that are consonant with the current procedural imperatives for the conduct of civil 
litigation within the prevailing adversarial system.     
Because of the myriad ways in which different fora approach the issues of expert 
evidence and legal professional privilege, this thesis limits its focus in terms of 
identifying the law and options for reform principally to the New South Wales and 
federal jurisdictions. However in doing so, it draws upon relevant comparative 
material from other Australian and international sources.  
New South Wales and the federal jurisdictions have been chosen because they were 
two of the first within Australia to adopt the Uniform Evidence Law and as a 
consequence, may be considered to have the richest seam of reported caselaw 
governing the introduction of this legislation and its interaction with the common 
law –– which, for the reasons set out in Chapter 3, it has not entirely abrogated. 
These are also among the jursdictions in which the problem relating to the 
intersection between legal professional privilege and the expert witness is at its most 
florid. This is because they are jurisdictions in which it is held that service of an 
expert report does not, without more, have the effect of waiving privilege that may 
otherwise inhere in draft reports prepared by, or prior communications of parties 
and solicitors with, the expert. Once again, these issues are discussed in Chapter 3 
and also explored in Chapter 4 in the context of the question as to whether reform 
is warranted and, if so, the criteria such reform should satisfy. 
The thesis also primarily focuses upon civil procedure, although it does draw on 
caselaw derived from the exercise of criminal jurisdictions by the courts. Once 
again, this is because such law reform proposals as have been raised in England and 
Australia and which are discussed in succeeding chapters, have predominantly 
focused on civil rather than criminal jurisdictions. It is also because this thesis 
identifies, in chapter 2, the locus of the recently revived concern over partisan 
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conduct of experts as being the movement of courts towards more stringent civil 
case management processes, with a renewed focus upon the overriding purpose of 
achieving the ‘just, quick and cheap’ resolution of real issues in proceedings.47 
It must also be recognised that there is a lack of meaningful data regarding the 
incidence of bias and expert shopping practices within the Australian legal system. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis considers the results, and criticism, of such fieldwork as has 
been undertaken with judicial officers to identify the frequency with which they 
have considered that they have encountered bias on the part of a party-engaged 
expert and its effect on their ability to discharge their role. Nevertheless, the self-
evident problem in dealing with issues such as ‘bias’ is their inherent unamenability 
to objective measurement. This has led the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, when considering reforms relating to expert evidence, to conclude 
that: 
What is difficult, however, is to determine the extent of adversarial bias … 
Although it is not possible to quantify the extent of the problem, in the 
Commission’s view it is safe to conclude that adversarial bias is a significant 
problem, at least in some types of litigation. Measures that would reduce or 
eliminate adversarial bias, therefore, are likely to have potential benefits, even 
if the extent of those benefits cannot be accurately determined.48 
That conclusion was also adopted by the Victorian Law Reform Commission in its 
2008 review into the Civil Justice System in Victoria.49  
The performance of field work to attempt to ascertain more precisely the incidence 
of expert bias and expert witness shopping behaviours is, for similar reasons, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, the reasons as to why procedural reform may be warranted in the absence 
of such data are addressed in Chapter 4 and the proposals for reform canvassed in 
Chapter 5 take into account hardship to parties that may flow from the introduction 
of elaborate measures to counterract the perceived effects of bias which may be 
inherent within our legal system to a greater or lesser degree. Certainly, the case 
                                                        
47  See for example section 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). 
48  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 74.  
49  Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 512. 
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studies that have been identified in this thesis suggest that the problems associated 
with the application of legal professional privilege in the context of the party-
engaged expert are far from nebulous –– the irony of the situation being that, absent 
a reform of legal professional privilege in this area, we may never know how many 
cases might otherwise belong in the Universal Music v Sharman50 category of 
notoriety. 
C Methodology 
It is recognised that there is some value in an author of a higher degree by research 
thesis identifying the approach to legal research and writing adopted in it, even 
where the work is primarily the product of a methodology that might conventionally 
be described as ‘doctrinal’.51  
There is by no means consensus over the meaning of ‘doctrinal research’.52 
However, Terry Hutchinson identifies its essential nature as involving ‘a critical 
conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and case law to reveal a statement of 
the law relevant to the matter under investigation’.53 A more fulsome decription is 
contained in her jointly authored work with Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and 
Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’, in which it is emphasised that 
the crux of the doctrinal method is the ‘location and analysis of the primary 
documents of the law in order to establish the nature and parameters of the law’.54  
                                                        
50  Universal Music v Sharman (2005) 220 ALR 1 (discussed later in Chapter 4 of this thesis).  
51  See generally, Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal 
Legal Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83. The authors comment that ‘legal academics may 
argue that a statement of doctrinal methodology would be out of place in a doctrinal thesis … [o]ne 
commentator, Paul Chynoweth, asserts that “no purpose would be served by including a methodology 
section within a doctrinal research publication" because the process is one of “analysis rather than data 
collection”' (a proposition with which the authors disagree). However the authors note that Chynoweth 
goes on, despite this assertion, to recommend that legal academic ‘reflect upon our own previously 
unquestioned assumptions about the practices in our own discipline’ and identify these for the benefit of 
interdisciplinary colleagues and others within the field –– an approach they endorse. Ibid, 100.   
52  See for example: Council of Australian Law Deans, ‘Council of Australian Law Deans Statement on the 
Nature of Legal Research’ (October 2005) <https://cald.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/cald-
statement-on-the-nature-of-legal-research-20051.pdf>; Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 51; Terry 
Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law’ 
(2015) 3 Erasmus Law Review 130. 
53  Hutchinson, above n 52, 132. 
54  Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 51, 113. 
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This thesis includes, but is not limited to, an approach of this nature. Its starting 
point is a detailed examination of caselaw and legislation relevant to the 
development of the concepts of legal professional privilege and expert evidence 
respectively and then the caselaw and legislation lying at the intersection of the two, 
in order to establish a positive statement of the current orthodoxy with respect to 
the determination of privilege claims involving communications and documents 
generated by and passing between experts and solicitors.  
Hutchinson and Duncan contend that the approach undertaken by higher degree by 
research candidates conducting legal research is similar in methodology to that used 
by judges and legal practitioners, but tending towards the production of different 
objectives and outcomes.55 From a methodological perspective, this observation is 
apt in the context of the first three chapters of this thesis. Caselaw has been 
identified on the basis of extensive searches of, and cross-referencing of results 
within, usual repositories of cases (such as the databases maintained by AUSTLII, 
BAILII, Jade, LexisNexis and Westlaw) as well as on some more novel repositories 
that have become recently available for remote interrogation such as the index and 
paraphrase of the Printed Year Book Reports, 1268-1535 compiled by David J. 
Seipp at Boston University.56 At the risk of being criticised for excessive adoption 
of quotations, the approach largely adopted in this thesis has been to let, where 
appropriate, and particularly in the first three chapters, judges speak for themselves 
by replicating the relevant passages of decisions in order to permit the reader a 
greater opportunity to form their own views as to the meaning and intention of the 
decisions that have shaped the law with respect to legal professional privilege and 
expert evidence, rather than adopting potentially contentious summaries of them. 
To this end, recourse to secondary material has also been intentionally limited.  
Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis seek to move away from the explicatory approach of 
the opening chapters. They place greater emphasis upon establishing the existence 
of the problem postulated by this thesis, by reference to a broader range of sources. 
                                                        
55  Ibid 109. 
56  David Seipp J, An Index and Paraphrase of Printed Year Book Reports, 1268 - 1535 
<http://www.bu.edu/law/seipp>. 
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These include law reform reports, some fieldwork conducted in relation to issues 
of judicial apprehension of expert bias and the adoption of a limited number of 
proceedings as case-studies to depict the manner in which reliance of a party on 
legal professional privilege may have a tendency to obscure deficiencies in expert 
evidence led by that party. As stated above, this thesis does not involve the 
performance of fieldwork or multi-disciplinary approaches to its subject matter, but 
it does seek to critically evaluate relevant fieldwork performed by others and which 
is taken into account in reaching the conclusions identified in Chapters 4 and 5.  
These chapters in particular, move beyond that which may be conventionally 
considered as a ‘doctrinal’ approach by considering practical reforms that may 
ameliorate the problems arising from the application of legal professional privilege 
to expert evidence. In this sense, they more readily fall within the third category of 
legal research identified in the report produced in 1987 by Dennis Pearce, Enid 
Campbell and Don Harding (‘Pearce Report’), namely ‘reform oriented research’ 
which ‘evaluates the adequacy of existing rules and recommends changes to any 
rules found wanting’.57  
The Pearce Report identified a third putative category of legal research, namely 
‘theoretical research’, the focus of which is the fostering of ‘a more complete 
understanding of the conceptual bases of legal principles and of the combined 
effects of a range of rules and procedures that touch on a particular area of activity’. 
Because of the more practical and reform-oriented purpose of this thesis, it does 
not, in terms, seek to challenge or move beyond certain of the underlying features 
of Ausralia’s current legal landscape and may not, in this sense, constitute 
‘theoretical research’ as that term might perhaps be understood.58 For instance, this 
thesis takes as a given that civil and criminal processes within Australia will always 
                                                        
57  Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, ‘Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for 
the Commonwealth Territory Education Commission’ (AGPS, 1987); quoted in Council of Australian 
Law Deans, above n 52, 1. Despite the comparative antiquity of the Pearce Report, its approach to the 
categorisation of legal research was described by the Council of Australian Law Deans in 2005 as 
‘remaining pivotal in the concept of legal research’, if a little narrow. 
58  See for example Terry Hutchinson, Research and Writing in Law (Lawbook Co, Second, 2006) 44–54. 
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be conducted within that which is fundamentally an adversarial system of justice.59 
However, as intimated at the beginning of this introduction, to the extent that this 
thesis encompasses a more theoretical and jurisprudential theme, it is that particular 
care must be taken when fashioning laws that lie at the intersection of anomalies. It 
is hoped that this work provides a meaningful analysis of one such phenomenon.   
                                                        
59  Albeit, with the possibility of some procedural measures that might sit outside of traditional adversarial 
processes, such as the concept of the court-appointed expert, discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 1 – LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE 
 
And further, did Lucullus then in Macedonia, know more of this than you did, 
Hortensius––you who were in Rome, you from whom Dio sought help, you 
who wrote to Verres earnestly protesting against Dio’s wrongs? Is all this new 
and surprising to you? Does this charge now come to your ears for the first 
time? Did you hear nothing of it from Dio––nothing from that highly-respected 
lady your mother-in-law Servilla, so long Dio’s guest and hostess? Are not 
many of the facts unknown to my witnesses and known to you? It is not your 
client’s innocence, but the exemption the law gives you, that has deprived me 
of calling you as a witness to the truth of this charge. 
    Marcus Tullio Cicero, Against Verres 60 
I  The Nature of the Privilege 
The text of Cicero’s second speech in the prosecution of Gaius Verres, former 
Roman Governor of Sicily, evidences a plan to goad Verres’ advocate, Hortensius, 
over his state of knowledge of his client’s crimes. However, as the speech makes 
clear, despite Cicero’s rhetorical insinuation, he could not have taken the further 
step of calling Hortensius as a witness for the prosecution. This was not because of 
any rule regarding property in a witness, but because of an exception recognised by 
Roman law and expressly recorded by Cicero, that considered an advocate not to 
be a competent witness in a cause for which he has furnished his services.  
This exception has established itself in English law as part of the concept known as 
‘legal professional privilege’ or ‘client legal privilege’.61 Variously described as a 
‘doctrine’,62 ‘a rule of substantive law’, 63 a ‘fundamental and general principle of 
the common law’,64 and ‘a fundamental condition on which the administration of 
                                                        
60  Cicero, The Verrine Orations (Harvard University Press, 1928) vol 1, 317. 
61  The terms ‘legal professional privilege’ and ‘client legal privilege’ can essentially be used 
interchangeably but for an interesting discussion of the nomenclature, see Justice Brereton, above n 14, 
171–172. The Uniform Evidence Law adopts the term ‘client legal privilege’ but the majority of caselaw 
referred to in this thesis adopts the term ‘legal professional privilege’ and accordingly, the latter term is 
primarily adopted in this work.  
62  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 119 (Dean J). 
63  Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 
213 CLR 543, 552 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
64  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 116–117 (Deane J). 
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justice as a whole rests’,65 the modern concept of legal professional privilege does 
not admit precisely of description. Its conceptual fluidity has been aptly described 
in the following terms: 
It seems that the concept of the privilege has never been based on any precise 
and generally accepted theory. Because of this lack of theory, the scope of 
privilege has always been somewhat flexible. Thus, as Wigmore stated, one of 
the four fundamental conditions for its existence was that ‘the injury that would 
be done to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater 
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation’ 
(Evidence, 1961 vol 8, p 527, para 2285).66 
These ‘four fundamental conditions’ identified by John Henry Wigmore at the 
beginning of the twentieth century in A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law,67 are: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties; (3) The 
relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered; and (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.68 
It is a feature of Wigmore’s analysis that the notion of a duty of confidence does 
not, of itself, confer a right to withhold the communication the subject of that duty 
from inquisitorial judicial processes. The scope of Wigmore’s survey was wider 
than that of solicitor and client. He uses the four conditions as a benchmark against 
which to assess the extent to which any given relationship should be sanctioned as 
giving rise to a privilege against disclosure. Thus, it is the failure to satisfy the 
second condition which deprives the relationship between patient and physician of 
the status, despite there being a duty of confidentiality clearly owed by the latter to 
the former. And the failure to satisfy the third condition similarly disentitles the 
relationship between priest and penitent.  
                                                        
65  R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex Parte B (1995) 4 All ER 526, 541 (Lord Taylor CJ), quoted in Telstra 
Corporation Limited v Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (No 2) [2007] 
FCA 1445, [19] (Graham J). 
66  Re Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141, 158–159 (Murphy J).  
67  John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
(Little Brown and Company, 1940). 
68  Ibid §2285. 
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It was axiomatic to Wigmore that, in the case of solicitor and client, ‘all four 
[conditions] are present’69. With a notable protest,70 this appears to be the orthodoxy 
that emerged from the nineteenth century and this is clear from the sources relied 
upon by Wigmore himself, including the explication of the rule in the 1814 text 
Phillipps on Evidence in which it is stated: 
The expediency of the rule must depend not on the impropriety of violating the 
confidence reposed, but on a consideration that the collateral inconvenience, 
which would ensue if no such confidence were reposed, would preponderate 
over the direct mischief produced by a chance of the failure of justice resulting 
from the exclusion of evidence.71 
The rationale is also clear from the 1851 decision of Wigram V.C. in Russell v 
Jackson: 
The rule which protects from disclosure confidential communications between 
solicitor and client, does not rest simply upon the confidence reposed by the 
client in the solicitor, for there is no such rule in other cases in which at least 
equal confidence is reposed … it seems to rest not upon the confidence itself 
but upon the necessity of carrying it out.72 
In Australia, the policy rationale for legal professional privilege was explained in 
the High Court case of Grant v Downs 73 in the following terms: 
The rationale ... is that it promotes the public interest because it assists and 
enhances the administration of justice by facilitating the representation of 
clients by legal advisers, the law being a complex and complicated 
discipline.  This it does by keeping secret their communications, thereby 
inducing the client to retain the solicitor and seek his advice, and encouraging 
the client to make a full and frank disclosure for the relevant circumstances to 
the solicitor.  The existence of the privilege reflects, to the extent to which it is 
accorded, the paramountcy of this public interest over a more general public 
interest, that which requires that in the interests of a fair trial litigation should 
be conducted on the footing that all relevant documentary evidence is 
available.74 
Given the centrality of this ‘public policy’ element to the conferral of the privilege 
on the solicitor and client relationship as we now know it, it is somewhat surprising 
that, despite the comparative antiquity of the concept of legal professional 
                                                        
69  Ibid. 
70  The lively opposition of Jeremy Bentham in ‘Rationale of Judicial Evidence’ to the continued operation 
of the privilege is discussed in more detail below. 
71  Wigmore, above n 67, §2285 n 1. 
72  Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 391 quoted in Wigmore, Ibid §2285 n 1. 
73  Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674.  
74  Ibid 685 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ). 
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privilege,75 the public policy rationale does not find its way into recorded decisions 
until the eighteenth century. A brief survey of the appearance and development of 
legal professional privilege is discussed later in this chapter. However, it is 
convenient firstly to identify the current position in Australia. 
II  The Current Formulation of the Privilege under the Uniform 
Evidence Law 
As now recognised, legal professional privilege comprises two overlapping species 
of privilege: ‘legal advice privilege’; and ‘litigation privilege’. The development of 
the two were, for the reasons set out below, historically intertwined.  
In this thesis, the term ‘Uniform Evidence Law’ is used to denote the Evidence Act 
1995 (Commonwealth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (New South Wales) and each of 
those acts is separately identified76 where material differences arise. Key differences 
between the position under the Uniform Evidence Law and the position at common 
law are discussed in more detail in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
The requirements for the existence of legal advice privilege under the Uniform 
Evidence Law are currently reflected in the wording of section 118 in the following 
terms: 
Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that 
adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: 
(a)  a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or 
(b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting 
for the client; or 
(c)   the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) 
prepared by the client, lawyer or another person; 
for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, 
providing legal advice to the client. 
                                                        
75 The historical survey below dates the initial recorded case of its application to the early 15th century. 
76  As NSW Evidence Act and Commonwealth Evidence Act respectively. 
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Under the Uniform Evidence Law then, the current conditions for legal advice 
privilege to apply, insofar as it relates to communications, are: a confidential 
communication; between a client and a lawyer (or two or more lawyers acting for 
the client); for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice to the 
client.77 
The first of these current conditions, namely, the requirement of confidence, 
correlates precisely with that identified by Wigmore. The second, for the reasons 
identified below, corresponds with the second, third and fourth conditions identified 
by Wigmore. The third current condition, is, in fact, the consequence of a relaxation 
of the principle that the sole purpose of the communication be the provision of legal 
advice to the client (which was the position at common law at the time the Uniform 
Evidence Law was enacted and remained the common law position for a period 
thereafter).78 For this reason, it is not a condition expressly recognised by Wigmore, 
nor does it feature in the early decisions from which the doctrine came to be 
expressed.  
As to the concept of a ‘confidential communication’, section 117(1) of the Uniform 
Evidence Law relevantly states: 
"confidential communication" means a communication made in such 
circumstances that, when it was made: 
(a)  the person who made it; or 
(b)  the person to whom it was made; 
was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether 
or not the obligation arises under law. 
                                                        
77  Subsection 118(c) brings within the scope of the rule the contents of a confidential document created by 
a client, lawyer or another person. The extension of the latter to ‘another person’ is the result of the 
decision in Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357. That decision is 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. It should be noted that communications (not in the nature 
of a document) with such other person do not, pursuant to section 118, enjoy the privilege. 
78  Further discussed at the end of this chapter. 
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The judgment which has been widely recognised as providing some content as to 
the application of the requirement of confidence79 is that of Megarry J in Coco v A 
N Clark (Engineers) Ltd80 in which his Honour stated: 
… the information must have been communicated in circumstances importing 
an obligation of confidence. However secret and confidential the information, 
there can be no binding obligation of confidence if that information is blurted 
out in public or is communicated in other circumstances which negative any 
duty of holding it confidential. From the authorities cited to me, I have not 
been able to derive any very precise idea of what test is to be applied in 
determining whether the circumstances import an obligation of confidence.81 
Although it is trite to affirm that the relationship between solicitor and client will 
almost inevitably furnish the requirements for the imposition of an obligation of 
confidence, which is implied in the retainer,82 in most circumstances, the 
involvement of others in such communications, the voluntary disclosure of the 
communications to others, or other factors influencing the relationship between 
solicitor and client, may alter the character of the communications and defeat the 
privilege. The exceptions to the principle that communication of privileged 
information to third parties has the effect of waiving the privilege are rare and can 
principally be found in the provisions of section 122 of the Uniform Evidence Law 
(disclosure to agents or those with common interests) and section 119 of the 
Uniform Evidence Law, which governs litigation privilege, discussed below. For 
the reasons there stated, seemingly fine distinctions between classes of person (and 
capacities in which they act) to whom disclosure is made are often determinative of 
whether privilege in a communication can be maintained. Further, as intimated 
above, uncertainty regarding the status of the relationship between solicitor and 
                                                        
79   Commonwealth v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39, 51 (Mason J); Half Court Tennis Pty 
Limited v Seymour (1980) 53 FLR 240, 255 (Dunn J); O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310, 326 
(Mason J, with whom Murphy, Aicken, Wilson and Brennan JJ agreed); Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v 
Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434, 443 (Gummow J); Smith Kline & French Laboratories 
(Aust) Ltd v Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 22 FCR 73, 86–87 (Gummow J); 
Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Limited & Ors v Expense Reduction Analysts 
Group Pty Ltd & Ors (2012) 295 ALR 348, 389 (Campbell JA, with whom Macfarlan JA and Sackville 
AJA agreed); Marshall v Prescott (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1949, [150] (Beech-Jones J); Streetscape 
Projects (Aust) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 240, [17] (Meagher, Barrett and Ward 
JJA).  
80  Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41. 
81  Ibid 47. 
82  Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrine and Remedies (Butterworths LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2002) 
[41-015]; and Parry-Jones v Law Soc (1969) 1 Ch 1 there quoted. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 30 
client, and considerations associated with the context in which communications are 
made, can also defeat the operation of the privilege.  
In Seven Network Limited v News Limited83 a question arose as to the capacity in 
which an ‘in-house lawyer’ who also acted in a number of commercial capacities 
within the News Group of companies was giving advice. Tamberlin J said, of the 
position of ‘in-house lawyer’: 
The courts recognise that being a lawyer employed by an enterprise does not 
of itself entail a level of independence. Each employment will depend on the 
way in which the position is structured and executed.  
… 
The authorities recognise that in order to attract privilege the legal adviser 
should have an appropriate degree of independence so as to ensure that the 
protection of legal professional privilege is not conferred too widely.84 
However, disclosure of information to and by third parties can, in the right 
circumstances, be brought within the scope of section 118 of the Uniform Evidence 
Law85 or the species of legal professional privilege known as ‘litigation privilege’. 
Litigation privilege is a concept distinct from legal advice privilege. It has, as its 
object, ‘the facilitation of access to legal advice [a point in common with advice 
privilege], the inducement to candour in statements prepared for the purposes of 
litigation, and the maintenance of the curial procedure for the determination of 
justiciable controversies’.86 Or, as has been put more succinctly, ‘as you have no 
right to see your adversary's brief, you have no right to see that which comes into 
existence merely as the materials for the brief’.87  
The formulation of litigation privilege reflected in section 119 of the Uniform 
Evidence Law88 is as follows: 
                                                        
83  Seven Network Limited v News Limited [2005] FCA 142. 
84  Ibid [4], [5] and [38]. 
85  See discussion of Pratt, commencing on page 60. 
86  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 108 (Brennan J). 
87  Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 346, 346 (Lord Simon), quoted in Baker, ibid. 
88  The common law and Uniform Evidence Law tests for litigation privilege are discussed below in Chapter 
3. 
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Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that 
adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of:  
(a)  a confidential communication between the client and another person, or 
between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was 
made, or  
(b)  the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that 
was prepared,  
for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal 
services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the 
proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or 
overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have 
been, a party. 
The key points of distinction between litigation privilege and legal advice privilege 
are that the former extends to communications between the client and ‘another 
person’ or a lawyer acting for the client and another person but only arises in the 
context of the provision of legal services relating to a proceeding or an anticipated 
or pending proceeding.89 
Litigation privilege, although springing from the same jurisprudential root as legal 
advice privilege (as identified in the historical survey below), has developed along 
a different trajectory to the latter –– a trajectory which, it is contended as the basis 
of this thesis, places it directly in conflict with the principles of law with respect to 
party-engaged expert witnesses. 
A detailed account of the current orthodoxy in respect of the application of 
‘litigation privilege’ to the field of expert evidence is set out in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
III   Origins and the Development of Legal Professional Privilege 
A The Starting Point 
Many contemporary references to the origins of legal professional privilege take as 
a starting point the first extant modern law reports of the latter part of the sixteenth 
                                                        
89  See discussion of Pratt, commencing on page 60. 
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century.90 Such records are, themselves, (as was customary at the time) little more 
than an account of the factual circumstances of the case in question and a record of 
the decision made. Scholars of the early twentieth century attributed the rise of the 
privilege to conditions that did not come into being until the fifteenth century: 
The history of this privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth, where the 
privilege already appears as unquestioned [quoting Berd v Lovelace from 
1577] … In as much as the testimony of witnesses (in the modern sense) did 
not come to be a common source of proof in jury trials till the early 1500s and 
as testimonial compulsion does not appear to have been generally authorised 
until the early part of Elizabeth’s reign … it would seem that the privilege 
could hardly have come much earlier into existence; for there could have been 
but little material for its application. It thus appears to have commended itself, 
at the very outset, as a natural exception to the then novel right of testimonial 
compulsion.91 
The recent compilation of the great repository of medieval English legal history, 
The Year Books, into a searchable database by David Seipp of Boston University92 
has provided an opportunity to discover the extent to which (if at all), the privilege 
was identified in the period from 1268 to 1535. In fact, and consistently with 
Wigmore’s postulation regarding the historical circumstances in which the privilege 
came into being, there appears to be scant recognition of the privilege in this period.  
However, if analogous features of Roman law are put to one side, certain of the 
doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings at common law may be inferred from 
pronouncements in one of the earliest recorded English cases dealing with an 
example of ‘conflict of interest’ involving a solicitor.  
In 1433, during the reign of Henry VI, a plaintiff by the name of John (or William) 
Somerton brought an action against a solicitor whom he alleged he had retained to 
purchase or lease a manor and whom, it was further alleged, had permitted himself 
to be retained by another in respect of the same transaction (‘Somerton’s case’).93 
William Babington, the Chief Justice of Common Pleas, delivered a judgment in 
the following terms: 
                                                        
90  Brereton, above n 14, 129. 
91  Wigmore, above n 67, §2290. 
92  Seipp, above n 56. 
93  Somerton’s Case [1433] Seipp Number 1433.010. 
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if  he becomes counsel with another in this matter, I will have an action on my 
case, because he has deceived me, for he is bound to keep my counsel while 
he is retained with me; but if one shows his title deeds to a man of law, even 
though afterwards he becomes the counsel of another, and discovers counsel 
of the said title deeds, he will not have an action against him on this matter, 
inasmuch as he was not retained by him but if he discloses his counsel, and 
becomes of counsel to another to purchase this manor for him, now this is a 
deceit for which I will have an action on my case.94 
John Martin, Judge of Common Pleas said: 
the cause of action … is that defendant had disclosed his counsel, and had 
become counsel to another.95 
Despite their lack of clarity, which is perhaps more to do with the translation than 
the original reports, it is possible to discern from these reasons some recognition of 
elements necessary for the existence of legal professional privilege, namely: a 
relationship of solicitor and client (the status of which is conferred by the retainer); 
and a confidential communication between the two which ought not be disclosed 
(provided the communication is made in the course of the retainer). However, the 
case does not go so far as to evidence a protection from disclosure of such 
communication, only the consequences if such disclosure is made.96 Nor is a public 
policy dimension identified. The remedy is recognised as being a cause of action 
for deceit. One further notable element of Somerton’s case is that it may constitute 
an early (if not the first) recognition of the distinction between the role of a solicitor 
when acting in that professional capacity and when not ‘he will not have an action 
against him on this matter, inasmuch as he was not retained by him’. This simple 
point, which seems here to have been wholly accepted by the court in the context 
                                                        
94  Ibid also refer 1433.023 (http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/lawyearbooks/display.php?id=17601) and 
1433.087(http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/lawyearbooks/display.php?id=17665) being related decisions in 
this matter. 
95  Ibid. 
96  A further reported decision, from a case in 1470, may reference some concept of client confidentiality, 
but the comments of the justices are too ambiguous to lead with any certainty to such a conclusion. The 
case, in which the parties are not named, (Seipp Number 1470.003 
http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/lawyearbooks/display.php?id=20169) concerned a claim for repayment of a 
debt arising from an annuity said to be payable by the defendant to the plaintiff under a deed by which 
the plaintiff was to provide ‘counsel’ to the defendant. What is missing is some indication that the plaintiff 
was a solicitor and the ‘counsel’ he was retained to provide was in the nature of legal advice. If the 
plaintiff were a solicitor, and the advice in question legal advice, the comments made by Justice Nedeham 
as follows, suggest some acknowledgment as to the secrecy of solicitor/client communications: Nedeham 
JCP said ‘perhaps the counsel ought to have been given in such a matter that the party had not wanted to 
have discovered’.  
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of the existence or not of a cause of action for breach of confidence, was the subject 
of extensive debate well into the eighteenth century, as will be discussed below.  
It is not until the sixteenth century that recorded cases provide some proof of the 
existence of legal professional privilege, or something quite akin to it. In Berd v 
Lovelace,97 dating to 1576, the plaintiff served the defendant’s solicitor with a 
process to testify in the proceedings. Upon learning that Thomas Hawtry, the man 
the subject of the process, was the defendant’s solicitor, the Master of the Rolls held 
that he was ‘not … compelled to be deposed’ and was ‘in no danger of any 
contempt, touching the not executing of the said process’.98  
A year later, in 1577, reports indicate that in two separate decisions, the courts 
discharged and refused to admit for examination, solicitors who had been served 
with subpoenas to testify in the very matters in which they acted for a party.99 The 
rationale is not given, save that in the second case, the discharge is said to have 
been ‘by reason he was solicitor in the cause’.100 This suggests the existence of a 
rule of law, axiomatic with the existence of a retainer for the matter in question, that 
a solicitor could not be compelled to testify as a witness.  
Then, in the 1578 case of Creed v Trap,101 a Mr Colwell was served with process to 
testify but upon finding that he had been engaged as ‘Solicitor’ or ‘Counsel’ for the 
defendant in the matter, it was ‘ordered that Colwell shall not be examined upon 
any Interrogatories which shall compel him to discover any matter which came to 
his knowledge as a Solicitor or as a Councel in this case; but for any other matter it 
shall be lawful for the plaintiff to examine him’.102  
                                                        
97  Berd v Lovelace [1576-1577] Cary 62. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Austen v Vesey [1577] Cary 63; Hartford v Lee [1577-1578] Cary 63. 
100  Hartford v Lee [1577-1578] Cary 63. 
101  Creed v Trapp (1578) 121 Choyce Cases. 
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In 1579, a plaintiff sought to have a legal practitioner by the name of Master 
Oldsworth ‘examined touching a matter in variance, wherein he hath been of 
counsel’.103 It was ordered that:  
he shall not be compelled by subpoena, or otherwise, to be examined upon any 
matter concerning the same, wherein he the said Mr Oldsworth was of counsel, 
either through the indifferent choice of both parties, or with either of them by 
reason of any annuity or fee.104 
Oddly, despite the profusion of cases concerning solicitors being subpoenaed to 
give evidence in matters concerning their clients in the late sixteenth century, 
recorded decisions on the topic throughout the seventeenth century are sparse. It is 
unclear whether this is a reflection upon the reporting of the era or the acceptance 
by the profession that the question of a solicitor’s compellability in the very matters 
in which he is engaged had been settled. Having regard to the volume of reported 
cases from the nineteenth century (discussed below), the latter proposition can be 
doubted.  
Two of the 17th century decisions that touch on the issue most directly are the 1654 
case of Waldron and Ward105 and the 1676 case of Bulstod v Letchmere.106 The report 
of the former is pithy: 
In a tryal at the Bar between Waldron plaintiff, and Ward defendant, one Mr. 
Conye a counceller at the Bar was examined upon his oath to prove the death 
of Sir Thomas Conye. Whereupon Serjeant Maynard urged to have him 
examined on the other part, as a witness in some matters whereof he had been 
made privy as of counsel in the cause. But Roll Chief Justice answered, He is 
not bound to make answer for things which may disclose the secrets of his 
clients cause, and thereupon he was forborn to be examined.107 
Bulstod v Letchmere decided that a ‘counsellor at law, shall not be bound to answer 
concerning any writings which he hath seen, nor for any thing which he knoweth in 
the cause as counsellor’.108 This matter differed from those of the 16th century by 
                                                        
103  Dennis v Codrington 1579–1580 Cary 100. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Waldron v Ward [1658] Sty 449.  
106  Bulstod v Letchmere (1676) 2 Freeman 6. 
107  Waldron v Ward [1658] Sty 449, 450.  
108  Bulstod v Letchmere (1676) 2 Freeman 6, 6. 
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reason of the fact that the solicitor himself was a defendant, not a mere witness and 
the proceedings a bill for discovery for documents in his possession.  
The case is also noteworthy because it (along with the decision in Waldron and 
Ward) identifies a limitation of the doctrine, which is consistent with the 
requirement that the solicitor be acting in a professional capacity before the 
privilege is engaged: ‘but if any thing came into his knowledge before he was 
counsellor, or upon any other account, he shall … have the privilege of the bar and 
is not obliged to answer’.109 The context suggests that the word ‘not’ has been 
inserted in the incorrect place and this is indeed noted in the commentary. However, 
and more significantly, this is identified by Paul Brereton as being the first reported 
case in which the word ‘privilege’ is used.110 
It is apparent from the reported decisions that follow, that sometime between 1676 
when Bulstod v Letchmere was decided and 1712, not only had the scope of the 
privilege become fully developed, but its policy underpinnings have been largely 
expounded upon by authoritative judgments, not all of which have made their way 
down to us. 
The exposition of the policy underpinnings of the concept of litigation privilege 
was not, in this period, confined to England. The Dutch jurist Johannes Voet in his 
Commentarius ad Pandectas, published in 1698,111 gave the following justification 
for the rule prohibiting a solicitor from being a witness in a matter in which he had 
been engaged: 
An advocate or an attorney is also not a competent witness in a cause for which 
he has furnished his services in the respective capacity; whether he is called on 
behalf of the client or against him. He is at any rate not to be compelled to 
reveal things which he has ascertained from no other source than the laying 
bare of them by his client … As regards other things learned from other sources 
nothing forbids an advocate being forced to make a statement in reference to 
them against his client; lest otherwise it should be in the power of a litigant to 
                                                        
109  Ibid. 
110  Justice Brereton, above n 14, 133. 
111  Voet, Johannes and Johannes Van Der Linden, The Selective Voet Being the Commentary on the Pandects 
by Johannes Voet [1647 - 1713] and the Supplement to That Work by Johannes Van Der Linden [1756 - 
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rob his opponent of the opportunity of giving proof by adopting as his 
supporters those who have knowledge of the matter.112 
The consistency of the reasoning that can be seen between the commentaries of 
Voet and the decision in Creed v Trap113 suggest that the concept of litigation 
privilege was not merely a construct of English law – a matter borne out by Cicero 
himself.114    
Returning to England, in 1712, the case of Lloyd d Fiennes & Mignon v Lord Saye 
& Sele (‘Lord Say and Seal’s case’)115 came before the Court of Kings Bench. In it, 
a question arose as to the date upon which a certain deed was executed. The 
plaintiffs contended it was executed on the date it bore, namely, 23 October 1701. 
Lord Say and Seal contended that the deed was in fact executed five months later, 
in March 1702. To prove this, counsel for Lord Say and Seal attempted to call as 
witness an attorney engaged by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs objected: 
because as an attorney has a privilege not to be examined as to the secrets of 
his client’s cause, so the attorney’s privilege was likewise the client’s 
privilege; for the client intrusts an attorney with secrets of his cause, upon 
confidence not only that he will not, but also that though he would yet he 
should not, be admitted by the law to betray his client; and for this, Holbeche’s 
case was relied upon…116 
The Court agreed with that argument: 
The Court were of the opinion, that Holbeche’s case was good law; and that 
an attorney’s privilege was the privilege of his client; and that an attorney, 
though he would yet should not be allowed to discover the secrets of his client. 
But notwithstanding this, they thought [the solicitor’s] evidence was to be 
received; for that a thing of such a nature as the time of executing a deed could 
not be called the secret of his client, that it was a thing that he might come to 
the knowledge of without his client’s acquainting him, and was of that nature, 
that an attorney concerned, or anyone else, might inform the Court of.117 
                                                        
112  Ibid 765. Voet relevantly goes on to state: ‘It seems clearly not to be doubted that he rightfully gives 
evidence in another cause in which he is not assisting as advocate or attorney, whether it be given for or 
against one to whom he earlier furnished his professional services or is still furnishing them in a different 
transaction. He ought not to be presumed to be swayed by private feelings in a cause which he has never 
handled’. 
113  See discussion on page 34. 
114  See the quote with which this chapter is opened. 
115  Lloyd d Fiennes & Mignon v Lord Saye & Sele (1712) 10 Mod 40 (‘Lord Say and Seal’s Case’). 
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Unfortunately, as intimated above, Holbeche’s case was unreported and is not now 
available. Even the date upon which it was decided is unknown.118 By reason of this 
lacuna, it is impossible to identify with precision the point by which the doctrine 
was so developed and by which it can be said, with some degree of certainty, that 
the notion that the ‘privilege’ belonged to the client and not the attorney –– a notion 
that Wigmore considered, perhaps erroneously, persisted in fact well into the 18th 
century. 
The other case relied upon by the Court in Lord Say and Seal’s case in support of 
the proposition that an attorney’s privilege is that of the client and a thing that the 
attorney should not be allowed to disclose without the consent of a client is that of 
Lindsay v Talbot.119 A record of this case (the date of which is uncertain but must 
be earlier than 1712), exists in the compendium produced by Sir John Strange in 
1754, in the following terms:  
On a Trial at Bar the Court refused to hear the Evidence of an Attorney, of 
Matters revealed to him by his Client, and Trin. 3 George, Astrey against Alsop, 
an Attorney turned off by the Plaintiff offered to give Evidence against her; 
and Parker Chief Justice refused to hear him, and reproved him.120 
Lindsay v Talbot is also quoted and relied upon in the 1795 text, A Treatise of Equity 
on the topic of the compellability of witnesses: 
With respect to the exclusion of the testimony of counsel, &c. against their 
clients, this disqualification of the counsel, &c. is the privilege of the client, it 
being against the policy of law to permit any person to betray a secret with 
which the law has intrusted him, Lindsay v Talbot, T. 12 G.121 
Then, from amidst the missing and incomplete records of cases heard, from 1743 
comes a complete account of a State Trial between Campbell Craig, Lessee of 
James Annesley and Richard Earl of Anglesea (‘Annesley v Anglesea’).122 The trial 
was presided over by Lord Chief Baron Bowes, Baron Mountenay and Baron 
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Dawson of the Court of Exchequer in Ireland. At issue was a matter of inheritance, 
to be determined by reference to whether the late Baron of Altham (the brother of 
the Defendant), had a living son.123 In the course of the hearing, counsel for the 
Plaintiff sought to call Mr Gifford who he described in the following terms: 
Mr Gifford is an attorney of reputation in England, and as such has been twenty 
years or thereabouts employed by this noble earl [the Defendant] in his 
business, as he had occasion for him. When my unfortunate client was to be 
tried at the Old Bailey, that was the time Lord Anglesea had greatest occasion 
for this Mr Gifford; and … disclosed his intentions to him…124  
Those intentions, are said to have included the statement made by the Earl to Mr 
Gifford in respect of the Plaintiff, to the effect of ‘he would spend 10,000l. to get 
him hanged’.125  
Not surprisingly, counsel for the defendant objected to Mr Gifford being called as 
a witness in the case.  The reasoning given included the following, which is worth 
quoting at some length:126 
…formerly persons appeared in court themselves; but as business multiplied 
and became more intricate, and titles more perplexed, both the distance of 
places and the multiplicity of business, made it absolutely necessary that there 
should be a set of people who should stand in the place of the suitors, and these 
persons are called attornies. Since this has been thought necessary, all people 
and all courts have looked upon that confidence between the party and attorney 
to be so great, that it would be destructive to all business, if attornies were to 
disclose the business of their clients … Now, if an attorney was to be examined 
in every case, what man would trust an attorney with the secret of his estate, if 
he should be permitted to offer himself as a witness? If an attorney had it in his 
option to be examined, there would be an entire stop to business; nobody would 
trust an attorney with the state of his affairs.  
The reason why attornies are not to be examined to any thing relating to their 
clients or their affairs is, because it would destroy the confidence that is 
necessary to be preserved between them. 
The solicitor for the plaintiff agreed, but with certain qualifications. He relevantly 
stated: 
[T]his rule can never be extended either to a case where the matter was not 
communicated to him as a secret, in the cause wherein he was employed, or 
before he was employed as attorney in that cause; because there the client was 
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not under any necessity of disclosing the fact to him; and if it were otherwise, 
this inconvenience must happen, that no attorney could ever be witness against 
a person, if he ever happened, upon any occasion whatsoever, to be his 
attorney.127 
The debate continued between the parties on this matter for some time. In its course, 
the question arose as to whether Mr Gifford had the discretion to waive the 
privilege. At this point, Lord Say and Seal’s case was invoked as authority for the 
proposition that ‘an attorney’s privilege is the privilege of his client; and that an 
attorney, although he would, yet shall not be allowed to discover the secrets of his 
client’.128  
Eventually, and following the parties arguing ‘at large, every point arising in the 
cause, which could possibly bear the least debate’, 129 the Barons delivered their 
judgments on the issue of Mr Gifford’s compellability. The Lord Chief Baron 
relevantly stated: 
Now, admitting the policy of the law in protecting secrets disclosed by the 
client to his attorney, to be, as has been said, in favour of the client, and 
principally for his service, and that the attorney is in loco of the client, and 
therefore his trustee, does it follow from thence, that every thing said by a client 
to his attorney, falls under the same reason? I own, I think not; because there 
is not the same necessity upon the client to trust him in one case as in the other; 
and of this the Court may judge, from particulars of the conversation. Nor do I 
see any impropriety in supposing the same person to be trusted in one case as 
an attorney or agent, and in another as a common acquaintance. In the first 
instance, the Court will not permit him, though willing, to discover what came 
to his knowledge as an attorney, because it would be in breach of that trust 
which the law supposes to be necessary between him and his employer: but 
where the client talks to him at large as a friend, and not in the way of his 
profession, I think the Court is not under the same obligations to guard such 
secrets, though in the breast of an attorney.130 
His Lordship then seemed to prevaricate over whether the obligation of secrecy, if 
it arose in the context of a particular cause, ceased once that cause is ended, but 
ultimately decided that the words in question were uttered as ‘casual conversation’, 
and found that was enough to mean that there was no bar to them being disclosed.131  
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Baron Mounteney’s judgment included the following pertinent statements: 
…the law hath very justly established, an inviolable secrecy to be observed by 
attornies, in order to render it safe for clients to communicate to their attornies 
all proper instructions for the carrying out on those causes which they found 
themselves under a necessity of intrusting to their care.  
In [Lord Say and Seal’s case] the Court were of the opinion (and I think most 
rightly) that the privilege of an attorney is the privilege of his client; (and so I 
have always understood the law to be) but, notwithstanding that, the Court 
admitted the very attorney, who had been intrusted in suffering the common 
recovery, to prove that the deed to lead the uses of that very recovery was 
antedated.132  
Each of the Lord Chief Baron and Mounteney and Dawson BB agreed, despite 
recognising the existence of the privilege and its rationale, that the matter sought to 
be disclosed was a conversation between Mr Gifford and the Defendant made other 
than in the context of a secret divulged by a client to a lawyer. Rather, this was 
instead, a matter discussed between the two as acquaintanances. Mr Gifford was 
sworn and examined. He duly testified that the Defendant had spoken the impugned 
words.133  
The significance of Annesley v Anglesea to the history of the development (or 
explication) of the concept of legal professional privilege cannot be overestimated. 
Not only does it establish that, by 1743, the concept was fully formed, but also that 
it had been properly settled since at least the time of the Lord Say and Seal’s case 
in 1712, which, in turn, had affirmed the state of the concept as espoused in 
Holbeche’s case some indeterminate time before that. A number of the key modern 
qualifications to the operation of the privilege were also clearly articulated: the need 
for the solicitor to be engaged by the client; for the communication to be made in 
the context of such a professional relationship (and not merely between parties as 
acquaintanaces); and for the communication to be confidential. Even a matter that 
returned to vex some judges in the nineteenth century, namely, whether the 
privilege arose only upon a suit being on foot, was adjudged in clarion terms by 
Dawson B in his statement of reasons, in which he said: 
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If I have an apprehension that a man intends a suit against me, and I employ 
an attorney to draw a state of my case from my papers, though there is no cause 
depending, there I apprehend it would be a breach of trust to disclose the 
contents of those papers, and that the attorney ought not to be admitted to 
disclose what has been so intrusted to him.134  
One further development of the law during the course of the eighteenth century 
should be noted. In 1791, an issue arose as to whether the privilege could be 
maintained when communications passed between client and solicitor through and 
in the presence of an interpreter. In Du Barré v Livette,135 the plaintiff sought to call 
as witness a Mr Rimond who had acted as translator between the defendant and the 
defendant’s solicitor. It was hoped that the plaintiff could thereby establish an 
admission on the part of the defendant in those conversations that he had taken the 
jewels that were the subject-matter of the action. In his judgment, Lord Kenyon 
said:  
…the relation between attorney and client is as old as the law itself. It is 
absolutely necessary that the client should unbosom himself to his attorney, 
who would otherwise not know how to defend him. In a case like the present, 
it is equally necessary that an interpreter should be employed: everything said 
before that interpreter was equally in confidence as if said to the attorney when 
no interpreter was present; he was the organ through which the prisoner 
conveyed information to the attorney, and it is immaterial whether the cause 
for the defence of which the conversation passed is at an end or not, it ought 
equally to remain locked up in the bosoms of those to whom it was 
communicated.136 
This latter point, regarding the immateriality of the passing of the particular cause 
of action the subject of the communication, provides the unequivocal response to 
the matter over which the Lord Chief Baron in Annesley v Anglesea appears to have 
prevaricated.  
B The Nineteenth Century and the Benthamite Objection 
As may be expected having regard to the general improvement in the detail and 
reliability of legal reporting, the nineteenth century contains numerous examples of 
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the recognition of legal professional privilege and reflects attempts to define the 
scope of litigation privilege.  
One of the first significant cases of the nineteenth century concerning the 
development of legal professional privilege is the decision of Lord Chancellor 
Lyndhurst in Hughes v Biddulph from 1827.137 The case concerned certain letters 
passing between the defendant, her country solicitor (and general agent), Mr 
Douglas and her town solicitor, Mr Williams. The solicitors for the plaintiff argued 
that the communications were not immune from production and pointed out that Mr 
Douglas was her agent in the matters the subject of the suit as well as being her 
solicitors.138  
The Lord Chancellor held that: 
confidential communications between the Defendant and her solicitors, or 
beween the country solicitor and the town solicitor, made in their relation of 
client and solicitors, either during the cause or with reference to it, though 
previous to its commencement, ought to be protected…139 
For reasons that will shortly be discussed, this decision is of considerable 
importance to the development of the concept of litigation privilege.  
In precisely the same year as the Lord Chancellor espoused this view, a challenge 
to its jurisprudential basis, and a direct assault upon the reasoning adopted by Lord 
Kenyon in Du Barré v Livette140 emerged in the form of Jeremy Bentham’s 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence.141 In a section titled ‘The Exemption Improper’, 
Bentham rails not only against the concept of legal professional privilege, but those 
who would espouse it as being conducive to the ends of justice: 
English judges have taken care to exempt the professional members of the 
partnership from so unpleasant obligation as that of rendering services to 
justice. ‘Counsel and attorneys … ought not to be’ (say rather are not) 
‘permitted to discover the secrets of then clients, though they offer themselves 
for that purpose.’ 
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On which of the two above-mentioned grounds does the exemption rest in 
those learned bosoms? Is it that the client would sufffer so much more from 
being hurt by his lawyer’s testimony than by his own? or that a man is so much 
dearer to his advocate and his attorney, than to himself? 
The oracle has given its response:– ‘The privilege is that of the client, not of 
the attorney’… The law adviser is neither to be compelled, nor so much as 
suffered, to betray the trust thus reposed in him. Not suffered? Why not? Oh, 
because to betray a trust is treachery; and an act of treachery is an immoral 
act.142 
Sarcasm aside, it is apparent that the focal point of Bentham’s critique is his 
perception that the privilege somehow works to pervert the ends of justice by 
subverting utilitarian principles: 
If [the confidence between solicitor and client], when reposed is permitted to 
be violated, and if this be known (which, if such be the law, it will be) the 
consequence will be, that no such confidence will be reposed. Not reposed? – 
Well: and if it be not, by the supposition there is nothing to betray: let the law 
adviser say everything he has heard, everything he can have heard from his 
client, the client cannot have anything to fear from it … What, then, will be the 
consequence? That a guilty person will not in general be able to derive so much 
assistance from his law adviser, in the way of concerning a false defence, as he 
may do at present. 
Except the prevention of such pernicious confidence, of what other possible 
effect can the rule for the requisition of such evidence be productive? Either 
none at all, or of the conviction of delinquents, in some instances in which, but 
for the lights thus obtained, they would not have been convicted.143 
There is little in Bentham’s sophistry to commend itself. Not only is the argument 
advanced by Bentham (which in essence amounts to the wholesale adoption of the 
adage that ‘those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear’) completely 
inapplicable to the field of civil law, in which field the disclosure and the misuse of 
confidential information has the capacity to harm interests irrespective of 
criminality, but it also appears inconsistent with tenets of the Anglo-Australian 
criminal justice system that posits rights to legal advice, a presumption of innocence 
and due process. 
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These are perhaps the primary reasons why Bentham’s sustained polemic against 
legal professional privilege does not appear to have gained any substantial influence 
over the course of the doctrine’s development. 
In 1833, Lord Chancellor Brougham delivered a judgment that succinctly picked 
up and developed the threads of the reasoning of Dawson B in Annesley v Anglesea 
in respect of the time at which privilege arises and also identified the prevailing 
rationale for the existence of the privilege: 
The foundation of this rule is not difficult to answer. It is not (as has sometimes 
been said) on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to 
the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them 
protection, though certainly it may not be very easy to discover why a like 
privilege has been refused to others, and especially medical advisers.  
But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and 
to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men 
skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters 
affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial 
proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown 
upon his own legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man 
would not venture to consult any skilled person, or would dare only to tell his 
counsellor half his case. If the privilege were confined to communications 
connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one 
could safely adopt such precautions as might eventually render any 
proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous.144 
This is a significant judgment and one of the clearest expositions of the policy 
behind the rule to be recorded in a reported decision in this era. In the words ‘a man 
would not venture to consult any skilled person, or would dare only to tell his 
counsellor’ can be found the germ of the notion that the privilege, through the 
involvement of the attorney, may be extended to others whose skill is required to 
provide technical advice in respect of issues the subject of the case, a modern 
feature of the doctrine of litigation privilege.  
A further key foundation of the doctrine of litigation privilege can (perhaps for the 
first time) be found clearly articulated in a judgment delivered in 1835 by Sir 
Charles Pepys (then Master of the Rolls)145 in the case of Curling v Perring146. At 
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issue was the question of whether correspondence between the solicitor of the 
defendants and a third party, on a matter directly relating to the key issue in dispute 
in the proceedings –– namely, the Plaintiff's title –– was privileged. Counsel for the 
plaintiff ventured to state, in support of his application for disclosure of the 
communications, that ‘there was no case in which it had ever been held that a 
communication between a solicitor and a person who was no party to the suit was 
protected on the ground of privilege’.  
In refusing the application for disclosure of the communications, Sir Charles is 
reported to have said that:147 
the correspondence, having taken place after the dispute which was the subject 
of litigation had arisen between the parties, formed no part of the Plaintiff's 
title, and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the inspection of it. If the right of 
inspecting documents were carried to the length contended for by the Plaintiff, 
it would be impossible for a Defendant to write a letter for the purpose of 
obtaining information on the subject of the suit without the liability of having 
the materials of his defence disclosed to the adverse party. 
This is, self-evidently, a key decision in the development of the concept of litigation 
privilege. 
By 1842, despite the keen sophistry of Bentham, the circumstances in which the 
privilege (as between solicitor and client) would arise appeared beyond doubt. In 
Herring v Clobery,148 Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, after surveying the authorities, 
including the decision in Greenough v Gaskell, said: 
I therefore entertain no doubt as to the principle upon which I ought to act in 
this case with respect to [the solicitor] and I lay down this rule with reference 
to this cause, that where an attorney is employed by a client professionally, to 
transact professional business, all communications that pass between the client 
and the attorney in the course, and for the purpose, of that business, are 
privileged communications; and that the privilege is the privilege of the client 
and not of the attorney.149 
Shortly after his determination in Herring v Clobery, Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst 
was, in the matter of Steele v Stewart,150 required to rule on a question of the 
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applicability of the privilege to letters which contained communications between a 
Mr Warren, who was sent to India by the defendant at the suggestion of the 
defendant’s solicitors to collect evidence on behalf of the defendant in support of a 
defence that the ship the subject of the suit was not seaworthy, and the defendant in 
person.151 The letters in question ‘were written by [Mr Warren] to the Defendant 
and his solicitors in this country whilst he was in Calcutta, acting by the direction 
and as the agent of the Defendant’s said solicitors in procuring evidence in support 
of the action in the amended bill mentioned’.152 The content of the letters related to 
and concerned the evidence collected by Mr Warren.153  
The case constituted an appeal by the plaintiffs from an earlier decision, made in 
July 1843,154 of the Vice-Chancellor, who had refused the application for production 
of the letters. In refusing the application, the Vice-Chancellor considered the extent 
to which the circumstances of the case constituted an extension of or departure from 
the decision of the Lord Chancellor in Hughes v Biddulph. The Vice-Chancellor 
stated: 
The authorities that have been cited establish that, if the party who was sent to 
collect the evidence had been a clerk of the Defendant's solicitors, his 
communications would have been privileged. And, in my opinion, there is no 
difference in principle whether the communications are made by the clerk to a 
solicitor, or by a person whom the solicitor has employed specially as his agent 
to collect evidence on behalf of the client. I admit this is an extension of the 
rule; but it seems to me that the principle on which the Lord Chancellor acted 
in Hughes v Biddulph applies to the present case; and accordingly I think that 
the letters were written by the captain of the ship to the Defendant and his 
solicitors, relative to the evidence which the captain had collected in support 
of the action, are privileged and ought not to be produced.155  
On appeal, the Lord Chancellor concurred with the Vice-Chancellor and delivered 
a judgment in the following terms: 
When a solicitor is employed to collect evidence for his client in a pending 
suit, it is clear that his communications with his client respecting such evidence 
are privileged. But a solicitor cannot always act in his own person in the 
collection of evidence. Distance and communications may render this 
impossible. Such was the case here … [i]t was necessary therefore that the 
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solicitor should employ an agent, and whether that agent was a clerk to the 
solicitor or any other person appears to me wholly immaterial. In performing 
this duty he represented the solicitor, and his communications to the client, on 
the subject of the evidence, were the communications of the solicitor, falling 
within the same principle and entitled to and requiring the same protection.156 
The decision marks a critical juncture in the refinement of legal professional 
privilege and a milestone on the trajectory of the expansion of the doctrine. It is one 
of the earliest cases in which the concept of ‘litigation privilege’ arises. Although 
the decision in Curling v Perring157 was referred to by counsel in the course of 
argument, it does not feature in the judgment of the Lord Chancellor, the reasoning 
processes within which, are by no means transparent. It appears quite plausible to 
construe the decision as a mis-statement of the classic formulation of legal 
professional privilege per se rather than an early explanation of the litigation 
privilege distinction. This is largely due to the rather ‘loose’ characterisation of the 
role of Mr Warren in the judgments of the Vice-Chancellor and the Lord 
Chancellor. It is tolerably clear from the background contained in the report of the 
case that Mr Warren was not a legal practitioner and was not an employee of the 
solicitor in question. He was the master of the ship that had been lost and possibly 
an employee of or contractor to the defendant.158 The letters that he wrote in 
connection with the gathering of evidence were sent variously to the defendant 
himself and to the defendant’s solicitor.159 Privilege was claimed in respect of both 
categories of correspondence and upheld by the Vice-Chancellor and then the Lord 
Chancellor.  
Insofar as the correspondence was sent by Mr Warren to the defendant directly, it 
is unclear how such a communication falls within the scope of legal professional 
privilege as articulated in by the Lord Chancellor himself in Herring v Clobery. 
However, such communications would potentially be capable of being 
characterised as the subject of litigation privilege by the modern test set forth in 
section 119 of the Uniform Evidence Law, by reason of them being ‘a confidential 
communication between the client and another person … that was made … for the 
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dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services 
relating to an [Australian or overseas] proceeding, or an anticipated or pending 
[Australian or overseas] proceeding’. 
If the Lord Chancellor was, at the time of giving judgment in Steele, conscious of 
the distinction that could be drawn between legal professional privilege as it had 
(until that time) been formulated and litigation privilege as a related concept, the 
judgment gives no sign of it. It adopts an unquestioning assumption of Mr Warren 
being ‘the solicitor’s agent’160 before going on to state that ‘whether that agent was 
a clerk to the solicitor or to any other person appears to me wholly immaterial’.161 
As to his Lordship’s earlier statement of principle that ‘when a solicitor is employed 
to collect evidence for his client in a pending suit, it is clear that his communications 
with his client respecting such evidence are privileged’–– this is not a matter of 
controversy and, as his Lordship’s own reasons in Herring v Cloberry make clear, 
such privilege applies whenever a solicitor ‘is engaged or is employed by a client 
professionally, to transact professional business’.162 It is not changed by reason of 
there being litigation on foot or pending. 
For this reason, one might approach with some caution his Lordship’s concluding 
statement, namely ‘I do not … concur with [the Vice-Chancellor] in considering 
this an extension of an admitted principle. I consider the case as coming within the 
same principle on which the communication of the solicitor himself would, under 
similar circumstances, be privileged’.163 The warrant for that caution is justified by 
analysis of the next decision of relevance to the issue – ironically, that of the very 
same Vice-Chancellor in Steele’s case, Sir J. L. Knight Bruce. 
Pearse v Pearse164 was decided in December 1846. At issue was whether 
communications between a client and solicitor made prior to proceedings and 
without reference to such proceedings could be the subject of legal professional 
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privilege. Not surprisingly, during the course of argument, the Vice-Chancellor 
expressed some surprise that the issue remained alive and referred the parties back 
to the decision in Herring v Clobery.165 Nevertheless, counsel for the plaintiff 
persisted and sought to draw a distinction between the entitlement of a solicitor to 
insist on the privilege for the benefit of a client and the entitlement of a client to 
withhold from disclosure communications made to his or her attorney other than in 
contemplation of or pending a suit.166 In doing so, counsel called to aid the decision 
in Hughes v Biddulph.167 and presumably the Lord Chancellor's statement in that 
case as to privilege applying to a communication with a solicitor ‘during the cause 
or with reference to it’.168 
The Vice-Chancellor, in upholding the decision of the Lord Chancellor in Herring 
v Clobery, gave one of the most comprehensive and, indeed, stirring judgments on 
the issue of legal professional privilege and its rationale. Before quoting the Vice-
Chancellor, it is appropriate to recall the rationale of Bentham, which is 
encapsulated in the following tract: 
A counsel, solicitor, or attorney, cannot conduct the cause of his client’ (it has 
been observed) ‘if he is not fully instructed in the circumstances attending it: 
but the client’ (it is added) ‘could not give the instructions with safety, if the 
facts confided to his advocate were to be disclosed.’ Not with safety? So much 
the better … The argument employed as a reason against the compelling of 
such disclosure, is the very argument that pleads in favour of it … Expect the 
lawyer to be serious in his endeavours to extirpate the breed of dishonest 
litigants! Expect the fox-hunter first to be serious in his wishes to extirpate the 
breed of foxes.169 
The Vice-Chancellor first quoted the words of Lord Lyndhurst in Herring v 
Clobery, discussed above,170 before proceeding to state: 
This I take to be not a peculiar but a general rule of jurisprudence. The civil 
law, indeed, considered the advocate and the client so identified or bound 
together, that the advocate was, I believe, generally not allowed to be a witness 
for the client. ‘Ne patroni in causa, cui patrocinium proestiterunt, testimonium 
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dicant,’ says the Digest … An old jurist, indeed, appears to have thought that, 
by putting an advocate to the torture, he might be made a good witness for his 
client; but this seems not to have met with general approbation. Professors of 
the law probably were not disposed to encourage the dogma practically. Voet 
puts the communications between a client and an advocate on the footing of 
those between a penitent and his priest.171  
…  
The discovery and vindication and establishment of truth are main purposes 
certainly of the existence of Courts of Justice; still, for the obtaining of these 
objects; which cannot be either usefully or creditably pursued unfairly or 
gained by unfair means, not every channel is or ought to be open to them. The 
practical inefficiency of torture is not, I suppose, the most weighty objection 
to that mode of examination …. Truth, like all other good things, may be loved 
unwisely – may be pursued too keenly – may cost too much. And surely the 
meanness and the mischief of prying into a man's confidential consultations 
with his legal advisor, the general evil of inducing reserve and dissimulation, 
uneasiness, and suspicion and fear, into those communications which must 
take place, and which, unless in a condition of perfect security must take place 
uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for truth itself.172 
It is perhaps the most eloquent exposition of the jurisprudential basis for the 
doctrine which, from this point onwards, must be considered to have been fully 
formed within the English system.  
Scarcely a decade later, the position with respect to communications between 
solicitors, clients and lay witnesses also appears to have been substantially resolved. 
In Lafone v The Falkland Islands Company (No 1),173 a situation similar to that in 
Steele v Stewart had arisen. The question was whether answers to inquiries 
addressed by the defendants to their agent in the Falkland Islands by direction of 
their solicitor for the purpose of procuring evidence in support of the defendants’ 
case were protected from production. However, the facts of this case differed from 
those in Steele v Stewart. In this case, a report addressed to the defendants was 
prepared by their agent, Thomas Hevers. The report responded to a number of 
inquiries, some of which had been asked at the instigation of the defendants’ 
solicitor and others at the instigation of the defendants themselves. When the 
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plaintiff called for production of the report, disclosure was made of it, save for the 
passages that constituted responses to the solicitor’s inquiries.174 The plaintiff 
pressed for disclosure of those passages.  
Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood, in deciding that the passages were privileged 
and ought not be disclosed, provided a useful summary of the law on this point,175 
before going on to state: 
Here, as in Steele v Stewart, the matter in litigation was at a considerable 
distance, and probably it was not convenient to send one of his regular clerks 
for such a purpose. He, therefore, applies to the managing director of the 
company, describes to him the evidence he requires in support of the 
Defendants’ case, and directs him to communicate with the company’s agent 
in the Falkland Islands, and desires him to procure the evidence required and 
transmit it to England. That agent procures the requisite evidence and transmits 
it to England, and, of course, he transmits it for a purpose which will bring it 
within the rule as laid down by Lord Lynhurst in Steele v Stewart.176 
Critically, the Vice-Chancellor continues: 
It is true the solicitor does not go on to depose that it was transmitted to the 
Defendants in order to be communicated to him, otherwise the question would 
have been simply a repetition, in so many terms, of that in Steele v Stewart. 
But it is clear from the affidavit, that this was the purpose for which he directed 
the Defendants, or rather the managing director, to procure it; and that it has 
been so procured for the purpose of being communicated to the solicitor, and 
in order that it may be made use of as evidence in the cause.177 
The report the subject of the application, therefore, had not in fact been delivered 
to the solicitor. It was enough that the sections of it over which privilege was 
claimed had been intended for delivery to the defendants’ solicitor for the purpose 
of being used for evidence in the proceedings. Lafone v The Falkland Islands 
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Company would appear to be the first reported instance of the rule that would find 
its ultimate expression in that part of section 119 of the Uniform Evidence Law that 
provides privilege will inhere in a document, whether delivered or not, if the 
requisite intention is present and other criteria are met. It is another instance of the 
expansion of the doctrine.  
However, the cases thus far have not addressed communications with, or reports 
prepared by, experts. In the 1863 case of Walsham v Stainton,178 a solicitor engaged 
on behalf of the defendant sought a report from an accountant on books of the 
company of which Henry Stainton was a manager. It was alleged in the proceedings 
that Mr Stainton and other managers of the company had engaged in fraud. The 
accountant’s reports had been used by the solicitor in the preparation of pleadings 
filed in the proceedings. The plaintiffs sought production of the reports of the 
accountant.179 
Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood found that the reports of the accountant having 
been prepared at the direction of the solicitor, fell within the principle of both 
Curling v Perring and Steele v Stewart: 
Therefore, as regards the actual reports, I have no doubt whatever that they 
were prepared by the accountant qua clerk of the solicitor, and fall within the 
scope of the privilege. If this were not so a client would have to tell his solicitor 
‘Here is a heavy matter of account to be investigated; you must take care to 
have no inferences from the books put upon paper, lest they should become 
liable to production.’ That would not leave the means of free and unreserved 
communication, to which the client is entitled.180   
Despite involving expertise of an accountant, the case of Walsham v Stainton was 
not one in which expert evidence from the accountant was sought to be adduced in 
the proceedings. The early treatment of expert reports for the purposes of the 
determination of privilege claims is best illustrated through a series of English cases 
involving medical reports procured by railway companies following accidents 
occasioning personal injury.  
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In Baker v London and South Western Railway Co,181 Richard Baker, a passenger 
on a train belonging to the defendant company, sustained a serious injury as a 
consequence of an unspecified incident. The railway company sent a clerk and a 
medical officer to visit Mr Baker for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of his 
injuries and making an offer of financial compensation. The medical officer, Dr 
Vine, visited Mr Baker on 3 and 14 April 1866, examined him and prepared reports 
to the company. The company alleged that Mr Baker’s claim in negligence against 
it was satisfied for the payment of 75l. on 11 May 1866 being the date on which Mr 
Baker signed a receipt acknowledging the payment had been made. Shortly after 
that date, Mr Baker died. The proceedings were brought by executors of his estate 
for damages consequent upon the defendant’s negligence. In the course of those 
proceedings, the plaintiff sought the production of the reports prepared by Dr Vine 
and of the clerk.  
In granting access to the reports, Cockburn CJ relevantly stated: 
…when confidential communications have taken place between you and your 
agent, who has been sent to inquire and report about the subject matter of the 
litigation, you are not in general to be compelled to tell your adversary what 
the result of the inquiries may be. But when you send your agents to see and 
negotiate with the other party, whatever passes at such interviews ought to be 
made known, and the other party or those representing him, have a right to 
inspect the communications respecting them.182 
The  decision is somewhat surprising –– not least because it is nowhere made plain 
whether the content of the medical reports evidenced communications between the 
deceased and Dr Vine in the nature of, or regarding negotiations.  
A contrary conclusion was reached by the court in the 1870 case of Cossey and Wife 
v London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company.183 In that case, the 
plaintiffs claimed to have been injured when a train owned by the defendant 
collided with another train at New Cross station on 23 June 1869. On 12 July 1869, 
Mr Cossey wrote to the railway company’s secretary complaining of his injuries. 
On 23 July 1869, the railway company sent its ‘regular and permanent medical 
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officer’, Dr Maclure, to examine Mr and Mrs Cossey with a view to advising the 
company on their alleged injuries. Thereafter Mr and Mrs Cossey commenced 
proceedings against the company and sought production of the report prepared by 
Dr Maclure following the principle set down in Baker v London and South Western 
Railyway Co. The court refused and sought to distinguish the outcome of Baker in 
the following manner: 
It has been said that the effect of the decison in Baker v London and South 
Western Ry. Co. … is that, where the plaintiff has submitted to be examined 
by the medical officer of the company, there is an implied understanding that 
any reports made by him shall be produced. I cannot, however, consider that 
there is any such implied undertaking. The nature of the reports is stated in the 
affidavits which much govern our decision; and these shew that they were 
made by a person who went for the purpose of examining the plaintiffs as to 
the nature and extent of the injuries they had received and the compensation 
they had claimed, with a view to advising thereon and meeting the claim. 
Complaint had been made to the company, and the investigation took place 
with the view of compensating the plaintiffs.  I think the facts clearly bring this 
case within [the rule] which protects the party against the production of 
documents which are obtained with a view to impending litigation, and not 
within the exceptional case of Baker…184 
In fact it is not immediately clear why the same considerations should not have 
applied in Baker’s case. Nevertheless, the principle identified in Cossey is 
consistent with the contemporary approach to the upholding of claims for privilege 
in reports prepared for the purpose of use by a party in evaluating a matter in 
circumstances in which litigation was reasonably anticipated.185 
It is appropriate to give the last word on the topic of litigation privilege in the 
nineteenth century to the judgment of Jessel MR in Wheeler v Le Marchant186 
because his Honour's reasoning not only constitutes an eloquent explanation and 
restatement of the rule as it had developed in the English courts to that point (by 
way of comparison in respect of advice privilege generally), but an exposition of 
the rule that continued, until comparatively recently, to be applied to the 
determination of claims based upon the rule in courts throughout Australia.187 At 
                                                        
184  Ibid 151–152 (Bovill CJ). 
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issue in Le Marchant was whether communications between surveyors engaged by 
a client and a solicitor advising the client were the subject of privilege in 
circumstances in which, at the time they were made, litigation was not commenced 
or in contemplation.188  
Jessel MR summarised the law with respect to legal professional privilege as it 
stood at the time in the following terms: 
…The cases, no doubt, establish that such documents are protected where they 
have come into existence after litigation commenced or in contemplation, and 
when they have been made with a view to such litigation, either for the purpose 
of  obtaining advice as to such litigation, or of obtaining evidence to be used 
in such litigation, or of obtaining information which might lead to the obtaining 
of such evidence, but it has never hitherto been decided that documents are 
protected merely because they are produced by a third person in answer to an 
inquiry made by the solicitor. It does not appear to me to be necessary, either 
as a result of the principle which regulates this privilege or for the convenience 
of mankind, so to extend the rule. … [I]t must not be supposed that there is any 
principle which says that every confidential communication which it is 
necessary to make in order to carry on the ordinary business of life is 
protected.189  
Jessel MR then went on to consider whether the circumstances of the case warranted 
the extension of the privilege to circumstances in which no litigation was 
anticipated. 
But what we are asked to protect here is this. The solicitor, being consulted in 
a matter as to which no dispute has arisen, thinks he would like to know some 
further facts before giving his advice, and applies to a surveyor to tell him what 
the state of a given property is, and it is said that the information given ought 
to be protected because it is desired or required by the solicitor in order to 
enable him the better to give legal advice. It appears to me that to give such 
protection would not only extend the rule beyond what has been previously 
laid down, but beyond what necessity warrants.190 
Jessel MR's refusal to extend the privilege remained undisturbed in Australia until 
the decision in Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation,191 discussed in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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C The Early Twentieth Century 
By 1881, the law with respect to the application of legal professional privilege 
comprehending both advice privilege and litigation privilege was predominantly 
settled. The only substantive issue that remained to be determined was the extent to 
which the purpose of the confidential communication qualified or disqualified the 
communication from the application of the privilege.   
This issue was resolved (but not finally) in the 1913 case of Birmingham and 
Midland Motor Omnibus Company Limited v London and North Western Railway 
Company192 in which a party challenged the adequacy of an affidavit of discovery 
for the purposes of establishing privilege over a set of otherwise discoverable 
documents.  Buckley LJ stated: 
It is not I think necessary that the affidavit should state that the information 
was obtained solely or merely or primarily for the solicitor, if it was obtained 
for the solicitor, in the sense of being procured as materials upon which 
professional advice should be taken in proceedings pending, or threatened, or 
anticipated.193 
A different perspective was adopted by Hamilton LJ, who stated: 
To hold such documents privileged merely because it can be shewn of them, 
not untruthfully, that the principal, who made them part of the regular course 
of business and of the duties of his subordinates, foresaw and had in mind their 
utility in the case of litigation, feared, threatened, or commenced, would in my 
opinion be unsound in principle and disastrous in practice … The only 
authority cited to us for the proposition that the formula need not contain the 
statement that submission to the solicitor was the primary or the substantial 
purpose with which the document was brought into existence, and may even 
negative it, is London and Tilbury Ry Co. v. Kirk & Randall [(1884) 28 Sol. J 
688], a decision which, if correctly reported, I think is wrong.194 
Vaughan Williams LJ stated:195 
I have read the judgments of Buckley LJ and Hamilton LJ and I entirely agree 
in the result of those. Dealing with the details I would like to say I rather prefer 
the way in which Buckley LJ has put his judgment to that in which Hamilton 
LJ has put his, but I entirely agree with the result. 
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The Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the documents in question were 
privileged but that finding must be read, in light of the above judgments, as 
requiring that it must be shown that provision of the communications were made 
primarily or substantially for the purpose of provision to the solicitor for legal 
advice.  
IV The Australian Position 
It would not be for another 60 years that an Australian court, unconvinced about the 
weight of Vaughan Williams LJ’s concurrence with Buckley LJ in Birmingham and 
Midland Motor Omnibus Company, would revisit the issue with a view towards 
establishing a definitive rule by which to determine whether a communication was 
privileged on the grounds of it having been created for more than one purpose 
(namely, the obtaining of legal advice). That court was the High Court of Australia 
in Grant v Downs.196 Australia had, by this time, received the English doctrine of 
legal professional privilege in its fullest form.197 However, in their joint majority 
judgment, Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ found the issue regarding the purpose 
for which communications were brought into existence had not been conclusively 
decided (and in doing so, relied upon the fact that the decision of Hamilton LJ in 
Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Company left open the interpretation 
that a ‘sole purpose’ test should apply) in determining whether communications 
were susceptible to a claim for legal professional privilege. In order to do this, they 
characterised the nature of Vaughan Williams LJ’s concurrence in the following 
terms: 
Vaughan Williams LJ ‘rather’ preferred ‘the way in which Buckley LJ’ had 
‘put his judgment’.198 
This is a marginally selective reading of the nature of that concurrence.  
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This majority (with whom Jacobs J agreed), concluded that: 
All that we have said ... indicates that unless the law confines legal professional 
privilege to those documents which are brought into existence for the sole 
purpose of submission to legal advisers for advice or for use in legal 
proceedings the privilege will travel beyond the underlying rationale to which 
it is intended to give expression and will confer an advantage and immunity on 
a corporation which is not enjoyed by the ordinary individual. It is not right 
that the privilege can attach to documents which, quite apart from the purpose 
of submission to a solicitor, would have been brought into existence for other 
purposes in any event, and then without attracting any attendant privilege.199  
Barwick CJ, in dissent, adopted a different approach. His Honour relevantly stated 
that he was prepared to agree with Buckley LJ’s judgment in Birmingham and 
Midland Motor Omnibus Company to the extent that the latter found that the 
document must have been produced for the solicitor but not solely for the solicitor. 
Likewise, he accepted the view of Hamilton LJ to the effect that the mere fact that 
the document in question could prove useful in litigation would not qualify it as a 
privileged document. Barwick CJ concluded: 
For my part, I prefer the word ‘dominant’ to describe the relevant purpose. 
Neither ‘primary’ nor ‘substantial’, in my opinion, satisfies the true basis of 
the privilege.200 
The majority prevailed. 
However, the strictness of the sole purpose test met with criticism. In its interim 
report on evidence law in 1986, the Australian Law Reform Commission expressed 
the following view: 
It is suggested that the ‘dominant’ purpose test strikes the correct balance and 
should be adopted. It is an expression that has been used in other fields. It is a 
severe test, as it denied protection to the internal reports in Waugh’s case and 
Grant v Downs. The difference between it and the ‘sole’ purpose test is likely 
to emerge, however, in relation to communications which occur after litigation 
has been expressly threatened or commenced. A ‘dominant’ purpose test may 
be more difficult to apply than a ‘sole’ purpose test. There is, perhaps, more 
room for argument and false claims of the appropriate purpose. An 
examination of the document will often be sufficient for the ‘sole’ purpose test 
but not for the ‘dominant’ purpose test.201 
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The final Australian Law Reform Commission report into evidence law 
recommended the implementation of the recommendations of the Interim Report 
made in respect of the privilege.202 Accordingly, when it was enacted, sections 118 
and 119 of the Uniform Evidence Law adopted the ‘dominant purpose’ test. The 
ongoing disparity between this test and the position that prevailed at common law 
is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
All that then remained ultimately, and following a period of some uncertainty, was 
for it to be resolved whether the common law of Australia would be aligned with 
the test in the Uniform Evidence Law or continue with the sole purpose test arising 
from Grant v Downs. In Esso Australia Resources v Commissioner of Taxation of 
the Commonwealth of Australia,203 a majority of the High Court considered that the 
‘dominant purpose’ test should prevail. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ 
(with whom Callinan J relevantly agreed) considered that, although ‘[a]t first sight, 
sole purpose appears to be a bright-line test, easily understood and capable of ready 
application’,204 the ‘dominant purpose test should be preferred. It strikes a just 
balance, it suffices to rule out claims of the kind considered in Grant v Downs and 
Waugh, and it brings the common law of Australia into conformity with other 
common law jurisdictions’.205  
The final development of particular relevance to the history of legal professional 
privilege in Australia is the expansion of the concept of the doctrine to documents 
prepared by a third party for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal 
advice to a client other than in the context of existing or anticipated legal 
proceedings. This development is clearly contrary to the reasoning adopted in 
Wheeler v Le Marchant, in which Jessel MR considered such an approach as 
extending the rule not only ‘beyond what has been previously laid down, but beyond 
what necessity warrants’.206 Indeed, the judgment of Finn J in Pratt opens with an 
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expression of surprise that ‘the legal principle in issue can still be a matter of 
contest’.207 
The proceedings concerned whether an accounting report prepared by Price 
Waterhouse at the instigation of Pratt Holdings and for the dominant purpose of 
enabling Pratt Holdings to obtain legal advice in respect of taxation obligations 
could be the subject of legal professional privilege despite it not having been 
obtained for the purpose of anticipated or pending proceedings.  
Finn J (with whom Merkel J agreed), considered that there existed clear policy 
reasons for extending legal professional privilege to documents authored by third 
parties to enable a client to obtain such legal advice, particularly having regard to 
matters in which the client lacked the ‘aptitude, knowledge, skill and expertise, or 
resources’ to provide the solicitor with the information required to obtain legal 
advice.208  
Stone J (with whom Merkel J also agreed), considered that the rationale for the 
existence of legal professional privilege articulated by the High Court did not ‘lend 
itself to artificial’ distinctions regarding the source of assistance being provided by 
an agent or alter ego of the client on the one hand or by a third party on the other.209 
Both judges considered that the extension was warranted on the proviso that the 
company could demonstrate that the dominant purpose for the creation of the 
relevant document was the provision of legal advice.210 
The decision modified the common law by extending legal professional privilege 
to documents created by third parties for the dominant purpose of a lawyer 
providing legal advice to the client and the Uniform Evidence Law was amended to 
incorporate the extension in a new section 118(c).211  
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This is the relevant background to the development of legal professional privilege 
and the form in which it was received by the Australian legal system. From the 
single proposition that a solicitor be not compellable as a witness in respect of an 
action in which he or she has acted,212 to extension of the principle to 
communications with agents of the solicitor or client,213 to the further extension of 
the principle to third parties in the case of anticipated or pending litigation,214 the 
further extension of advice privilege to documents prepared by third parties,215 to 
the adoption of a ‘dominant purpose’ test for the application of the privilege –– the 
‘discovery’ of the common law features of legal professional privilege and, in 
particular, litigation privilege, reveal a trajectory of expansion. 
The touchstone of that expansion is perhaps captured by the following observation 
of Stone J in Pratt:  
The history of legal professional privilege shows that the courts have been 
willing to adapt the doctrine to ensure that the policy supporting the doctrine 
is not sabotaged by rigid adherence to form that does not reflect the practical 
realities surrounding the application of privilege …216 
Subsequent chapters will examine the current state of the privilege and how it is 
that the privilege, the rationale of which has now been extensively surveyed, both 
interacts and conflicts with similarly adopted principles associated with the party-
engaged expert witness. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE EXPERT AND EXPERT 
EVIDENCE 
 
And first I grant, that if matters arise in our law which concern other sciences 
or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which it 
concerns. Which is an honourable and commendable thing in our law. For 
thereby it appears that we do not despise all other sciences but our own, but we 
approve of them and encourage them as things worthy of commendation. 
Buckley v Rice-Thomas (1554)217  
I Overview 
In his 1933 lecture to the Medico-Legal Society of Melbourne, Justice Owen Dixon 
(then a puisne judge of the High Court) described what he considered to be the three 
true functions of the scientific or medical expert witness, namely: to supply the 
court with abstract or general knowledge which is necessary to enable it to 
understand the considerations which should determine its opinion upon scientific 
or medical matters involved in the issue before it; to describe the material facts of 
medical or scientific knowledge which the witness has observed; and to give the 
witness’s own inferences and opinions and the grounds upon which they proceed.218  
This much is uncontroversial. The difficulty lies in its application within the context 
of an adversarial system of justice where experts are typically engaged by parties. 
As Justice Dixon went on to state: 
Now, the object of the parties is always victory, not abstract truth. They will 
rely upon the considerations and arguments which will actually affect the 
result, and accordingly, the course they take in the conduct of a case is 
inevitably determined by their estimate of what will, in fact, influence the 
tribunal, whether judge or jury, before whom their litigation is tried.219 
Therein lies the difficulty of relying upon experts proferred by parties in an 
adversarial system.  
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Courts have made use of expert opinion for centuries and the manner of such use 
has varied. At least by the 15th century in England, it was common in certain 
categories of case for a jury of persons possessing specialist skills or experience to 
be empanelled so as to assist the court to make findings of fact. Examples of these 
juries include the ‘jury of matrons’, formed to advise a court of the pregnancy (or 
otherwise) of a woman; the jury of tradesmen, formed to advise a court of the 
quality or propriety of an impugned good; and the jury of ‘cooks and fishmongers, 
to try those accused of selling bad food’.220  
The Year Books221 include a case from the Court of Common Pleas in 1422 during 
which Serjeant-at-Law Thomas Rolf for the defendant stated that it was the law of 
the land that the issue of a woman claiming pregnancy by her deceased husband 
‘will be tried by the writ de Ventre inspiciendo, by women [a jury of matrons] by 
certain secret signs’.222 Another method, at least of a similar antiquity,223 by which 
courts traditionally received expert opinion (and a method which remains very 
much alive today), is the appointment of a ‘court expert’ or ‘assessor’.224 Such an 
expert is called by and gives testimony to the court. Although the court-appointed 
expert could be characterised as a ‘witness’, such experts are not witnesses engaged 
on behalf of or called by parties to the litigation. 
Reporting of cases involving party-engaged expert witnesses appears not to have 
become common in civil cases until at least the 1750s.225 However, Dwyer has found 
evidence of party-engaged expert witnesses being used in criminal courts of 
England by 1678.226  
This chapter considers the rise of the party-engaged expert and the historical 
features of the relationship between the party-engaged expert and the courts, in 
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order to reach an understanding of the current orthodoxy within Australian courts 
as to the reception of expert evidence. It concludes with an examination of those 
features of the expert which differentiate him or her from other categories of 
witness. It is contended that these features only serve to reinforce the exceptional 
nature of party-engaged experts within the Australian legal system and to 
underscore the problem posed by legal professional privilege when it comes into 
contact with them. 
II  The Archetype of the Unscrupulous Expert 
Despite the comparative antiquity of the concept of the party-engaged expert, 
towards the end of the twentieth century, there was something of an explosion of 
professional, academic and quasi-academic literature regarding the topic. 
In his 1991 publication, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, Peter 
W. Huber espouses the thesis that ‘[t]he pursuit of truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth has given way to reams of meaningless data, fearful 
speculation, and fantastic conjecture. Courts resound with elaborate, systematised, 
jargon-filled, serious-sounding deceptions that fully deserve the contemptuous label 
used by trial lawyers themselves: junk science.’227 Huber’s account provides scant 
detail on the history of expert testimony.228 The overriding message is that expert 
testimony was once constrained by the courts in a satisfactory manner, such that 
expert tesimony would only be received where it was ‘founded on theories, methods 
and procedures ‘generally accepted’ as valid among other scientists in the same 
field’.229 However, Huber contends that this constraint was abandoned during the 
1970s, such that ‘[m]ost courts have slouched towards what federal judge Patrick 
Higginbotham dubs the let-it-all-in approach to expert testimony’.230 
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Although Huber’s focus is jurisdictions within the United States of America, similar 
views were, at that time, being expressed across the Atlantic. 
In 1994, the English advocates’ journal Counsel editorialised as follows: 
Expert witnesses used to be genuinely independent experts. Men of 
outstanding eminence in their field. Today they are in practice hired guns: there 
is a new breed of litigation hangers on, whose main expertise is to craft reports 
which will conceal anything that might be to the disadvantage of their clients. 
The disclosure of expert reports, which originally seemed eminently sensible, 
has degenerated into a costly second tier of written advocacy. Costs of experts 
have probably risen faster than any other element of litigation costs in the last 
20 years. This deplorable development has been unwittingly encouraged by a 
generation of judges who want to pre-read experts’ reports before coming into 
court, and by practice directions stipulating that the reports be lodged in court 
to enable them to do so. What litigant can ignore an opportunity to implant his 
case in the judge’s mind before the hearing begins?231 
Lord Woolf, charged by the Lord Chancellor in 1994 with the task of reviewing and 
reporting on the current rules and procedures of the civil courts in England and 
Wales, evidently concurred, and in his interim report, after quoting the Counsel 
editorial, commented that ‘the change in the role of experts into additional 
advocates of the parties is a phenomenon well known in the United States of 
America and one which is causing real concern in Australia’.232  
There emerged from this period, a renewed focus on constraining the party-engaged 
expert. Lord Woolf’s final report states: 
…a new approach is required which emphasises experts’ impartiality. … In 
my view, clarification in the rules of court is also needed. Contributions to the 
Inquiry from experts themselves suggests that there is a degree of uncertainty 
among them as to their duties, and a perceived conflict between their 
professional responsibilities and the demands of the client who is paying their 
fee. Experts would welcome some formal recognition of their role as advisers 
to the court rather than advocates of the parties. The rules will provide that 
where an expert is preparing evidence for potential use in court proceedings, 
or is giving evidence in court, his responsibility is to help the court impartially 
on the matters within his expertise. This responsibility will override any duty 
to the client.233 
The call to clarify the rules around party-engaged experts was taken up by the 
Federal Court of Australia shortly after publication of Lord Woolf’s final report. 
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The Court sought submissions from the profession and the public regarding the 
introduction of a set of Federal Court Expert Usage Guidelines. In an article 
published in the Australian Bar Review, Justice Richard Cooper, writing extra-
judicially, explained the rationale for the step in the following terms: 
The content of the proposals is best considered against the background of the 
common law rules relating to the reception of expert eivdence and the changing 
nature of the role adopted by the experts in the litigation process. The proposals 
as formulated for consideration by the Federal Court reflect the 
recommendations of Lord Woolf in his report on the ‘Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales’. As his report acknowledges, the perceived problem in 
relation to experts and expert evidence has been receiving attention for some 
time in Australia and it was the subject of consultations between his Lordship 
and the court during the course of his inquiry. The importance of the Woolf 
Report is the confirmation that the problem he identifies is common to the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, South Africa and Australia. That 
result immediately suggests that the common law evidentiary rules and the 
adversarial approach to litigation may have some part to play in the problem.234 
A truism though it may be to cite the inherent features of common law systems as 
generating a form of tension, particularly where expert witnesses may be considered 
to owe competing duties to the court and the party that called them, there is no 
apparent lack of difficulty in accommodating expert evidence within civil law 
systems either. A recent report commissioned on behalf of the European Parliament 
made the following observation:  
A succinct comparative analysis of the different systems reveals the gulf 
between common law and Continental law countries. Fundamentally, judges 
in common law countries have a passive role in the conduct of proceedings, 
limiting themselves to an appraisal of the evidence presented to them and 
considering that it is the parties who are principally responsible for gathering 
and presenting evidence, it being in their interest to unravel what actually 
happened. In Continental law, the judge actively participates in seeking the 
truth. If this division were taken to be definitive, this would lead to a distinction 
between countries in which experts are appointed by the judge and those where 
experts are appointed and paid by the parties, and would lead to a proposal to 
harmonise only court appointed experts, as was the case with the CEPEJ best 
practices.  
In our opinion, this approach is too narrow: on the one hand, Continental law 
countries such as Spain have recently adopted provisions to limit the power of 
judges to commission expert reports by, in most cases, allowing only expert 
reports produced by the parties to be used in court; on the other hand, the 
                                                        
234  Justice RE Cooper, ‘Federal Court Expert Usage Guidelines’ (1997) 16 Australian Bar Review 203, 203–
204. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 68 
quintessential common law country, England, has increased the power of 
judges to nominate experts in the wake of Lord Woolf's reforms.235 
If accurate, the report underscores the irony of common law countries retreating 
from the use of party-engaged expert and civil law countries rushing to embrace it. 
But it is the notion that there is a problem, of comparatively recent provenance, with 
the whole concept of party-engaged experts across the common law world that is 
especially curious. Lord Woolf’s Interim Report appears to take at face value the 
lamentations appearing in the editorial of Counsel. It even goes further to infer, 
through oddly circumstantial reasoning, that the situation was worsening: 
The subject of expert witnesses has figured prominently throughout the 
consultative process … Concern was also expressed as to their failure to 
maintain their independence from the party by whom they had been instructed.  
The scale of the problem appears to have increased since the time of the Civil 
Justice Review [1988] and the Heilbron/Hodge report [1993] since experts 
were not the subject of specific recommendations in those reports.236 
A casual observer would be forgiven for thinking that the idea that there was 
something inherently problematic with expert testimony emerged for the first time 
towards the end of the twentieth century in response to a comparatively recent 
phenomenon. 
However, properly analysed, there does not seem to be much support for the notion 
that there was a ‘change in the role of experts’, as identified by Justice Cooper, or 
at all. Judicial and academic concern over the role of expert witnesses does not have 
a recent provenance.  
Certainly, at least by the late 19th century, a hundred years before the lamentations 
of Counsel and Lord Woolf, courts had grown wary of the unscrupulous use of 
party-engaged experts:  
Now I will consider the evidence on this point, but before doing so, I must say 
how the Plaintiffs contest it. They contest it by producing the evidence of some 
experts, whose evidence was met by at least as many experts on the part of the 
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Defendants. As to this, I may say what I think I have often said before, that in 
matters of opinion I very much distrust expert evidence…237 
And at the end of that century, judges were openly opining about the same issues 
regarding expert testimony that we are now confronted with, with that debate 
appropriately bookended by two papers written for the Harvard Law Review –– the 
first, by William L. Foster, written in 1897238 –– making a pragmatic case for the 
retention of the party-engaged expert process, and the second, by Learned Hand, 
written in 1901239 –– vehemently seeking its abolition. 
In order properly to consider the application of the doctrine of legal professional 
privilege to party-engaged experts, it is necessary to consider the historical advent, 
and current status of, party-engaged witnesses within the Australian legal system. 
III  Historical Adoption of Expert Testimony 
A The Early Usage 
The 1554 report of the case Buckley v Rice Thomas240 is useful not only for its 
explication of the attitude of early English courts to experts, but also for its survey 
of the uses the courts to that time had made of experts. The case concerned, inter 
alia, the meaning of the Latin term ‘licet’. In the course of his judgment, Staunford 
J stated: 
And in order to understand it truly, being a Latin word, we ought to follow the 
steps of our predecessor Judges of the law, who, when they were in doubt as 
to the meaing of any Latin words, enquired how those that were skilled in the 
study thereof took them, and pursued their construction.241  
In the same case, Saunders J made the following, oft-quoted statement: 
…if matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or faculties, we 
commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which it concerns which 
is an honourable and commendable thing in our law. For thereby it apears that 
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we do not despise all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them and 
encourage them as things worthy of commendation,242 
and usefully went on to provide examples of instances in which the law had called 
other sciences in aid and the mechanisms by which that was performed, such as 
judges in appeals of mayhem being informed by surgeons and in relation to 
pleadings concerning excommunication being informed by those well versed in 
canon law.243 
It is to be inferred that the manner in which such experts were called, and evidence 
taken, was predominantly at the behest of the court and the experts were not 
themselves engaged by the parties to the litigation. However, the use of an expert 
jury appears also to have been utilised during this period and well beyond.  
The 1761 case of Lewis v Rucker,244 concerned the appropriate measure of damage 
for an insured to recover pursuant to a policy of insurance for goods damaged during 
a sea voyage. In the course of his judgment, Lord Mansfield referred to a special 
jury that had been empanelled to hear the parties’ conflicting arguments regarding 
the proper rule of estimation for the loss: 
The special jury, (amongst whom there were many knowing and considerable 
merchants), found the defendant’s rule of estimation to be right, and gave their 
verdict for him. They understood the question very well, and knew more of the 
subject of it than any body else present; and formed their judgment from their 
own notions and experience, without much assistance from any thing that 
passed.245 
A curious feature of the decision, however, is the informality of the manner in which 
Lord Mansfield considered it appropriate to obtain for himself expertise in such 
matters:  
As I expected the other cause would be tried, I thought a good deal of the point, 
and endeavoured to get what assistance I could by conversing with some 
gentlemen of experience in adjustments. The point has now been fully argued 
at the Bar; and the more I have thought, the more I have heard upon the subject, 
the more I am convinced that the jury did right to pay no regard to [the 
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circumstances of the market at the time the goods may otherwise have been 
sold].246 
The above judgments appear not to overly concern themselves with formalities of 
admission into evidence of the ‘expertise’ in question save that by the late 18th 
century, the question of admissibility of that which is essentially ‘opinion’ evidence 
became a key question in a further case upon which Lord Mansfield was called to 
deliberate upon in the circumstances described below. 
B The Party-Engaged Expert 
By the late 18th century, the practice of party-engaged experts and the exchange of 
evidence by those experts appears to have become fully formed and used in a 
manner not disimilar to its usage today. The case was Folkes v Chad,247 the factual 
circumstances of which concerned whether a bank that had been established as a de 
facto sea-wall, had contributed to the ‘choking and filling up’ of a harbour by 
preventing back-flow.  
The plaintiff was the owner of land which had the benefit of the bank. The 
defendants were trustees for the preservation of Wells Harbour. The trustees 
considered that the presence of the bank was the cause of the deterioration of the 
harbour and proposed to cut the bank. The plaintiff commenced injunctive 
proceedings to restrain them. He also called to give evidence Mr Milne, an engineer, 
who opined that the bank was not the cause of the decay of the harbour. The plaintiff 
obtained a verdict in his favour but the defendants were subsequently granted a new 
trial on the basis that they were surprised by the evidence of Mr Milne. For the 
purposes of the new trial, directions were given to the parties ‘to print and deliver 
over to the opposite side the opinions and reasonings of the engineers whom they 
mean to produce on the next trial, so that both sides might be prepared to answer 
them’,248 the very procedure commonly adopted today in matters in which each party 
has engaged its own expert. 
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In the course of the new trial, expert evidence was proposed to be given by Mr 
Smeaton, an engineer. Mr Smeaton opined that ‘mathematically speaking, the bank 
may contribute to the mischief, but not sensibly’.249 Called to give judgment on the 
issue of an objection to the admissibility of Mr Smeaton’s evidence on the grounds 
that it was mere opinion, the reasoning adopted by Lord Mansfield has become a 
key tract in the explication of the law with respect to the admissibility of expert 
evidence. His Lordship stated: 
An instance frequently occurs in actions for unskilfully navigating ships. The 
question then depends on the evidence of those who understand such matters; 
and when questions come before me, I always send for some of the brethren of 
the Trinity House. I cannot believe that where the question is, whether a defect 
arises from a natural or an articifial cause, the opinions of men of science are 
not to be received. Hand-writing is proved every day by opinion; and for false 
evidence on such questions a man may be indicted for perjury… [t]he cause of 
the decay of the harbour is also a matter of science, and still more so, whether 
the removal of the bank can be beneficial. Of this, such men as Mr Smeaton 
alone can judge. Therefore we are of the opinion that his judgment, formed on 
facts, was very proper evidence.250 
The force of Lord Mansfield’s decision in Folkes v Chad is explained in annotations 
appearing in the report of the case, which relevantly note that: 
This may be regarded as the principal case on the admissibility of matter of 
opinion. It has been followed and confirmed in a variety of similar decisions. 
In Thornton v Royal Exchange Assurance Company, Peake, N. P. C. 25, Lord 
Kenyon admitted the evidence of a ship-builder on a case of sea-worthiness, 
though he had not been present at the survey. And in subsequent cases, his 
Lordship received the evidence of underwriters in explanation of the terms of 
a policy. The Scotch law is the same as our own on this subject. ‘Professional 
men, when examined on the subject of their art or science, are of necessity 
allowed to state their opinions, and to speak to the best of their skill and 
judgment. In homicides, the corpus delicti is, in many cases, established by no 
other evidence.’ Burnett on the Criminal Law of Scotland.251 
Contrary though to the handwriting cases referred to by Lord Mansfield, it is further 
noted that such ‘expert’ evidence was subsequently rejected in the later cases of 
Cary v Pitt,252 and in Gurney v Langlands,253 ‘in which the Judges expressed great 
doubts as to the admissibility of such evidence and, observed that, at all events, it 
was entitled to no weight, and was much too loose to be the foundation of a judicial 
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decision either by Judges or juries.’254 However it is evident that each of those cases 
turned upon the unfamiliarity of the ‘expert’ with the handwriting of the person in 
question – ‘[i]t is impossible for any person to speak to hand-writing being an 
imitation, unless he has seen the original; and it does not appear to me necessarily 
to follow that an inspector of franks has peculiar means of ascertaining imitated 
hand-writing’.255 It is clear that in each of these cases the concept of ‘expert 
evidence’ was not the subject of criticism, but rather, the party calling the ‘expert’ 
failed to establish any expertise that was relevant to the issue in question. Indeed, 
in the matter of Gurney v Langlands, the judge at first instance (Wood B) was at 
pains to draw such a distinction: 
There is no general known standard by which hand-writing can upon 
inspection only be determined to be counterfeited without some previous 
knowledge of the genuine hand-writing, the hand-writings of men being as 
various as their faces. Opinions of skilful engineers and mariners, &c. may be 
given in evidence in matters depending upon skill, viz. as to what effect an 
embankment in a particular situation may have upon a harbour, or whether a 
ship has been navigated skilfully. Because in such cases, the witness has a 
knowledge of the alleged cause, and his skill enables him to judge and form a 
belief of the effect.256 
Influential though it may have been, absent from Lord Mansfield’s reasoning in 
Folkes v Chad is a critical evaluation of the relationship between the expert and the 
party seeking to adduce his or her evidence. Even the other cases referenced above, 
that rejected the evidence of handwriting experts, did so on the tenuousness of the 
expertise, rather than the motivation of the expert.  
C The Rise of Judicial Scepticism 
By the mid-19th century, judicial scepticism regarding expert testimony becomes 
apparent in a number of reported decisions.  
In The Tracy Peerage,257 Lord Campbell said of Sir Frederick Madden, a 
handwriting witness called by the claimant in the case: 
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I dare say he is a very respectable gentleman, and did not mean to give any 
evidence that was untrue; but really this confirms the opinion I have 
entertained, that hardly any weight is to be given to the evidence of what are 
called scientific witnesses; they come with a bias on their minds to support the 
cause in which they are embarked; and it appears to me that Sir Frederick 
Madden, if he had been a witness in a cause and had been asked on a different 
occasion what he thought of this handwriting, would have given a totally 
different account of it.258 
In 1863, the Privy Council delivered judgment in the matter of Brown v Gugy.259 
The original action concerned the effect of a newly erected wharf on the 
navigability of a river and its impact on the plaintiff’s flour mill on the opposite 
bank. Thereafter, the Superior Court for the District of Quebec in Canada ordered 
that three experts be appointed to report to the Court on various technical matters 
concerning the impact of the wharf. It is evident that one of the experts was the 
nominee of the Court and each of the other experts a nominee of a party.260 The 
experts ultimately issued reports and there was a division of opinion. Lord 
Kingsdown felt the need to make the following remark in the course of judgment: 
Much of these evils is no doubt to be attributed to the parties, who seem to 
have been more anxious to indulge their feelings of hostility towards each other 
than to arrive at a cheap and speedy termination of their rights. But much must 
also be attributed to the unfortunate course adopted by the Court in directing 
the reference to Experts – a step which appears to us to have been unnecessary 
and to have led to no satisfactory result, but rather interposed difficulties in the 
way of the decision, and to have occcasioned crimination and recrimination 
amongst persons acting as Officers of the Court, little creditable to the 
administration of justice…261 
But it is the judgment of Jessel MR in Lord Abinger v Ashton262 that marks one of 
the first reported judicial critiques that engages with what might be characterised as 
the systemic difficulty posed by the concept of the party-engaged expert within the 
adversarial system. The case concerned the effect of the terms of a covenant upon 
the ability of the defendents to work contiguous mines. Expert evidence was led by 
the parties as to the extent of ventilation requirements in large mines so as to ensure 
worker safety. The critique of Jessel MR was two-fold. Firstly, that because the 
expert is a witness of opinion and not of fact, ‘although the evidence is given upon 
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oath, in point of fact the person knows he cannot be indicted for perjury, because it 
is only evidence as to a matter of opinion. So that you have not the authority of legal 
sanction’.263 However, his Honour's more pervasive criticism related not only to bias 
on the part of the expert – whether conscious or unconscious – but also to the nature 
of the witness of opinion in an adversarial context. His Honour stated: 
Expert evidence of this kind is evidence of persons who sometimes live by 
their business, but in all cases are remunerated for their evidence. An expert is 
not like an ordinary witness who hopes to get his expenses, but he is employed 
by and paid in the sense of gain, being employed by the person who calls him.  
Now it is natural that his mind, however honest he may be, should be biased in 
favour of the person employing him, and accordingly we do find such bias. I 
have known the same thing apply to other professional men, and have warned 
young counsel against that bias in advising on an ordinary case. Indoubtably 
there is a natural bias to do something serviceable for those who employ you 
and adequately remunerate you. It is very natural, and it is so effectual, that we 
constantly see persons, instead of considering themselves witnesses, rather 
consider themselves as the paid agents of the person who employs them.264  
To illustrate his point, Jessel MR referred to the example of expert valuation 
evidence: 
Suppose a person wants to sell a house, and as he wants a very high value put 
upon it, he sends to ten valuers, and out of these he selects the three who have 
put the highest value on the house. The purchaser wants a very low value, and 
selects out of a number of valuers three of the lowest. Each set of valuers values 
high or low, according to the requirements of the person who employs them. I 
have known the same sort of thing done even as regards medical evidence. The 
consequence is, you do not get fair professional opinion, but an exceptional 
opinion by evidence selected in this way.265  
These extracts are of central importance to the discussion of expert evidence and 
legal professional privilege which is the subject of the susbsequent chapters of this 
thesis. Accordingly, quite apart from the issue of bias on the part of party-engaged 
experts, it is convenient to refer to Jessel MR's identification of the tendency of 
parties only to call experts who are supportive of their case, as ‘the paradigm of 
expert exceptionalism’, commonly manifested in the practice of ‘expert 
shopping’.266  
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Four years after delivering judgment in Lord Abinger v Ashton, Jessel MR delivered 
judgment in Thorn v Worthing Skating Rink Company,267 the subject matter of which 
concerned an alleged patent infringement. His Honour repeated his critique, but in 
these terms: 
[A]s usual, the evidence of experts on the one side and on the other, and, as 
usual, the experts do not agree in their opinion. There is no reason why they 
should. As I have often said since I have had the honour of a seat on this Bench, 
the opinion of an expert may be honestly obtained, and it may be quite different 
from the opinion of another expert also honestly obtained. But the mode in 
which the expert evidence is obtained is such as not to give the fair result of 
scientific opinion to the Court. A man may go, and does sometimes, to half-a 
dozen experts … I was told in one case, where a person wanted a certain thing 
done, that they went to sixty-eight people before they found one. I was told 
that by the solicitor in the cause. That is an extreme example case no doubt, 
but it may be done and therefore I have always the greatest possible distrust of 
scientific evidence of this kind, not only because it is universally contradictory, 
and the mode of its selection makes it necessarily contradictory, but because I 
know of the way in which it is obtained... 268 
Interestingly, his Lordship did not stop there, but in a prefigurement of the academic 
debates that would circulate around the end of the 19th century, went on to postulate 
why it is that the Court, when faced with conflicting party-led expert evidence, does 
not appoint an expert of its own. His Honour stated: 
First of all the Court has to find an unbiased expert. That is very difficult. The 
Court does not know how many of these experts have been consulted by the 
parties, either in the case of this particular patent or of a similar patent. It may 
turn out that a particular expert has been largely employed by the particular 
solicitor on the one side or the other in the case, and it is so extremely difficult 
to find a really unbiased expert and a man who has no preconceived opinion or 
prejudice, that I have, hitherto abstained from exercising the power which, no 
doubt, the Court has of selecting an expert to give evidence before the Court.269  
The complaints of Jessel MR were not unique to the English experience. In the 1899 
case of Mary A. Keegan v Minneapolis & St Louis Railroad Company,270 Mitchell J 
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota remarked that: 
From this general outline of evidence, it is apparent that much of the expert 
testimony as to the origin of the disease, and as to the particular way by which, 
if at all, the injury produces articular rheumatism, consists, not of demonstrated 
or discovered facts, but mainly of mere theory or opinion, approaching very 
nearly to mere speculation... Experts are nowadays often the mere paid 
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advocates of partisans of those who employ and pay them, as much so as the 
attorneys who conduct the suit. There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd 
on its face, that cannot now be proved by some so-called ‘experts’... This evil 
has become so great in the administration of justice as to attract the serious 
consideration of courts and legislatures. 271  
The language is striking in its similarity to that used almost a century later in the 
Counsel editorial relied upon by Lord Woolf as a catalyst for reform. And the debate 
about the appropriate uses of expert evidence and the dangers of the party-engaged 
expert was, at the end of the 19th century, taken up by prominent jurists across the 
Atlantic outside of the courtroom.  
D The Tracts of Warring Judges 
On 22 May 1897, William L Foster delivered an address to the New Hampshire 
Medical Society. The substance of the address was subsequently published in the 
Harvard Law Review.272 After a brief survey of recent judgments that were scathing 
of expert testimony, Foster made the following observation:273 
This ‘bias’, or inclination in favor of the party by whom the witness is 
employed, is probably the most frequent complaint of all against the expert 
witness; and the inclination or partiality is often characterized by terms 
indicating dishonesty and corruption; but it is my belief, resulting from the 
observation and experience of many years, that there are few instances in 
which a scientific witness permits himself to testify or to be engaged on a side 
contrary to his convictions derived from a careful examination of the case. 
It is not unnatural that a man of strong conviction (at the same time honest and 
unpurchasable) should become the earnest advocate of his theory, and the 
zealous assistant of the attorney in preparing, and to some extent conducting 
his case in court; and the attorney does well to secure his testimony and service 
(and would be negligent and wanting in fidelity to his client if he did not) by 
suitable recognition of his value to him and his cause… 
Thus it may well be, as Foster goes on to state, that ‘the bias of the expert witness 
may not always be incidental to his calling or profession, but a purely scientific 
bias, due to some peculiar view of theory’.274 Accordingly, without misconduct, a 
solicitor will be drawn to a prominent expert who adheres to a scientific opinion 
which is consistent with an outcome in litigation desired by the solicitor’s client – 
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to the exclusion of other perhaps equally prominent experts who espouse a different 
scientific opinion. This is a key feature of the confluence of thought and agenda that 
lies at the heart of the 'the paradigm of expert exceptionalism' described by Jessel 
MR. 
But is there anything inherently problematic with this situation? The common law 
approach to the determination of litigated issues is based upon an adversarial system 
of fact-finding. After a brief survey of the manner in which expert evidence is called 
in civil law countries (judge-appointed in most cases in which the parties do not 
agree on the identity of the expert)275 and proposals by other theorists calling for the 
removal of all experts from testimony and placing them in the realm of arbitration 
– to decide competing issues for the court276 – Foster concludes his address by 
favouring the current approach, even allowing for its flaws. This is not only because 
it allows the parties to select their own witnesses (which his Honour asserts to be a 
constitutional right)277 but also because, in his view, the well-defined rules of 
practice in America, and broad latitude given for examination and cross-
examination, best equips judges and juries to decide between competing evidence 
given by experts.278 He concludes with the words: 
Finally, my belief is, that the supposed evils of the present system are much 
exaggerated, and to a great extent imaginary that they are not to be cured by 
any remedy that has been or seems likely to be deivsed, and that, on the whole, 
it is best to ‘let well enough alone’.279  
The pragmatic approach of Foster finds its counterpoint in the writings of the 
famous jurist, Learned Hand. In a paper titled ‘Historical and Practical 
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony’,280 published four years after Foster’s 
piece, and in the same journal, titled Learned Hand provides an historical overview 
of the development of expert testimony before turning to the central elements of his 
thesis, namely, that the party-engaged expert is an anomaly from which serious 
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practical difficulties arise.281 As to the anomalous nature of the party-engaged expert 
witness, Learned Hand considers that this arises from the very nature of expert 
testimony and the fact that it consists of evidence of opinion, going on to assert that 
it is the giving of evidence of opinion that usurps the role of judge and jury as triers 
of fact by, as it were, presenting the relevant conclusion.282  
That which did not particularly trouble William Foster, Learned Hand could not 
abide: 
There can be, in my opinion, no legal anomaly which does not work evil, 
because, forging an illogical precedent, it becomes the mother of other 
anomalies and breeds chaos in theory and finally litigation. 
… 
That the present position is not satisfactory to any one will, I believe, be 
admitted. True it is that some are found hardy enough to support it [here 
Learned Hand expressly references Foster’s address] but there are not many, 
and the criticism comes with great unanimity.283 
Learned Hand raises two serious objections with expert testimony: ‘[first] that the 
expert becomes a hired champion of one side; second that he is the subject of 
examination and cross-examination and of contradiction by other experts’.284  The 
first objection can readily be understood. The basis of the second objection is not 
immediately clear. The essence of the argument though appears to be that the effect 
of cross-examination of an expert witness differs from the effect of cross-
examination of the lay witness. Learned Hand sees the difficulty as lying ‘in the 
logical fulfilment of the expert’s position, as witness and not as adviser of the jury’, 
with the result that ‘the ordinary means successful to aid the jury in getting at the 
facts, aid, instead of that, in confusing them’.285 The argument is, in effect, that juries 
cannot be competent to decide questions of science or other fields of expertise in 
the face of contradictory evidence between experts in such fields – ‘how can the 
jury judge between two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly 
foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such a task 
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that the expert is necessary at all’.286 In Learned Hand’s view, the very fact of 
contradictory expert evidence renders the jury incompetent as a tribunal of fact.287 
Rather peremptorily, the conclusion expressed is that a board of experts or a single 
expert exercising the role of an advisor – or assessor – to the jury. However, the 
details of how such a board or assessor would be appointed are not discussed and 
are left to others to identify.288 
The general difficulty with Learned Hand’s analysis is that it does not advance 
beyond a style of a priori reasoning which considers differences of opinion between 
experts to be incapable of evaluation by non-experts. In circumstances in which 
experts are required to identify the material their opinions are based upon, expose 
their reasoning processes and be subjected to cross-examination, such an approach 
does not appear to be entirely justifiable. It is also curious that Learned Hand, 
despite having obviously read the address of William Foster,289 did not engage with 
any of the practical difficulties identified by him.  
There was no revolution along the lines espoused by Learned Hand. The existing 
system persisted in America and in England. Eighty-seven years after the decision 
of Mitchell J in Keegan v Minneapolis & St Louis Railroad, the same remarks were 
quoted by the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit in Chaulk v 
Volkswagen as evidencing ‘the age-old problem of expert witnesses’.290   
And in 1947, it was written in the English journal Modern Law Review: 
…since no very stringent tests are applied in assessing the amount of scientific 
or technical qualifications required to enable a man to set himself up before the 
Court as an expert, the parties are encouraged to search for experts who support 
their case. Frequently diametrically opposed expert opinions are propounded 
at the hearing. Experts tend by experience in English Courts to be biased in 
favour of the side which called them, took a proof of their evidence and is 
paying their ‘expenses’,291 
                                                        
286  Ibid 54. 
287  Ibid 55. 
288  Ibid 56, 58. 
289  See note 283 above. 
290  Chaulk v Volkswagen of America & Anor (1986) P11 CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. 248, [18]. 
291  HA Hammelmann, ‘Expert Evidence’ (1947) 10 Modern Law Review 82, 84. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 81 
thus suggesting a continuity of judicial and academic scepticism towards the party-
engaged expert witness that tends to contradict any latent nostalgia exhibited at the 
end of the 20th century regarding the demise of the ‘honourable expert’. 
E Towards a Modern Orthodoxy 
On 1 November 1951, the steamship Wagon Mound was berthed at Mort’s Bay in 
Balmain, Sydney Harbour and being supplied with oil when a fire broke out and 
was transmitted by oil floating on the surface of water in the vicinity, thereby 
severely damaging a number of other ships.292 The owners of the damaged ships 
commenced proceedings against the owner of Wagon Mound, seeking damages 
arising from, amongst other things, the negligence of the latter. 
The judge at first insance, Walsh J, was presented with evidence from a number of 
scientists regarding the reasonable foreseeability of fire damage caused by the 
presence of oil on the surface of water. His Honour did not find the evidence to be 
of much assistance because, to the extent that there were conflicts between the 
evidence given by such scientists, ‘they were upon points about which no definite 
knowledge or opinion would have been expected in the mind of a practical man’293 
–– being the touchstone upon which reasonable foreseeability was to be ascertained. 
However, it is his Honour’s casual remarks about expert evidence that indicate the 
extent to which judicial attitudes toward party-called experts had become ingrained 
in this country by that time. His Honour said: 
Professor Hunter, Mr Parker and Mr Tuddenham called for the defendant, and 
Professor Kirov for the plaintiffs, are all learned and intelligent men, and I have 
no doubt that they gave their evidence honestly, although affected in greater or 
less degree by the kind of unconscious bias which is a well-known 
characteristic of expert evidence…294 
Despite the undesirable features of party-engaged expert testimony being a more or 
less constant feature of judicial complaint since at least the mid-eighteenth century, 
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deliberate attempts made positively to circumscribe the role of the party-engaged 
expert do not appear to have become prevalent until the 1980s.  
In Whitehouse v Jordan,295 a case concerning medical negligence, Lord Wilberforce 
concluded his judgment with these words:296 
One final word. I have to say that I feel some concern as to the manner 
in which part of the expert evidence called for the plaintiff came to be 
organised... While some degree of consultation between experts and legal 
advisers is entirely proper, it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the 
court should be, and should be seen to be, the independent product of the 
expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation. To 
the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only incorrect but self 
defeating. 
A starkly different view appears to have been advanced in the 1987 case of Polivitte 
Limited v Commercial Union Assurance Co PLC,297 in which Garland J of the 
Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of England, made the following 
remarks: 
I have almost considered the role of an expert to be two-fold: first to advance 
the case of the party calling him, so far as it can properly be advanced on the 
basis of information available to the expert in the professional exercise of his 
skill and experience; and secondly, to assist the Court, which does not possess 
the relevant skill and experience, in determining where the truth lies…298 
The notion that part of the orthodox role of the party-engaged expert is to advance 
the case of that party not only contradicts the words of Lord Wilberforce in 
Whitehouse v Jordan but was, inferentially, wholly repudiated in the later case of 
‘The Ikarian Reefer’.299   
The Ikarian Reefer concerned the issue of whether the eponymous vessel was 
deliberately set alight and run aground in order to receive proceeds of an insurance 
policy or whether the cause of the fire was accidental.300 Not unexpectedly in these 
circumstances, expert evidence as to the cause of the fire was a significant feature 
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of the litigation. Cresswell J, apparently exasperated by the manner in which expert 
evidence was adduced in the course of the trial and hearing, said: 
I will refer to some of the duties and responsibilities of experts in civil cases 
because I consider that a misunderstanding on the part of certain of the expert 
witnesses as to their duties and responsibilities contributed to the length of the 
trial. 301 
Cresswell J then laid out a number of duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses 
as he saw them.302 These have since become highly influential not only in England 
but in Australia. In summary, these were:303  
1.  expert evidence presented to the Court should both be and be 
seen to be the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced 
as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation;  
2.  expert witnesses should provide independent assistance to the 
Court by way of unbiased opinion in relation to matters within 
their expertise;  
3.  expert witnesses should state the facts or assumptions upon 
which their opinion is based and should not omit to consider 
material facts which could detract from their concluded opinion;  
4.  expert witnesses should make it clear when a particular question 
or issue falls outside their expertise;  
5.  if an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because the 
expert considers that insufficient data is available, then this must 
be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a 
provisional one and in cases where the expert who has prepared 
a report cannot assert that the report contains the truth, the whole 
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truth and nothing but the truth without some qualification, the 
qualification must be stated in the report;  
6.  if after exchange of reports, an expert changes his or her view 
on a material matter having read the other side’s report or for 
any other reason, such change of view should be communicated 
to the other side without delay and where appropriate, to the 
Court;  
7.  where the expert evidence refers to photographs, plans, 
calculations, analyses, measurements, survey reports or other 
similar documents, these must be provided to the oppposite 
party at the same time as the exchange of reports.  
Curiously, and despite contradicting the first duty of the expert identified by 
Cresswell J, his Honour identified Garland J’s decision in Polivitte as the basis for 
the second enumerated duty.304 This presumably was only intended to be a reference 
to that part of Garland J’s decision that said: ‘and secondly, to assist the Court, 
which does not possess the relevant skill and experience, in determining where the 
truth lies’, because Cresswell J took the trouble expressly to add to the formulation 
of that second duty, the words ‘[a]n expert witness in the High Court should never 
assume the role of an advocate’ which is inconsistent with the first part of Garland 
J’s decision, namely ‘to advance the case of the party calling him…’.305 
F The Rise of the Codes 
Cresswell J’s decision has been influential. The duties and responsibilities of 
experts identified by his Honour have come to form, in large part, the backbone of 
all expert codes of conduct now published by superior courts in common law 
jurisdictions throughout Australia. The categories set forth in the decision of 
Cresswell J are not only referenced, but wholly extracted by Justice Cooper in the 
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article referenced above ‘Federal Court Expert Usage Guidelines’ concerning the 
proposed implementation of expert guidelines in that Court.306  
As intimated in Justice Cooper’s work, the Australian Federal Court was one of the 
first jurisdictions in Australia to introduce guidelines for expert witnesses. The 
‘Guidelines for Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia’ 
were first published in 1998307 (‘Initial Federal Court Guidelines’) and include the 
following: 
General Duty to the Court 
An expert witness has an overriding duty to assist the Court on matters relevant 
to the expert’s area of expertise. 
An expert witness is not an advocate for a party. 
An expert witness’s paramount duty is to the Court and not the person retaining 
the expert. 
The Form of the Expert Evidence 
… 
All assumptions made by the expert should be clearly and fully stated. 
… 
The expert should give reasons for each opinion. 
At the end of the report the expert should declare that ‘[the expert] has made 
all inquiries which [the expert] believes are desirable and appropriate and that 
no matters of significance which [the expert] regards as relevant have, to [the 
expert’s] knowledge, been withheld from the Court’. 
There should be attached to the report, or summarised in it, the following: 
(i)  all instructions (original and supplementary and whether in writing or 
oral) given to the expert which define the scope of the report; 
(ii)  the facts, matters and assumptions upon which the report proceeds; and 
(iii)  the documents and other materials which the expert has been instructed 
to consider. 
If, after exchange of reports or at any other stage, an expert witness changes 
his or her view on a material matter, having read another expert’s report or for 
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any other reason, the change of view should be communicated in writing 
(through legal representatives) without delay to each party to whom the expert 
witness’s report has been provided and, where appropriate, to the Court. 
If an expert’s opinion is not fully researched because the expert considers that 
insufficient data is available, or for any other reason, this must be stated with 
an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one. Where an 
expert witness who has prepared a report believes that it may be incomplete or 
inaccurate without some qualification, the qualification must be stated in the 
report… 
The Initial Federal Court Guidelines are clearly based upon, to a very large extent, 
the duties of an expert witness identified by Cresswell J in The Ikarian Reefer.308 
They have also largely formed the basis of corresponding expert witness guidelines 
adopted throughout the various Australian states, territories and in other tribunals 
of federal jurisdiction.309 
Similarly, in 2001, the Australian Federal Court Rules were reformulated to  
contain the following statement intended to complement the Initial Federal Court 
Guidelines: 
Duty to Court and form of expert evidence 
For an expert's duty to the Court and for the form of expert evidence, an expert 
witness should be guided by the Federal Court practice direction guidelines for 
expert witnesses. 
Note: While not intended to address all aspects of an expert's duties, the key 
points in the guidelines are: 
- an expert witness has a duty to assist the Court on matters relevant to the 
expert's area of expertise 
- an expert witness is not an advocate for a party 
- the overriding duty of an expert witness is to the Court and not to the 
person retaining the expert 
- if expert witnesses confer at the direction of the Court it would be 
improper for an expert to be given or to accept instructions not to reach 
agreement.310 
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However, neither the revised Federal Court Rules nor the Initial Federal Court 
Guidelines (or subsequent revisions thereto for that matter) adopt the proposition 
contained in the proposal referered to in Justice Cooper’s paper on the proposed 
expert usage guidelines, namely, the proposal that ‘[o]nce an expert has been 
instructed to prepare a report for the use of a court, any communication between the 
expert and the client or his/her advisers should no longer be the subject of legal 
privilege’.311 This is a matter discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
The introduction of the Initial Federal Court Guidelines and the adoption of 
corresponding guidelines by other courts and tribunals throughout Australia and in 
the United Kingdom312 marks the end of any period of uncertainty as to the proper 
role and the responsibilities of a party-engaged expert. Despite this, for the reasons 
set out in Chapter 4, notwithstanding the apparent clarity of the guidelines and codes 
of conduct and the uniformity of their application, they have clearly failed to prove 
to be a panacea to the issue of expert witness bias. Nevertheless, the expert witness 
guidelines and codes of conduct are among the most tangible legacy of the Lord 
Woolf reports and the late 20th century’s renewed focus upon case management and 
the problems associated with party-engaged experts. 
IV The Current Position in Australia 
Putting to one side guidelines and rules regarding the giving of expert evidence in 
Australia's various jurisdictions, the criteria for admissibility of expert evidence 
generally falls to be determined by reference either to common law rules or to the 
position under the Uniform Evidence Law, depending upon the forum in which the 
evidence is adduced. 
A Admissibility of expert evidence at common law 
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At common law, Ian Freckelton has identified five ‘rules of expert evidence’ 
governing admissibility, namely: the expertise rule; the area of expertise rule; the 
common knowledge rule; the basis rule and the ultimate issue rule.313  
In order to satisfy the ‘expertise rule’, a person must qualify as an ‘expert’. In 
Galvin v Murray,314 Murphy J of the Supreme Court of Ireland said that generally, 
‘an expert may be defined as a person whose qualifications or expertise give an 
added authority to opinions or statements given or made by him within the area of 
his expertise’.315 In order to satisfy the ‘area of expertise rule’ and not fall foul of 
the ‘common knowledge rule’, such area of expertise must be ‘sufficiently 
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or 
experience’316 and must, although there remain areas of controversy on this point,317 
not fall within the scope of that ‘which may be competently approached or dealt 
with by the … judge or jury’.318  
The ‘basis rule’ has been identified by the plurality in Dasreef v Hawchar319 as ‘a 
rule by which opinion evidence is to be excluded unless the factual bases upon 
which the opinion is proffered are established by other evidence’.320 In the same 
judgment, the plurality refused to make a finding as to whether such a rule formed 
part of the Australian common law.321 The status of a ‘basis rule’ at common law 
remains the subject of some controversy, particularly in light of the fact that Heydon 
J in Dasreef delivered a dissenting judgment that categorically asserts the 
persistence of a ‘basis rule’ (which his Honour characterised as being more aptly 
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described as a ‘proof of assumption rule’) at common law.322 This controversy is 
further discussed later in this chapter. 
The final rule identified by Freckelton is the ‘ultimate issue rule’, the basic effect 
of which is to exclude an expert witness from giving evidence about that which is 
the ‘ultimate issue’ in the case, lest the expert be inappropriately substituted for the 
trier of fact.323 As Freckelton notes, that rule has been abolished under the Uniform 
Evidence Law and in certain other fora, but may be said to persist in certain 
jurisdictions in which the common law governs the criteria for admissibility of 
expert evidence.324 
B Admissibility of expert evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law  
Under the Uniform Evidence Law, admissibility of expert evidence is governed by 
the interaction between sections 76(1) and 79(1). Section 76(1) of the Uniform 
Evidence Law (‘the opinion rule’) relevantly states: 
Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about 
which the existence of which the opinion was expressed. 
Section 79(1) of the Uniform Evidence Law (‘the expert exception’) operates as an 
exception to the opinion rule. It relevantly states: 
If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person's training, study or 
experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that 
person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. 
Makita (Australia) Pty Limited v Sprowles325 has, since the introduction of the 
Uniform Evidence Law, been a leading authority within Australia for determining 
the admissibility of evidence given by an expert pursuant to that legislation. The 
case concerned a claim for damages in negligence by the plaintiff at first instance 
and respondent on appeal, Ms Sprowles, who slipped and fell down a flight of stairs 
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at her place of employment. A significant portion of the hearing was devoted to 
expert testimony regarding the slipperiness of surfaces in question and 
corresponding issues of safety. That expert testimony was of particular significance 
to the outcome of the hearing because but for it, the court considered that a 
conclusion that the stairs in question were not slippery would have been 
inevitable.326  
After a lengthy survey of caselaw from Australia and the United Kingdom, 
including reciting the duties propounded by Cresswell J in The Ikerian Reefer, and 
the wording of section 79 of the Uniform Evidence Law, which had since been 
enacted, Heydon JA set out the following criteria for the admissibility of expert 
evidence: 
In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it 
must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of ‘specialised knowledge’; 
there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness 
demonstrates that by reason of the specified training, study or experience, the 
witness has become an expert; the opinion proferred must be ‘wholly or 
substantially based on the witness’s expert knowledge’; so far as the opinion 
is based on facts ‘observed’ by the expert, they must be identified and 
admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on 
‘assumed’ or ‘accepted’ facts, they must be identified and proved in some other 
way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a 
proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration 
or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions 
reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of 
‘specialised knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, 
study or experience’, and on which the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially 
based’, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion 
propounded.327  
Heydon JA concluded by explaining that the consequence of a failure to make the 
above matters explicit would be that ‘it is not possible to be sure whether the 
opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert’s specialised knowledge’ and 
hence ‘the evidence is strictly speaking, not admissible, and, so far as it is 
admissible, of diminished weight’.328 It is particularly noteworthy that Heydon J’s 
judgment emphasises the criticality of the expert explaining how his or her 
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specialised knowledge ‘applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce 
the opinion propounded’.  
Despite some notable exceptions in which the criteria have been viewed as a 
‘counsel of perfection’,329 Heydon JA’s formulation for the admissibility of expert 
evidence in Makita was widely followed330 until the operation of section 79 of the 
Uniform Evidence Law was further clarified in the 2011 decision of the High Court 
in Dasreef.331  
As intimated above in the discussion of the rules of admissibility of expert evidence 
at common law, Dasreef has laid bare, without resolving, some controversies within 
this area. There is undoubtably some overlap between the position in respect of 
admissibility at common law and under the Uniform Evidence Law. For example, 
in HG v The Queen,332 Gaudron J (with whom Gummow J agreed)333 stated: 
The position at common law is that, if relevant, expert or opinion evidence is 
admissible with respect to matters about which ordinary persons are unable ‘to 
form a sound judgment … without the assistance of [those] possessing special 
knowledge or experience … which is sufficiently organised or recognised to 
be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.334 There is no 
reason to think that the expression ‘specialised knowledge’ gives rise to a test 
which is in any respect narrower or more restrictive than the position at 
common law.335     
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However, in light of the decision of the plurality in Dasreef, care must be taken not 
to unnecessarily import concepts applicable to the common law into the 
interpretation of the Uniform Evidence Law. 
At issue in Dasreef, was the admissibility of expert evidence given by a Dr Basden 
regarding the amount of silica to which Mr Hawchar had been exposed in the course 
of his employment. A majority of the judges of the High Court made the following 
statement, which must now be taken as the authoritative pronouncement as to the 
rule regarding admissibility of expert evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law in 
Australia: 
It should be unnecessary, but it is none the less important, to emphasise that 
what was said by Gleeson CJ in HG (and later by Heydon JA in the Court of 
Appeal in Makita (Australia) Pty Limited v Sprowles) is to be read with one 
basic proposition at the forefront of consideration. The admissibility of opinion 
evidence is to be determined by the application of the requirements of the 
Evidence Act rather than by any attempt to parse and analyse particular 
statements in decided cases divorced from the context in which those 
statements were made. Accepting that to be so, it remains useful to record that 
it is ordinarily the case, as Heydon JA said in Makita, that ‘the expert’s 
evidence must explain how the field of “specialised knowledge” in which the 
witness is expert by reason of “training, study or experience”, and on which 
the opinion is “wholly or substantially based”, applies to the facts assumed or 
observed so as to produce the opinion propounded’. The way in which s79(1) 
is drafted necessarily makes the description of these requirements very long. 
But that is not to say that the requirements cannot be met in many, perhaps 
most, cases very quickly and easily.336 
In Dasreef, Dr Basden’s evidence as to the numerical or quantitative level of Mr 
Hawchar’s exposure to silica dust was not demonstrated to have been based (wholly 
or substantially) upon any specialised knowledge acquired by Dr Basden through 
training, study or experience and was consequently found not to be admissible as 
expert evidence for the purposes of section 79 of the Uniform Evidence Law.  
The manner in which the plurality in Dasreef recast the judgment of Heydon JA in 
Makita has since been characterised by Simpson JA in the New South Wales Court 
of Criminal Appeal in the following terms: 
The plurality in Dasreef refined Heydon JA’s seven admissibility criteria in 
Makita to two: 
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- that the witness who gives the evidence ‘has specialised knowledge based 
on the person’s training, study or experience’; and 
- that the opinion expressed in the evidence by the witness ‘is wholly or 
substantially based on that knowledge’. 
The plurality added (citing [85] of Makita) that: 
‘ordinarily … “the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of 
“specialised knowledge” in which the witness is expert by reason of 
“training, study, or experience”, and on which the opinion is “wholly or 
substantially based”, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to 
produce the opinion propounded.’ 
This, it appears to me, states a third criterion of admissibility.337 
It is that ‘third criterion’ as recognised by Simpson JA, that appears in fact to 
resemble a form of ‘basis rule’, although the plurality in Dasreef was not 
prescriptive as to its manner of application and considered that, depending upon the 
circumstances of the case, it may require ‘little explicit articulation or amplification 
once the witness has described his or her qualifications and experience, and has 
identified the subject matter about which the opinion is proffered’.338 As Kumar has 
pointed out, that which was particularly important to Heydon J in his dissenting 
judgment, namely, a need ‘for the expert to “state the criteria necessary to enable 
the trier of fact to evaluate that the expert’s conclusions are valid”’339 is not the focus 
of the plurality’s judgment. The focus of the latter was, rather, upon the giving by 
the expert of ‘evidence of training, study or experience to provide a connection to 
their opinion’ and ‘not for the purpose of validating the expert’s conclusions’.340  
The dissenting judgment of Heydon J in Dasreef represents something of a 
sustained defence of the need, as a matter of practicality as much as principle, for 
the maintenance of a ‘basis rule’ both at common law and under the Uniform 
Evidence Law. A key element of his Honour’s argument is based upon his belief 
that the ‘basis rule’ operates so as to expose as irrelevant, expert opinion based upon 
assumptions that are not themselves the subject of ‘primary evidence’341 and to 
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overcome the situation in which an opposing party is ‘left to find out about the 
expert’s thinking for the first time in cross-exmaintion’.342   
It is contended that the absence of clear authority on this point only serves to 
heighten the importance of providing parties with the means of evaluating the 
validity of an expert’s conclusions by reference to the information with which the 
expert was briefed and which may not adequately be exposed in the reports of that 
expert served on those parties. It is this information that may under the current 
orthodoxy, be subject to legal professional privilege and not amenable to disclosure. 
This issue is further explored in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  
This constitutes the relevant background to the reception of expert evidence in the 
Australian legal system and the identification of a number of the key criteria 
regarding the admissibility of such evidence that will be further examined in the 
context of the operation of legal professional privilege in connection with 
communications with experts.  
It is apparent that, putting aside any lingering disparities between the tests for 
admissibility of expert evidence between the Uniform Evidence Law and the 
common law, and despite a significant outpouring of concern towards the end of 
the 20th century in relation to the role of the party-engaged expert, there is little 
associated with the concept that had not been previously raised and carefully 
considered more than a century earlier. What then, was responsible for the 
resurgence of interest in that which was essentially an age-old problem?  
V  Case Management and the Rise of ‘Mega-Litigation’     
Writing extra-judicially, Justice Peter McClellan identified economic forces as a 
key catalyst for reforms of the adversarial system towards the end of the 20th century 
–– unlike many other sectors of common law economies, the cost of litigation had 
not, by this time, put access to justice within the ready reach of all.343 Chief Justice 
                                                        
342  Ibid 623 (Heydon J). 
343  Justice McClellan, ‘Civil Justice Reform - What Has It Achieved?’, above n 11. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 95 
Tom Bathurst, speaking more recently,344 characterised civil litigation in this period 
as having a decidedly Dickensian air,345 with a ‘strong laissez faire flavour’, such 
that discovery was of virtually unlimited scope and interrogatories involved the 
asking of ‘every possible question of the other side’.346  
The change in focus from early laxity and comparative freedom in the running of 
litigation to the application of strict principles of case management within Australia 
even between 1997 and 2009, can be starkly illustrated by comparing these words 
from the decision of the High Court in Queensland v J L Holdings: 
Case management, involving as it does the efficiency of the procedures of the 
court, was in this case a relevant consideration. But it should not have been 
allowed to prevail over the injustice of shutting the applicants out from raising 
an arguable defence, thus precluding the determination of an issue between the 
parties,347 
with those of the same Court (differently constituted) twelve years later: 
Statements in JL Holdings which suggest only a limited application for case 
management do not rest upon a principle which has been carefully worked out 
in a significant succession of cases. On the contrary, the statements are not 
consonant with this Court’s earlier recognition of the effects of delay, not only 
upon the parties to the proceedings in question, but upon the court and other 
litigants. Such statements should not be applied in the future… 
In the past it has been left largely to the parties to prepare for trial and to seek 
the court’s assistance as required. Those times are long gone.348  
The incompatibility between the more ‘laissez faire’ approach to litigation with one 
in which case management is given a significant role to play finds its nexus with 
the issue of the party-engaged expert in a number of cases running during the first 
decade of the 21st century which became examples of so-called ‘mega-litigation’. 
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In Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Limited,349 Einstein J quoted with 
approval from a speech given by then High Court Chief Justice Murray Gleeson in 
which his Honour stated: 
if thought is given to some modern mega litigation, usually fought out between 
substantial corporations, it may be very difficult to assess what the parties are 
intending to achieve, or what public purpose is being served by a judge who 
devotes many months to presiding over proceedings that are ultimately settled. 
Court time is not allocated evenly amongst litigants. Especially in commercial 
disputes, some litigants consume hugely disproportionate amounts of scarce 
judicial resources…350 
In Idoport, Einstein J was faced with numerous experts sought to be adduced by the 
parties and concluded that the time required to be taken for cross-exmination of 
such experts would be ‘somewhere up to a calendar year of court hearing time’.351 
His Honour decided to appoint an examiner in order to assist with that task. 
In Seven Network Limited v News Limited,352 Sackville J opened his judgment with 
the following comments: 
The case is an example of what is best described as ‘mega-litigation’. By that 
expression, I mean civil litigation, usually involving multiple and separately 
represented parties, that consumes many months of court time and generates 
vast quantities of documentation in paper or electronic form. An invariable 
characteristic of mega-litigation is that it imposes a very large burden, not only 
on the parties, but on the court system and, through that system, the 
community.353  
His Honour then proceeded to provide statistical support for the assertion, including 
references to the trial having lasted for 120 hearing days, having involved pleadings 
which ran to 1,028 pages, lay evidence which ran to 1,613 pages and expert reports 
in evidence which ran to 2,041 pages excluding ‘many hundreds of pages in 
appendices, calculations and the like’.354 Of the expert evidence sought to be 
adduced by the parties to the litigation, Sackville J was particularly critical. After 
                                                        
349  Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [No 37] [2001] NSWSC 838. 
350  Ibid [87] quoting Gleeson, above n 12.  
351  Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [No 37] [2001] NSWSC 838, [70] to [71]. 
352  Seven Network Limited v News Limited [2007] FCA 1062. 
353  Ibid [2]. 
354  Ibid [4], [6]. 
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commenting on the expense of the parties’ reliance upon expert evidence, his 
Honour stated: 
…a substantial proportion of the costs incurred by the parties in producing this 
material was wasted. Some reports were inadmissible; some were largely 
repetitive of other reports …; at least one … I did not find particularly helpful; 
some expressed opinions on the basis of elaborate factual assumptions that 
have not been borne out by the evidence; and some, given the conclusions I 
have reached, have turned out to be unnecessary,355  
going on to refer to the propensity of parties in the age of mega-litigation to engage 
in ‘heavy, often unthinking reliance on expert evidence’.356   
Likewise, ASIC v Rich357 was a case in which the final hearing ran for 232 days and 
resulted in 16,642 pages of transcript358 and which involved significant reliance 
upon expert evidence that proved to be inadmissible.359  
These cases took place in an environment in which the Lord Woolf reports were at 
the forefront of judicial minds. Justice Peter McClellan was also of the view that 
the Lord Woolf inquiry and reports into access to justice issues in England had the 
effect of generating ‘considerable discussion’ within Australia in relation to the 
issue of expert evidence and were the impetus for the implementation of the first 
expert witness codes of conduct. Such an analysis is supported by the extra-curial 
writing of Justice Richard Cooper, quoted earlier in this chapter, which draws a 
direct correlation between the Lord Woolf inquiry and the introduction of the first 
Federal Court Expert Witness Code of Conduct.360  
In short, although there was nothing new about the difficulty of adversarial systems 
of justice accommodating party-engaged expert witnesses, the extent and cost of 
reliance upon such witnesses in cases emerging in this period appears to have 
                                                        
355  Ibid [22]. 
356  Ibid [23]. An interlocutory determination of Sackville in those proceedings, Seven Network Limited v 
News Limited (No 15) [2006] FCA 515 provides the example of a party leading an expert report of 143 
pages (excluding appendices) from an expert witness ultimately found by the Court to be incompetent to 
give evidence about the Australian market the subject of the report (ibid [2], [31]-[32] (Sackville J).  
357  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229. 
358  Ibid [23]. 
359  Ibid [33] and see above comments relating to Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Rich 
(2005) 218 ALR 764. 
360  McClellan, ‘Contemporary Challenges For the Justice System - Expert Evidence’, above n 11, 2; Cooper, 
above n 234. 
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generated a momentum for reform of the law with respect to the receipt of evidence 
from expert witnesses that continues to this day.361 
It is appropriate before leaving the topic of the expert witness at large, to identify 
some other unique characteristics of the party-engaged expert, the existence of 
which need to be taken into account in considering the extent of the problem 
identified in Chapter 4 and the proposals for reform identified in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. 
VI  The Peculiar Characteristics of Expert Witnesses     
A Overview 
To consider, as subsequent chapters of this thesis shall, the case for any differential 
operation of legal professional privilege as between expert and lay witnesses, it is 
important to identify some of the other key characteristics that mark out the expert 
witness from the lay witness (other than the ability to give admissible evidence of 
opinion) and to identify other characteristics of an expert witness that differentiate 
him or her from professional colleagues not involved in the giving of evidence.  
The key differences between an expert witness and a lay witness are that an expert 
witness receives renumeration for the giving of evidence in the proceedings, 
whereas the lay witness is entitled only to recover expenses in connection therewith 
and, further, that the expert witness is less amenable to sanction for perjury because 
of the inherent difficulty of proving misleading conduct in respect of an opinion, as 
opposed to a fact. 
The key difference between a professional who is engaged to provide expert 
evidence and a professional who is not, is that the former has the benefit of the 
                                                        
361  For example the introduction of a revised Expert Evidence Practice Note (GPN-EXPT) on 25 October 
2016 in the Federal Court and the amendments to the Expert Witness Code of Conduct contained in 
Schedule 7 to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) made in December 2016. 
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doctrine of immunity from suit in connection with critical features of that 
engagement, whereas the latter does not.  
B Remuneration of Expert Witnesses 
Firstly, as Jessel MR stated in Lord Abinger, an expert witness is remunerated by 
payment of professional fees:  
An expert is not like an ordinary witness who hopes to get his expenses, but he 
is employed by and paid in the sense of gain, being employed by the person 
who calls him.362 
This situation is to be compared with the position of a lay witness who, for example, 
when called to give evidence in response to a subpoena is entitled only to be 
compensated for ‘reasonable loss or expense’.363  
In fact, where a lay witness is paid amounts in excess of reasonable losses or 
expenses in connection with the giving of evidence, the credibility of that witness 
can be impugned and, in certain circumstances, particularly in the context of 
witnesses for the prosecution in criminal trials, such conduct is capable (in an 
extreme case) of giving rise to an abuse of process.364 
C Sanction for Perjury (or lack thereof) 
Secondly, and as Jessel MR also noted: 
although the evidence is given upon oath, in point of fact the person knows he 
cannot be indicted for perjury, because it is only evidence as to a matter of 
opinion. So that you have not the authority of legal sanction.365  
The classic definition of ‘perjury’ is that it ‘consists in giving upon oath, in a judicial 
proceeding … evidence which was material to some question in the proceeding and 
was false to the knowledge of the deponent or not believed by him to be true’.366 
                                                        
362  Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) 17 LR Eq 358, 373.  
363  See for example, rule 33.11 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). 
364  See for example, Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 384, [1]-[11] 
(Levine J); Julian Ronald Moti v R (2011) 245 CLR 456, 464–466 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
365  Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) 17 LR Eq 358, 373. 
366  R v Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473, 475 (King CJ). 
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True it is that all witnesses are required to give evidence upon oath, the traditional 
sanction for perjury is inapt to deal with the expert witness who gives evidence not 
of fact, but of opinion, about which reasonable minds may differ. 
D Immunity from Suit 
A question also arises as to whether an expert witness can even be subject to a claim 
in negligence by the party that engaged him or her or subject to disciplinary 
proceedings in connection with a professional opinion given by that expert as part 
of a trial process. In Palmer and Another v Durnford Ford (a firm) and Another,367 
the English High Court said: 
It is well settled that witnesses in either civil or criminal proceedings enjoy 
immunity from any form of civil action in respect of evidence given during 
those proceedings. The reason for this immunity is so that witnesses may give 
their evidence fearlessly and to avoid a multiplicity of actions in which the 
value of their truth or their evidence would be tried over again...This immunity 
has been held to apply to the preparation of evidence which is given in court.368 
The witness in Palmer was a party-engaged expert witness in the field of 
engineering. He was retained to advise from an engineering perspective whether a 
civil claim lay against the vendor and subsequent repairer of a lorry tractor unit. In 
the course of proceedings against the vendor and repairer, the plaintiffs abandoned 
their claim and thereafter sued their expert and the solicitor for breach of a duty of 
care (the former for accepting a retainer that he was unqualified to accept or, in the 
alternative, failing to advise that the claim was unjustified and the latter, for 
instructing this expert in the first place). Ultimately the judge found that the expert 
was immune from suit in respect of work involved in giving evidence in 
proceedings and, to the extent intimately connected with the giving of evidence in 
proceedings, in respect of pre-trial work.369 His Honour went on to clarify the 
position in the following terms: 
[T]he immunity would only extend to what could fairly be said to be 
preliminary to his giving evidence in court judged perhaps by the principal 
purpose for which the work was done. So the production or approval of a report 
                                                        
367  Palmer and Another v Durnford Ford (a firm) and Another [1992] 2 All ER 122, 126 (Simon Tuckey 
QC). 
368  Ibid 125–126. 
369  Ibid 127. 
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for the purposes of disclosure to the other side would be immune but work 
done for the principal purpose of advising the client would not. Each case 
would depend upon its own facts with the court concerned to protect the expert 
from liability for the evidence which he gave in court and the work principally 
and proximately leading thereto…370 
It is clear from the foregoing, an expert will not be liable in negligence to his or her 
client at least in respect of the content of a report prepared for use in proceedings 
or for the giving of evidence in court. 
In Meadow v General Medical Council,371 the English Court of Appeal considered 
the case of a paediatrician who gave evidence for the prosecution in the trial of a 
mother for the murder of her two sons. The mother was initially convicted on the 
strength of Professor Meadow's evidence and the mother's first appeal against 
conviction was unsuccessful. However, a subsequent appeal was allowed and the 
convictions set aside on the basis that Professor Meadow, ‘in his use of certain 
statistics in his capacity as an expert witness, had acted outside the range of his 
expertise and that his evidence had been so flawed that it had amounted to serious 
professional misconduct’.372 
In his judgment, Sir Anthony Clarke MR restated the principles regarding a 
witness's immunity from suit, namely: 
[N]o action lies against parties or witnesses for anything said or done, although 
falsely and maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause, in the 
ordinary course of any proceeding in a court of justice.373 
and found that such immunity extends to an expert witness.374 The rationale being 
that the administration of justice would be impeded if persons declined to come 
forward to give evidence in fear of being sued by a party.375  
However, in Meadow, the key question was whether an expert witness was subject 
to disciplinary sanction in respect of conduct in court proceedings which would, in 
any other circumstance, give rise to an issue of unsatisfactory professional conduct 
                                                        
370  Ibid. 
371  Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] 1 All ER 1 (‘Meadow’). 
372  Ibid 31 (Auld LJ). 
373  Ibid 7. 
374  Ibid 8. 
375  Ibid. 
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or professional misconduct. By differentiating the purpose of disciplinary 
proceedings (ie. protection of the public by the exercise of a protectionary 
jurisdiction) from those of civil proceedings, Sir Anthony Clarke MR found that an 
expert witness could still be liable for disciplinary sanction in respect of evidence 
given in proceedings.376 This approach has since been followed in Australia.377 
E No Property in a Witness? 
Finally, it should be observed that despite it now being clarified in most 
jurisdictions that an expert witness owes a paramount duty to the court and not to 
the party calling him or her, it is clear that an expert can be restrained to a very 
significant extent from giving evidence on behalf of a party in certain 
circumstances. 
In Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis,378 Lord Denning MR stated: 
So far as witnesses are concerned, the law is as plain as can be. There is no 
property in a witness. The reason is because the court has a right to hear every 
man's evidence. Its primary duty is to ascertain the truth. Neither one side nor 
the other can debar the court from ascertaining the truth either by seeing a 
witness beforehand or by purchasing his evidence or by making 
communication to him. In no way can one side prohibit the other from seeing 
a witness of fact, from getting the facts from him and from calling him to give 
evidence or from issuing him with a subpoena.379 
Harmony Shipping concerned whether an expert witness who had been engaged by 
a party can be called to give evidence by another party. Lord Denning found that, 
subject to the right of the first party to object to the adducing before court of any 
communications falling within the scope of legal professional privilege, the law 
with respect to expert witnesses was no different than that with respect to lay 
witnesses.380   
Importantly, Lord Denning’s reasoning went further: 
                                                        
376  Ibid 13–15. 
377  James v Keogh [2008] SASC 156, at [72] to [74] per Debelle J. 
378  Harmony Shipping SA v Davis [1979] 3 All ER 177. 
379  Ibid 180. Lord Denning relied upon: Law Society ‘Guide to Professional Conduct of Solicitors’ (1944) 
41 LS Gaz 8; and the ‘Guide to Professional Conduct of Solicitors’ (1963) 60 LS Gaz 108. 
380  Harmony Shipping SA v Davis [1979] 3 All ER 177, 181. 
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I would add a further consideration of public policy. If an expert could have 
his hands tied by being instructed by one side, it would be very easy for a rich 
client to consult each of the acknowledged experts in the field. Each expert 
might give an opinion adverse to the rich man, yet the rich man could say to 
each, 'Your mouth is closed and you cannot give evidence in court against me'. 
We were told that in the Admiralty courts where there are a very limited 
number of experts, one side may consult every single one of them. Does that 
mean that the other side is debarred from getting the help of any expert 
evidence because all the experts have been taken up by the other side? The 
answer is clearly No. It comes back to the proposition which I stated at the 
beginning. There is no property in a witness as to fact.381 
Harmony Shipping has been followed in Australia, to a point,382 but a number of 
more recent decisions appear to be more in favour of applying some restraints on 
the extent to which expert witnesses who have been exposed to confidential 
information or communications the subject of a claim for legal professional 
privilege in connection with one party, can be called to give evidence for another.   
In Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Limited v Anderson Formrite Pty 
Limited,383 Johnson J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia was required to 
determine an application by a defendant for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff 
from dealing with an independent engineering consulting firm. The firm had acted 
for the defendant in a number of capacities in connection with a project on which 
the defendant provided formwork. The failure of that formwork was an issue in the 
proceedings. The defendant also engaged the firm to provide advice to the 
defendant in connection with matters the subject of the proceedings, namely, the 
reasons for the failure of the formwork. The solicitor for the plaintiff subsequently 
sought to engage the engineering firm to provide an expert opinion in respect of 
certain matters associated with the proceedings. The defendant applied to restrain 
the firm from dealing with the plaintiff on the basis that the firm's confidential 
information obtained in the course of the engagement by the defendant may thereby 
be wrongfully disclosed and the confidence breached. 
Johnson J surveyed the existing law with respect to restraining threatened breaches 
of an equitable duty of confidentiality and concluded that three elements were 
                                                        
381  Ibid. 
382  See for example: Kimbers Pty Ltd v Harley (1998) BC9807400 Unreported 7–8 (Wheeler J); Wimmera 
Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v Iluka Midwest Ltd [2002] FCA 653, [44]-[46] (Sundberg J). 
383  Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Limited v Anderson Formrite Pty Limited [2005] WASC 255. 
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required to establish such breach, namely: the information was required to have the 
necessary quality of confidence about it; the information must have been imparted 
in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and there must be an 
unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating 
it.384 His Honour found that the duty of confidentiality existed in this case.385 In order 
to balance that finding, and the ability of a court to restrain the threatened breach of 
such an obligation with the principle that there is ‘no property in a witness’, his 
Honour said: 
…assuming for the present purposes that [the plaintiff is entitled to call the 
director of the engineering firm] as a witness, there would be no impediment 
to asking [the witness] for his expert engineering opinion based on established 
facts, provided that in the course of providing that opinion, [the expert] does 
not rely on any confidential information passed to [the engineering firm] 
during the course of its engagement by [the defendant]. However, pre-trial 
discussions, held as they are in the absence of a representative of the opposing 
party protecting that party's interest, would run the risk of a breach of 
confidentiality … Consequently, in my view, the trial process is the more 
appropriate arena to deal with this issue, as [the defendant] through its counsel, 
will then be in a position to immediately raise any issue of breach (sic) 
confidentiality arising from a specific question put to the witness.386  
A similar view was reached by Habersberger J in Protec Pacific Pty Limited v Brian 
Cherry,387 a matter in which the expert was privy not only to confidential 
information, but communications between a party and the expert which were the 
subject of a claim for legal professional privilege. In that case, his Honour found 
that the need to restrain the expert from having any communication with the other 
party before hearing was justified because, inter alia ‘what is to happen if [the expert 
witness] unwittingly blurted out some privileged or confidential information? … 
One only has to ask these questions to see, in my opinion, that the only way to avoid 
the drastic consequences of the real and sensible possibility of the misuse of 
privileged and confidential information is to prevent [the expert] from speaking any 
further with [the lawyers for the other party].’388  
                                                        
384  Ibid [62] relying upon Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Limited [1969] RPC 41, 47-48 (Robert Megarry J). 
385  Ibid [125]. 
386  Ibid [138]. 
387  Protec Pacific Pty Ltd v Brian Cherry [2008] VSC 76. 
388  Ibid [69]. 
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Habersberger J relied on the rationale adopted by Johnson J in Rapid Metal 
Developments (Australia) for concluding that such a restraint did not contravene 
the principle of ‘no property in a witness’ because the expert could still be called at 
trial (albeit without any opportunity to confer with those calling him prior thereto). 
And in Australian Leisure Hospitality Group Pty Limited & Anor v Dr Judith 
Stubbs & Anor389 Nicholas J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales reached the 
same conclusion, despite the proferring of an undertaking by the expert in question 
not to divulge any confidential information, because of the risk of ‘inadvertent or 
subconscious breach by [the expert] of [that undertaking]’.390 
It is clear from the foregoing that, although the principle that ‘there is no property 
in a witness’ applies to expert witnesses as it does to lay witnesses, and although 
both expert witnesses and lay witnesses are capable of being restrained from acting 
in breach of an obligation of confidentiality,391 the approach of the courts has been 
to preserve the principle by permitting the calling of the expert to give evidence at 
trial but prohibiting pre-trial communications between that expert and the side that 
wishes to call him or her. Such a situation clearly places the side wishing to call the 
expert at significant forensic disadvantage, because not only will the party be denied 
the opportunity of ascertaining the expert's likely response to any given set of facts 
or assumptions, but also because in such circumstances the party calling the expert 
will be unable to obtain a report from that expert for use in the proceedings and will 
ordinarily be denied the opportunity of asking leading questions of the expert.392 
The result is that the very situation postulated by Lord Denning MR in Harmony 
Shipping (ie. that of the rich man engaging the eminent experts in a given field and 
thereafter saying ‘[y]our mouth is closed and you cannot give evidence in court 
against me’) although perhaps not being capable of arising in an absolute sense, 
could still be engineered so as to place opposing parties at a significant forensic 
disadvantage in any litigation. The possibility of this ‘Croesus litigant’ (ie. a 
                                                        
389  Australian Leisure Hospitality Group Pty Ltd & Anor v Dr Judith Stubbs & Anor [2012] NSWSC 215. 
390  Ibid [41]. 
391  See for example AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464 (restraining an employee 
from breaching an obligation of confidentiality to a former employer). 
392  See section 37 of the Uniform Evidence Law. 
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wealthy litigant seeking to monopolise expert witnesses) is something furthered by 
the current orthodoxy with respect to client legal privilege and expert evidence, as 
further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
VI  Conclusion 
The foregoing highlights the exceptional and problematic nature of the party-
engaged expert, now embedded within the framework of the Australian legal 
system.  
It also suggests that the difficulties perceived as being associated with the party-
engaged expert are by no means a recent phenomenon or the product of any ‘fall 
from grace’ of experts from once noble professionals. Rather, the difficulties are 
more appropriately explained in light of the inherent tension between the role of the 
expert in adducing evidence on behalf of a party (but holding a paramount duty to 
the courts), the need of the courts to be able to rely upon the testimony of experts 
to reach conclusions in matters of technical complexity and renewed scrutiny on 
issues such as access to justice and case management in the era of ‘mega-
litigation’.393 
In subsequent chapters, the current state of the law with respect to expert evidence 
and client legal privilege will be considered, further problems with these concepts 
distilled and suggestions for reform given. However, to be beneficial, such reform 
will need to meaningfully address at least the two issues highlighted in this Chapter, 
namely, the tendency of experts toward bias (conscious or unconscious) and the 
tendency of parties to give effect to the paradigm of expert exceptionalism by 
engaging in ‘expert shopping’. 
  
                                                        
393  It may be, although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, possible to align the trajectory of judicial and 
legislative concern regarding the role of the party-engaged expert with the passage through the courts of 
evidence of, and based upon, increasingly sophisticated technologies, heightening the reliance by the 
triers of fact on expert witnesses while at the same time reducing the susceptibility to scrutiny of expert 
opinions by reason of the complexity of their subject-matter. 
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CHAPTER 3 – FRAGMENTATION, INCONSISTENCY 
AND A DIFFERENTIAL ORTHODOXY 
 
The verb ‘adduce’, used in the [Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth)], means 
nothing more than to bring forward for consideration. A great deal of 
inconvenience would be avoided if the bringing forward of evidence for use in 
a later trial (as by responding to an order for discovery, a subpoena or some 
other ancillary process) were held to fall within the Act… A host of 
undesirable and even irrational distinctions between the law applicable to the 
ancillary and the substantive parts of the same proceedings would be avoided 
if a broad view were taken of the phrase ‘adducing of evidence’.  
    Kirby J, Mann v Carnell394 
I Overview 
As discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis, expert evidence is evidence 
provided to a court to assist the judge or jury to determine questions of science or 
professional skill that lie beyond their expertise.395 It is, at heart, an exception to the 
rule that prohibits the adducing of opinion evidence. The price of obtaining the 
exception is the expert's affirmation that his or her paramount duty is to the court 
and not to the client.396   
Litigation privilege is a species of client legal privilege and a principle of public 
policy that operates to restrict the obligation of a party to disclose protected 
communications (and in some cases documents) in certain circumstances.397 It is an 
exception to rules of evidence which would otherwise require the disclosure of 
documents or communications relevant to matters in issue in proceedings. 
It is not surprising that the point at which these anomalies intersect has long been 
and, to a significant extent remains, an area characterised by complexity, confusion 
and divergence of judicial opinion.  
                                                        
394  Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1, 45.  
395  See for example Hammelmann, above n 291, 82. 
396  See for example the Expert Witness Code of Conduct, Schedule 7 to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
2005 (NSW); Expert Witness Guidelines, Practice Note GPN-EXT, Federal Court of Australia and Rule 
23.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. 
397  Bullivant & Ors v The Attorney-General for Victoria [1901] AC 196, 200 (Lord Halsbury LC). 
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Putting these problems to one side for the moment, in order to identify the current 
orthodoxy (if any) regarding the application of litigation privilege to expert 
witnesses, it is necessary to recognise that a number of the complexities that remain 
in this area relate to issues of jurisdiction and the application (or non-application) 
of legislation and rules of evidence, and not necessarily divergent concepts of 
jurisprudence.  
II Differential Application of Laws 
A The Spectrum 
To the extent that there is a current orthodoxy with respect to the application of the 
concept of legal professional privilege to the expert witness within New South 
Wales and the federal jurisdictions, it is a differential orthodoxy. This is because, 
depending on the range of factors discussed below, the applicable test for privilege 
either falls to be determined under the Uniform Evidence Law or falls to be 
determined by reference to common law principles –– with potentially different 
outcomes.  
To understand why this is the case notwithstanding the enactment of the Uniform 
Evidence Law, reference first needs to be made to the application of the Uniform 
Evidence Law itself because, to the extent (if any) that it does not apply, the 
common law fills its place.398 
Section 4(1) of the NSW Evidence Act relevantly states: 
This Act applies to all proceedings in a NSW court, including proceedings that: 
(a)  relate to bail, or 
(b)  are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind, or 
(c)  are heard in chambers, or 
(d)  … relate to sentencing. 
                                                        
398  See for example Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543, 552–553 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
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A ‘NSW Court’ is defined in the Dictionary accompanying the NSW Evidence Act 
to mean: 
(a)  the Supreme Court, or 
(b)  any other court created by Parliament, 
and includes any person or body (other than a court) that, in exercising a 
function under the law of the State, is required to apply the laws of evidence. 
Similar provisions but incorporating a definition of ‘federal court’, are contained in 
section 4 of the Commonwealth Evidence Act, which states: 
(1)    This Act applies to all proceedings in a federal court, including 
proceedings that: 
(a)    relate to bail; or 
(b)    are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar 
kind; or 
(c)    are heard in chambers; or  
(d)    subject to subsection (2), relate to sentencing. 
A ‘federal court’ is defined in the Dictionary accompanying the Commonwealth 
Evidence Act in the following terms: 
(a)    the High Court; or 
(b)    any other court created by the Parliament (other than the Supreme 
Court of a Territory); 
and includes a person or body (other than a court or magistrate of a State or 
Territory) that, in performing a function or exercising a power under a law of 
the Commonwealth, is required to apply the laws of evidence. 
The first restriction, then, upon the operation of the Uniform Evidence Law, is that 
it only applies to courts, persons or bodies ‘required to apply the laws of evidence’. 
This means that the Uniform Evidence Law does not apply to fora in which 
adherence to the laws of evidence is either excluded or discretionary and in those 
circumstances, the relevant test for the applicability of legal professional privilege 
to expert witnesses continues to fall to be determined by reference to the common 
law.  
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By way of illustration, examples of New South Wales and Commonwealth courts, 
persons or bodies not required to apply the laws of evidence include (without 
limitation): referees the subject of a reference under rule 20.14 of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW);399 arbitrations conducted pursuant to the 
Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW)400 or pursuant to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitrations;401 proceedings of the Small Claims 
Division of the Local Court of New South Wales;402 processes of the Independent 
Commission against Corruption (New South Wales);403 the NSW Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal;404 processes of the Industrial Relations Commission 
(NSW);405 coronial proceedings in New South Wales406; proceedings in the Drug 
Court of New South Wales;407 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(Commonwealth);408 procedures of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission;409 and the National Native Title Tribunal.410 
Critically, however, even in fora that are required to apply the Uniform Evidence 
Law, the Uniform Evidence Law itself is not always engaged by the procedures 
through which privilege claims in respect of expert witnesses are determined.  
This is because the section of the Uniform Evidence Law governing litigation 
privilege in the context of expert evidence411 commences with the words ‘[e]vidence 
is not to be adduced if…’. The preamble is significant. 
                                                        
399  Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rule 20.20(2)(b);   
400  See section 19(3) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW);  
401  See Article 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (as adopted by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985, and as amended by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006) forming Schedule 2 to the 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Commonwealth).  
402  Local Court Act 2007 (NSW), section 35(3) 
403  Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW), section 17(1). 
404  Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), section 38(2), save in respect of proceedings in the 
exercise of the enforcement jurisdiction of the Tribunal and proceedings for the imposition by the 
Tribunal of a civil penalty in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, section 38(3).  
405  Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), section 163(1)(b). 
406  Coroners Act 2009 (NSW), section 58(1). 
407  Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW), section 26(3). 
408  Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Commonwealth), section 33(1)(c) 
409  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Commonwealth) section 44ZF(1)(a); section 95R(7); section 
103(1)(c) 
410  Native Title Act 1993 (Commonwealth), section 109(3). 
411  Uniform Evidence Law, section 119. 
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In its report accompanying the bill that formed the basis for the Uniform Evidence 
Law, the Australian Law Reform Commission gave the following explanation of 
the meaning of ‘adduced’ in the context of section 119: 
The Bill is drafted on the basis that a witness in the witness box is ‘giving' 
evidence. The party who is questioning the witness (whether in examination in 
chief or in cross-examination) is ‘adducing’ the evidence that the witness is 
giving. It is the court's function to admit or refuse to admit the evidence so 
adduced.412 
The report also went on to clarify that section 119 was not intended, in terms, to 
apply to ancillary processes to the adducing of evidence in a courtroom. It stated: 
The Terms of Reference limit the Commission to considering the application 
of the privilege in the courtroom where evidence is sought to be given. 
Situations may arise where a party obtains access to documents outside the 
courtroom which are protected in the courtroom by the proposed 
privilege. Under the proposal, the privilege will still apply in the courtroom 
unless the client voluntarily disclosed the document. Having wider access on 
discovery or under a search warrant is usual. Access is not determined by the 
rules of admissibility such as relevance and hearsay. It is not unreasonable to 
have wider access in the investigative stage.413 
Shortly after the commencement of the Uniform Evidence Law in New South 
Wales, courts attempted to make sense of the potential discrepancy between the 
operation of that law in certain aspects of proceedings and the continued application 
of the common law in others. And, to the extent that the High Court is the 
authoritative voice for the determination of justiciable controversies within 
Australia, it is clear that a number of other distinguished bodies reached erroneous 
conclusions in connection with this issue.   
B Curial Misconceptions (Part 1) 
In Trade Practices Commission v Port Adelaide Wool,414 Branson J sitting in the 
Federal Court of Australia, considered the effect of the enactment of sections 118 
and 119 of the Commonwealth Evidence Act on the common law with respect to the 
application of legal professional privilege in relating to ancillary processes of the 
                                                        
412  Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Evidence’, above n 202, [58]. 
413  Ibid [199]. 
414  Trade Practices Commission v Port Adelaide Wool (1995) 60 FCR 366 (‘Port Adelaide Wool’). 
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Court. Her Honour’s statement, which was initially met with broad judicial 
approval, was as follows: 
It would be a curious result, in my view, if a party to proceedings in this Court 
could be required to produce for inspection by the other party or parties during 
pre-trial procedures, or indeed in court, a confidential document prepared, for 
example, for the dominant, but not the sole, purpose of a lawyer providing legal 
advice to that party, notwithstanding that at trial that party could successfully 
object on the ground of client legal privilege to any evidence being adduced 
which would result in disclosure of the contents of the document.  That is, logic 
at least would seem to suggest that the ambit of client legal privilege should be 
constant throughout the litigation process.  That logic is reflected in the fact 
that historically legal professional privilege with respect to the contents of 
documents has had the same ambit whether invoked as a privilege against 
production of documents outside of the courtroom as part of the discovery 
process, or as a privilege against disclosing the contents of such documents 
within the courtroom either by their physical production or by disclosure of 
their contents in response to questions asked in cross-examination.415 
Branson J’s decision was delivered at the time when the ‘sole-purpose’ test for the 
existence of legal professional privilege was still ascendant – as discussed above, it 
was not until the High Court’s decision in Esso that the ‘dominant purpose’ test 
became legitimised outside the ambit of the Uniform Evidence Law. But the ‘sole 
purpose’ versus the ‘dominant purpose’ tests were not the only point of 
differentiation between the common law and the Uniform Evidence Law. Another 
key differentiating factor (which is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter), 
is the fact that the Uniform Evidence Law is concerned with communications and 
documents – section 119 of the NSW Evidence Act for example, relevantly states:  
[e]vidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that 
adducing the evidence would result in the disclosure of: (a) a confidential 
communication between the client and another person … or (b) the contents of 
a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared, for the 
dominant purpose… (emphasis added) 
whereas the privilege under the common law is concerned only with 
communications.416  
                                                        
415  Ibid 370. 
416  Commissioner of Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501, 552 (‘Propend’) 
(McHugh J). 
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Branson J refused to require the production as part of pre-trial processes, documents 
that could have been the subject of a claim for legal professional privilege if sections 
118 or 119 of the Commonwealth Evidence Act were invoked at hearing.   
The following year, Sackville J, also sitting in the Federal Court, quoted Branson 
J’s decision in Port Adelaide Wool with approval and reached a similar 
conclusion.417 
A year after Sackville J’s determination, in Telstra Corporation v Australis Media 
Holdings & Ors [No 1],418 McLelland Chief Judge in Equity of the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales, was faced with an application for leave to inspect certain 
documents the subject of a subpoena to a non-party, Publishing & Broadcasting 
Limited. Publishing & Broadcasting Limited asserted that the documents in 
question were the subject of legal professional privilege and resisted disclosure.  
McLelland CJ in Eq was required to ascertain whether Division 1 of Part 10 of the 
NSW Evidence Act  (including, for the purposes of this thesis, sections 118 and 119) 
had any role to play in determining claims for privilege that arose during ancillary 
processes of the court (being processes such as discovery, interrogatories and the 
production of documents under subpoena or notices to produce).419 The question 
had already been resolved for the purposes of discovery and interrogatories because 
the Supreme Court Rules expressly applied the NSW Evidence Act tests to those 
processes. However, no similar provision had at that time been made in respect of 
subpoenas or notices to produce.420 
McLelland CJ in Eq was also persuaded by the reasoning of Branson J in Port 
Adelaide Wool and considered that the enactment of the NSW Evidence Act ‘in 
respect of the adducing of evidence at a hearing has resulted, as an indirect or flow-
                                                        
417  BT Australasia Pty Ltd v The State of New South Wales & Ors (1996) 140 ALR 268. 
418  Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings & Ors [No 1] (1997) 41 NSWLR 277. 
419  Ibid 278. 
420  Ibid; Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), Pt 23, r 1(c) and Pt 24, r 6(3)(c). 
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on effect, in the application of equivalent principles to all ancillary processes’.421 
His Honour’s approach is encapsulated by his statement: 
For the above reasons, the Evidence Act principles should be treated as 
applying, not directly, but derivatively, to the claims of privilege presently 
under consideration.422 
C Dissent 
McLelland CJ in Eq's approach was not universally accepted. In Esso Australia 
Resources Limited v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of 
Australia,423 at first instance, Foster J, having canvassed the opinions of Branson J 
and McLelland CJ in Eq discussed above, felt unable to reach a similar conclusion. 
His Honour focused upon the disparity between the ‘sole purpose’ test that was then 
ascendant under the High Court decision of Grant v Downs and the ‘dominant 
purpose’ test as set out in sections 118 and 119 of the Commonwealth Evidence Act 
to lay out four propositions: 
1. The common law was authoritatively declared by the High Court 
in Grant v Downs.  The test to be applied was the sole purpose 
test in both trial and pre-trial situations. 
2. The law as so stated can be altered only by the High Court itself 
or by an Act of the Parliament. 
3. The Evidence Act has altered the test in relation to trial 
proceedings only. 
4. The sole purpose test in relation to pre-trial proceedings remains 
the test until altered by the High Court or a further Act of 
Parliament.424  
                                                        
421  Ibid 270. 
422  Ibid 271. 
423  Esso Australia Resources Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 150 ALR 117. 
424  Ibid 121–122. 
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The application of these propositions made the documents susceptible to discovery 
because the evidence did not support the view that the documents were created for 
the sole purpose of obtaining legal advice. The facts at issue in the case before 
Foster J related to the discoverability of certain documents that had been prepared, 
it was said, in contemplation of litigation and hence potentially within the scope of 
operation of section 119 of the Commonwealth Evidence Act if it had application to 
the ancillary process of discovery. Perhaps in recognition of the contestability of 
his finding, his Honour, apparently unprompted, granted leave to appeal his own 
decision.425 
In the meantime, a separate case made its way to the Full Court of the Federal Court. 
In Adelaide Steamship Co Limited & Anor v Spalvins & Ors,426 that court, 
constituted by Olney, Kiefel and Finn JJ, was required to determine whether the 
issue of waiver of privilege in the context of subpeonaed material fell to be 
determined under the Commonwealth Evidence Act  or the common law. The Court 
adopted the same approach as that of Branson J and McLelland CJ in Eq and 
respectfully expressed disagreement with Foster J. The gravamen of the Court’s 
reasoning can be found in the following passage: 
In our view the issue that needs to be faced is what are the common law 
principles that are to be … applied. With the greatest respect to those who have 
expressed the contrary view (see, for example, Esso Australia Resources 
Limited v FCT) we do not consider that those well known decisions of the High 
Court dealing generally with the common law to which we have earlier referred 
conclude the matter. In those decisions the High Court considered the common 
law in a setting unencumbered by the Act. In our view such is the significance 
of the Act’s provisions in this that their advent has created an entirely new 
setting to which the common law must now adapt itself, and adapt itself in such 
a way as to ‘include [the Act] as a fundamental part of its fabric’.427 
Accordingly, the Court considered that the common law must be ‘adapted’ in a 
manner that was consistent with the Commonwealth Evidence Act.  
                                                        
425  Ibid 126. 
426  Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins & Ors (1998) 152 ALR 418.  
427  Ibid 428. 
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D Initial Resolution  
Because of the differences of judicial opinion on the issue (including the decision 
in Spalvins), the Full Court of the Federal Court constituted to hear the appeal from 
the decision of Foster J in Esso Australia Resources Limited v The Commissioner 
of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia comprised five judges: Black CJ, 
Beaumont, Sundberg, Merkel and Finkelstein JJ.428 It is illustrative of the 
divisiveness of the issue that the court split, with a narrow majority (comprising 
Black CJ, Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ) holding that the common law continued to 
apply to the determination of issues of privilege required to be made in connection 
with ancillary processes.429 Interestingly, an issue that appeared to be persuasive to 
the conclusion of the majority was quite similar to that which seems to have swayed 
the minority –– incongruity in the application of laws. Whereas the minority found 
it absurd, as a matter of statutory construction, for the Commonwealth Evidence Act 
test to apply to the determination of privilege claims during the hearing of a matter 
and yet have the common law apply to the determination of privilege claims during 
processes leading up to trial,430 the majority found persuasive the asserted 
impossibility of having the common law modified by a statute which, at that stage, 
applied to a small number of jurisdictions: 
there is but one common law in Australia: Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 562-563, and it seems to us impossible to 
have a common law dominant purpose test applicable to discovery in New 
South Wales and in other parts of Australia when the issue arises in a federal 
court, and a common law sole purpose test at all other times and in all other 
places…431 
Prior to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Esso making its way 
to the High Court, in Northern Territory v GPAO,432 Gleeson CJ and Gummow J 
made the following comments, suggestive of a view that the Commonwealth 
                                                        
428  Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 83 FCR 511. 
429  Ibid 518–519, 564–576. 
430  Ibid 555 (Merkel J, with whom Beaumont J agreed). 
431  Ibid 525 (Black CJ and Sundberg J). 
432  Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 117 
Evidence Act had not somehow infiltrated the common law so as to apply to 
ancillary processes as well as the adducing of evidence at hearing: 
…the Evidence Act is concerned with the adducing of evidence (Ch 2), the 
admissibility of evidence (Ch 3), proof (Ch 4) and certain ancillary matters (Ch 
5). It does not deal with the obligations of a party to whom an order in the 
nature of a subpoena is addressed to produce documents to the court in 
question. Nor does the Evidence Act deal with the grant of leave by the court 
to inspect or otherwise make use of documents which have been produced in 
answer to a subpoena.433 
Later that year, the High Court finally delivered judgment on the appeal in Esso 
from the Full Court of the Federal Court. A majority, comprised of Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron and Gummow JJ and Callinan J (who issued a separate judgment), agreed 
with the reasoning of the majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court to the effect 
that the common law applicable to the determination of claims regarding legal 
professional privilege should not be treated as having been affected by the 
enactment of the Evidence Act and continued to apply to ancillary processes of 
courts even in circumstances in which the Evidence Act applied to the determination 
of similar questions at hearing.434 The majority also took a step that the Federal 
Court was precluded from doing, namely, confirming that, in light of the decision 
of the majority of the High Court in Grant v Downs,435 the dominant purpose test 
and not the sole purpose test was relevant to the determination of claims for the 
existence of legal professional privilege at common law.436 In this manner, the 
common law test and the provisions of sections 118 and 119 of the Uniform 
Evidence Law were harmonised in one respect, but importantly, not in others. 
E The ‘Fix’ 
The undesirability of having a ‘dual system’ in which questions of privilege are 
subject to different regimes within the same jurisdiction was considered in a joint 
report on the operation of the Uniform Evidence Law prepared by the Australian, 
New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commissions in 2006 (‘Law Reform 
                                                        
433  Ibid 571. 
434  Esso v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49, 54–73 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 93-108 (Callinan J). 
435  Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674. 
436  Esso v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49, 64–73 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 101-107 (Callinan J). 
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Commissions 2005 Report’).437 A  detailed section of that report was devoted to the 
issue of the extension of privileges to pre-trial matters. The report was critical of 
the ‘dual system’, stating that: 
It is the clear position of the courts in Australia since Baker v Campbell that 
legal professional privilege is a fundamental right that applies to court, 
administrative and investigative proceedings. The Commission's view is that, 
in the interests of clarity and uniformity, the client legal privilege sections of 
the uniform Evidence Acts should be extended to respond to these pre-trial 
contexts, as currently regulated by the common law rules of legal professional 
privilege.438 
The report canvassed various ways of achieving greater harmony of tests for 
privilege within each relevant jurisdiction by: amending relevant court rules;439 
inserting a ‘mutatis mutandis’ provision in the Uniform Evidence Law to require 
the application of the tests for privilege applicable under the Acts to all 
circumstances in which disclosure is required;440 and amending Part 3.10 of the 
Uniform Evidence Law to replace the more limited concept of evidence ‘adduced’ 
with disclosure under a ‘compulsory process’.441 Each of these methods was 
characterised in the report as being ‘imperfect’ with the exhortation that, until 
mirror legislation across jurisdictions was enacted to give uniform effect to the test 
for privilege under the relevant evidence legislation, ‘uniform Evidence Act 
jurisdictions will have to determine the means and extent to which uniform 
Evidence Act privileges are to apply in pre-trial and other contexts’.442 
In fact, by the time of the Law Reform Commissions 2005 Report, changes had been 
made to procedural rules applicable to most Supreme, District and Local Court 
proceedings in New South Wales, to extend the operation of the NSW Evidence Act 
to certain pre-trial procedures. 
                                                        
437  Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Final Report “Uniform Evidence Law”’ (ALRC Report 102, 
Australian Law Reform Commission, December 2005); NSW Law Reform Commission, ‘Final Report 
“Uniform Evidence Law”’ (NSWLRC Report 112, NSW Law Reform Commission, December 2005); 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, ‘Final Report “Uniform Evidence Law”’ (VLRC Report 186, 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, December 2005). 
438  Ibid 467. 
439  Ibid 460-461. 
440  Ibid 461-462 
441  Ibid 462-263. 
442  Ibid 463. 
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The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) contained a definition of 
‘privileged document’ (being ‘a document that contains privileged information’) 
and a definition of ‘privileged information’ being information which relevantly, 
‘could not, by virtue of the operation of Division 1 of Part 3.10 of the NSW Evidence 
Act, be adduced in the proceedings over the objection of any person’. 
In addition, a new rule 1.9 was introduced, which relevantly states: 
(1)  This rule applies in the following circumstances: 
(a)  if the court orders a person, by subpoena or otherwise, to 
produce a document to the court or to an authorised officer, 
(b) if a party requires another party, by notice under rule 34.1, to 
produce a document to the court or to an authorised officer, 
(c)  if a question is put to a person in the course of an examination 
before the court or an authorised officer. 
… 
(3)  A person may object to producing a document on the ground that the 
document is a privileged document or to answering a question on the 
ground that the answer would disclose privileged information. 
(4)  A person objecting under subrule (3) may not be compelled to produce 
the document, or to answer the question, unless and until the objection 
is overruled.  
There appears to have followed a period in which it was assumed that the wording 
of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules resolved the ‘dual system’ problem – at least 
insofar as pre-trial court processes were concerned.443 This proved not to be the case. 
F Curial Misconceptions (Part 2) 
In Westpac Banking Corporation v 789Ten Pty Limited,444 Tobias JA (with whom 
Beazley JA and Campbell AJA agreed), was faced with an application for access to 
documents subpoenaed by a party from a third party (not being a party to the 
proceedings) and in respect of which a claim for legal professional privilege was 
                                                        
443  These amendments could obviously have no effect to tribunals and other bodies not bound to apply the 
rules of evidence and which did not have processes governed by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. 
444  Westpac Banking Corporation v 789Ten Pty Limited [2005] NSWCA 321. 
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made by a party to the proceedings. His Honour applied the test set out under the 
NSW Evidence Act for the determination of the claim. 445 
In the matter of Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Limited (in liquidation),446 Austin J likewise 
applied the NSW Evidence Act test for the existence of legal professional privilege, 
stating: 
Submissions were made, correctly, on the basis that [ss 118 and 119] of the 
Evidence Act are applicable to the production of the documents in context here. 
Rule 1.9 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) applies, inter alia, 
if the court orders a person by subpoena to produce a document to the court. 
That is the case here.447 
In ML Ubase Holdings Co Limited v Trigem Computer Inc,448 Brereton J was 
required to rule in respect of a privilege claim regarding documents relating to an 
expert report prepared by a Mr Jhe in that case, which had been the subject of a 
subpoena issued by the plaintiff to a related body-corporate of the defendant. His 
Honour stated: 
As I think is appropriate under the present rules [UCPR r 1.9], I treated this as 
an objection to production of documents on the ground that the documents 
were privileged documents … I upheld the claim for privilege and refused 
access, concluding that the documents were enittled to privilege under (NSW) 
Evidence Act 1995, s 119 (being confidential communications between Mr 
Woods, a lawyer acting for Trigem Australia, the client, and Mr Jhe) for the 
dominant purpose of Trigem Australia being provided with professional legal 
services relating to these proceedings…449 
Each of these decisions failed properly to address the correct legal principles. It was 
not until the subsequent decision of Brereton J in Carbotech-Australia Pty Limited 
v Yates450 that the inadequacy of the attempts to harmonise pre-trial and trial 
processes under the NSW Evidence Act became truly apparent. The lacuna identified 
by Brereton J in that case lies in the fact that rule 1.9 (3) is directed towards the 
production of documents and entitles a person to object to producing a document, 
                                                        
445  Ibid [6]-[7]. 
446  In the matter of Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2006] NSWSC 543 (‘Bauhaus’). 
447  Ibid [19]. 
448  ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577. 
449  Ibid 586. 
450  Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 (‘Carbotech’). 
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inter alia, in response to a subpoena, on the ground that the document is a privileged 
document. As his Honour noted in Carbotech: 
…providing, as it does, that a person may object to producing a document - is 
addressed only to an objection by the person required to produce the document, 
and not an objection or claim for privilege by someone else in respect of a 
document so produced. 451  
Accordingly, the rules seeking to invoke the NSW Evidence Act principles in 
relation to the existence of privilege in an ancillary stage of proceedings were 
inapplicable where the entity objecting to production was a party to the proceedings 
and not the person required to make production. Confirming that each of the 
decisions in Westpac Banking Corporation v 789Ten Pty Limited, In the matter of 
Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Limited (in liquidation), and ML Ubase Holdings Co Limited 
v Trigem Computer Inc were made without reference to the distinction between the 
common law and Evidence Act approaches to the question of the existence and 
waiver of privilege, Brereton J declined to follow the path of McLelland CJ in Eq 
in Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings & Ors [No 1]452 to ‘apply the 
statutory provisions “derivatively”’ to the objection-taking stage of the production 
of documents pursuant to subpoena in light of the decision of the High Court in 
Esso Australia Resources v The Commissioner of Taxation. 453   
As a consequence of the recommendations contained in the Law Reform 
Commissions 2005 Report, the NSW Evidence Act was amended454 to introduce a 
new section 131A, which relevantly provides that a court is to determine any 
objection to the giving of information or the provision of documents pursuant to a 
‘disclosure requirement’, by applying the provisions of Part 3.10 of the NSW 
Evidence Act. A ‘disclosure requirement’ is defined to mean: 
… a court process or court order that requires the disclosure of information or 
a document and includes the following: 
(a)  a summons or subpoena to produce documents or give evidence; 
                                                        
451  Ibid [8]. 
452  Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings & Ors [No 1] (1997) 41 NSWLR 277. 
453  Carbotech [2008] NSWSC 1151, [11]. 
454  Evidence Amendment Act 2007 (NSW), s [63] 
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(b)  pre-trial discovery; 
(c)  non-party discovery; 
(d)  interrogatories; 
(e)  a notice to produce; 
(f)  a request to produce a document under Division 1 of Part 4.6 of the 
Evidence Act. 455 
There followed yet a further round of conflicting decisions, the vicissitudes of 
which were succinctly put by White J in Singtel Optus Pty Limited v Weston,456 
wherein his Honour stated: 
In Waugh Asset Management v Merrill Lynch [2010] NSWSC 197 McDougall 
J held that s 131A also applied at the stage of production and did not apply at 
the second stage where inspection is sought of documents produced to the 
court, so that the relevant principles to be applied were those of the common 
law (at [9]-[12]). I followed his Honour's decision in d'Apice v Gutkovich (No. 
1) [2010] NSWSC 1336 at [10], as did Adams J in Alderman v Zurich [2011] 
NSWSC 754 at [12]. 
However, in TransGrid v Members Lloyd's Syndicate 3210 [2011] NSWSC 
301, Ball J, without deciding the question, raised doubts as to whether this was 
the better construction of s 131A (at [10]). On further consideration I consider 
that these doubts are well founded. Relevantly subs 131A(1) applies where a 
person is required by a ‘disclosure requirement’ to ‘produce’ a document. 
Prima facie, as McDougall J held, the section applies at the stage of production. 
However, the definition of ‘disclosure requirement’ as meaning a process or 
an order that requires the ‘disclosure’ of a document, including by way of 
production of a document on subpoena or a notice to produce, indicates that 
the draftsman intended the section to apply to the entire process by which the 
production of a document on subpoena or by notice to produce (or by the other 
means referred to in subs 131A(2)) would result in the disclosure of the 
document.  
… 
In my view, where the objection to inspection is taken by the person required 
to produce the document on subpoena or notice to produce, the Evidence Act, 
and not the common law, applies. 
However, as Allsop P held in State of New South Wales v Public Transport 
Ticketing Corporation [2011] NSWCA 60 at [32] and as the terms of s 131A 
clearly provide, the section only applies where the person objecting to 
disclosure on the ground of privilege is the same person who was required to 
produce the document. The section does not apply when a claim for privilege 
                                                        
455  It should be noted for completeness that the corresponding amendment to introduce section 131A in the 
Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth) extends that Act's concepts of privilege only to disclosure 
requirements insofar as they may apply to the disclosure of journalist sources. 
456  Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston (2011) 81 NSWLR 526. 
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is made by persons other than the person required to produce the documents. 
In such cases, the common law applies. 457 
This remains the case. Where objection to the production of a document by a third 
party is taken by an entity other than that third party, the NSW Evidence Act does 
not apply, despite the elaborate amendments made to it and the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules intended to bring about that result.458  
G Conclusions as to Fragmentation 
In the federal jurisdiction, the situation remains complicated by the lack of 
provisions in the Federal Court Rules corresponding with r 1.9 of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and the fact that the amendment to the 
Commonwealth Evidence Act that corresponds with the introduction of s131A into 
the NSW Evidence Act is limited in scope to documents that would disclose the 
identity of an informant the subject of journalistic privilege under section 126K of 
that Act.  
By reason of the foregoing, in the determination of claims for the existence or loss 
of privilege in New South Wales, the common law tests continue to apply: to bodies 
and proceedings which do not apply the laws of evidence; and to objections to the 
inspection of documents produced pursuant to subpoena where such objections are 
not made by the party producing such documents, and the tests under the NSW 
Evidence Act apply to the determination of such claims on all other occasions. 
In the federal jurisdiction, the common law tests continue to apply: to bodies and 
proceedings which do not apply the laws of evidence; and to the determination of 
claims for privilege arising during all ancillary processes of federal courts, and the 
tests under the Commonwealth Evidence Act apply to the determination of such 
questions on all other occasions.459 
                                                        
457  Ibid 531–532. 
458  See for example, Tavcol Pty Ltd v Valbeet Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1002, [8]-[12] (McDougall J); North 
Shore Real Estate Pty Ltd v Real Estate Property Management Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] NSWDC 
77, [17]-[18] (Dicker SC DCJ). 
459  With the exception of proceedings for indictable offences governed by Part III, Division 1A of the 
Federal Court Act 1976 (Commonwealth). 
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This fragmentation is self-evidently undesirable460 –– all the more so because the 
application of the common law and Uniform Evidence Law tests can yield different 
results to similar factual scenarios regarding the production of expert-related 
material. These are matters taken into account in the identification of the criteria 
and proposals for reform set out in Chapters 4 and 5.  
III  The ‘Orthodoxy’ under the Uniform Evidence Law 
A Restatement of the Legislation 
The relevant sections of the NSW Evidence Act (and in this regard, the provisions 
of the Commonwealth Evidence Act are identical) provide as follows:  
118  Legal advice 
Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that 
adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of:  
(a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer, or 
(b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting 
for the client, or 
(c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) 
prepared by the client, lawyer or another person, 
for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, 
providing legal advice to the client. 
119 Litigation 
Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that 
adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of:  
 (a)   a confidential communication between the client and another person, or 
between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was 
made, or 
 (b)   the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that 
was prepared, 
for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal 
services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the 
proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or 
                                                        
460  Not to mention the Law Reform Commission and judicial criticism referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 125 
overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have 
been, a party. 
Apart from the limited circumstance adverted to in section 118(c) ‘or another 
person’,461 only section 119 of the Uniform Evidence Law has the capacity to extend 
the scope of the interactions to which privilege may attach beyond solicitor/client 
interactions to third parties, notably for the purpose of this thesis, expert witnesses. 
This is because the protection is afforded to: confidential communications between, 
‘the client and another person’ or between a ‘lawyer acting for the client and 
another person’; and also to the contents of a ‘confidential document (whether 
delivered or not)’ prepared by any person. 
As to the meaning of ‘dominant purpose’, Branson J in Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd462 
stated: 
It will be a question of objective fact whether in any case any one purpose 
‘dominated’ the decision to bring the document into existence… 
Plainly if two purposes were of equal weight, one would not dominate the other 
… It seems to me that … the choice of the expression ‘dominant purpose’ 
rather than ‘sole purpose’ in s 119 of the Act is intended to bring within the 
scope of client legal privilege, a document brought into existence for the 
purpose of a client being provided with professional legal services 
notwithstanding that some ancillary use of the document was contemplated at 
that time.463 
As to the meaning of ‘legal services’, it is perhaps sufficient for present purposes 
to quote White J in New Cap Reinsurance Corp Limited (in liquidation) v 
Renaissance Reinsurance Limited:464 
A lawyer will provide professional legal services in relation to a witness 
statement of evidence where the lawyer is asked to advise on what the 
statement should contain and settle the form of the statement. The deployment 
of the final report by the plaintiff's lawyers through its service on the opposite 
                                                        
461 See the previous discussion of Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation in Chapter 1. It is 
curious to compare the rationale for the Full Court of the Federal Court in Pratt departing from the strict 
wording of section 118 of the Act on the grounds that to do so would be contrary to ‘practical realities 
surrounding the application of privilege’ with the strict adherence to form mandated by the High Court 
in respect of the non-application of sections 118 or 119 of the Evidence Act to ancillary processes of the 
Federal Court in Esso (discussed above). The lament of Kirby J in Mann v Carnell that opens this chapter 
might be said to have been justly made.   
462  Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322. 
463  Ibid 328. 
464  New Cap Reinsurance Limited (in liquidation) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 (‘New 
Cap’). 
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party and its tender into evidence will also constitute the provision of 
professional legal services relating to the proceedings.465  
As to the meaning of ‘an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding’, 
the Victorian Court of Appeal in Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v Victorian 
WorkCover Authority466 framed the appropriate consideration in the following 
manner when considering the common law test, which for these purposes is 
identical to the test under section 119 of the Uniform Evidence Law: 
…as a general rule at least, there must be a real prospect of litigation, as distinct 
from a mere possibility, but it does not have to be more likely than not.467 
Sections 122 and 126 of the Uniform Evidence Law concern circumstances in which 
client legal privilege (including litigation privilege) may be lost.  
Section 122 of the Act relevantly states: 
122 Loss of client legal privilege: consent and related matters 
(1)  This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence given with the 
consent of the client or party concerned. 
(2)  Subject to subsection (5), this Division does not prevent the adducing 
of evidence if a client or party has knowingly and voluntarily disclosed 
to another person the substance of the evidence. 
Section 126 of the Act states: 
126   Loss of client legal privilege: related communications and documents 
If, because of the application of section 121, 122, 123, 124 or 125, this Division 
does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or the contents 
of a document, those sections do not prevent the adducing of evidence of 
another communication or document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a 
proper understanding of the communication or document. 
Reliance upon an expert report in proceedings will therefore constitute either the 
consent of the client or the knowing and voluntary disclosure of the report and any 
privilege inhering in the report itself will be waived.  
                                                        
465  Ibid [28].Ibid, [28]. 
466  Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (2002) 4 VR 332.  
467  Ibid 341 (Batt JA, with whom Charles and Callaway JJA agreed). This approach has since been followed 
in New South Wales, including in Singapore Airlines v Sydney Airports Corporation [2004] NSWSC 
380, [19] (McDougall J) and in State of New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279, [67] (Giles 
JA). 
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Similarly, privilege in a communication or document may be waived if: the 
substance of such communication or document is disclosed in the expert report or 
by the expert; the expert has identified the communication or document as having 
been relied upon by the expert in reaching the opinion the subject of his or her report 
or testimony; or it is otherwise reasonably necessary to enable a proper 
understanding of the report or testimony made by the expert. The issue of waiver is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
B Creation and loss of privilege under the Uniform Evidence Law – some 
illustrations regarding expert evidence  
The position under the Uniform Evidence Law in the context of expert evidence has 
been aptly summarised by White J in New Cap468. In respect of the creation of 
privilege, his Honour relevantly stated: 
Section 119(b) of the Evidence Act extends the privilege to confidential 
documents, whether communicated or not, provided they were brought into 
existence with the requisite dominant purpose. The question however is what 
that purpose is. If an expert prepares a draft report, or notes for the report, with 
the dominant purpose of a draft report (whether the precise draft then prepared 
by the expert or an intended later draft) being furnished for comment or advice 
by the lawyer, then it is privileged. If not, it is not. 
The issue may not be an easy one to determine. In all probability, an expert 
witness retained by a lawyer for a party will prepare a draft report with the 
intention (and purpose) that it will set out the evidence which he or she expects 
to give, but also with the intention and purpose of its being considered and 
commented on by the party’s lawyers. If the latter purpose is dominant, the 
document so produced is privileged. If not, it is not privileged. 
In this way, in the case of claims for privilege over working notes and expert’s 
draft reports not communicated to a client’s lawyer, the same practical 
outcome may be reached in many cases whether the privilege is claimed at 
common law or under s 119 of the Evidence Act. However, the analysis of the 
claims must proceed on different paths. 469 
In the course of hearing the application before him, White J also considered it 
appropriate to inspect the documents the subject of the privilege claim. In this 
regard, he stated: 
                                                        
468  See n 464 above. 
469  New Cap [2007] NSWSC 258, [34]-[36]. 
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Following the course taken by Einstein J in Integral Energy Australia v EDS 
(Australia) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 971, I thought it appropriate to inspect the 
documents for which privilege is claimed in order to consider whether such 
documents may have influenced the content of the report. There are limits to 
whether this is a useful exercise. It would be impossible, as a matter of practice, 
and inappropriate, as a matter of principle, for a judge to approach that question 
in the same way as a party might wish to do so if preparing a cross-examination 
of the expert.470 
It should be noted that this is a course expressly authorised by section 133 of the 
Uniform Evidence Law, which relevantly states: 
If a question arises under this Part in relation to a document, the court may 
order that the document be produced to it and may inspect the document for 
the purpose of determining the question. 
Such an approach was endorsed by Gleeson CJ and Gaudron and Gummow JJ in 
Esso in which their Honours stated that: 
A claim for privilege is not conclusively established by the use of a verbal 
formula. A court has power to examine documents in cases where there is a 
disputed claim, and it should not be hesitant to exercise such a power.471 
Given that the majority decision in Esso constituted the reversal of the majority 
decision in Grant v Downs which had, until that time, maintained the ‘sole purpose’ 
test in determining the existence of privilege and the upholding of Barwick CJ's 
notable dissent in that case advocating just such a change, it is perhaps ironic that 
in Esso, some other words of Barwick CJ in Grant v Downs were clearly ignored, 
namely: 
Whether or not a document does so qualify [for privilege] is a question 
ultimately to be decided, if need be, upon an inspection by the judge of the 
document itself, and by the application of the stated principle. I say ‘if need 
be’ because where the judge who hears the application for inspection may 
possibly be the trial judge, sitting without a jury, it may be better to decide the 
matter upon the evidence as to the purpose of the production of the document 
rather than upon an inspection of it, thus avoiding any complication which 
might arise from the document having been seen by the judge and the privilege 
from inspection accorded to it.472 
It is contended that a rule of law precluding the disclosure of certain classes of 
documents is itself problematic if the only reliable means of enforcing it is for those 
                                                        
470  Ibid [51]. 
471  Esso v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49, 70. 
472  Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 677. 
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documents to be inspected by the relevant decision-maker. Further comments on 
this issue are made in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
The explication of the creation and loss of litigation privilege in the context of 
expert evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law made by White J in New Cap was 
further refined by Ball J in Traderight (NSW) Pty Limited v Bank of Queensland 
Limited (No. 14)473.  
Traderight 14 was one of a number of interlocutory judgements issued in respect 
of protracted litigation against the Bank of Queensland (‘BoQ’) by franchisees of 
the Bank of Queensland (referred to as "OMB [owner manager branch] Parties") 
against the BOQ. At a general level, the proceedings concerned the claim by the 
OMB Parties that the BoQ had, by inducing them to become interstate franchisees, 
engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. 
The OMB Parties briefed an expert, Professor Suzan Burton to provide a report 
regarding the adequacy of marketing investigations undertaken by the BoQ prior to 
its decision to offer interstate franchises. The OMB Parties had served a copy of the 
report in the proceedings and parts of the report had been accepted into evidence 
(and other parts rejected).474 
The BoQ served a subpoena on Professor Burton, seeking production of a range of 
documents related to the preparation of her report. The OMB Parties claimed 
privilege over three categories of documents to which the subpoena related, 
namely:475 draft reports of Professor Burton, containing comments, requests or 
advice made by the OMB Parties’ legal advisors and communicated to Professor 
Burton in connection with the proceedings; draft reports of Professor Burton created 
for the dominant purpose of or with the expectation that those draft reports would 
be provided to the OMB Parties’ legal advisors for the purpose of those advisors 
considering or providing comment or advice on those draft reports and 
                                                        
473  Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 14) [2013] NSWSC 211 (‘Traderight 14’). 
474  These matters were the subject of Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd & Ors v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 13) 
[2013] NSWSC 90 (‘Traderight 13’). 
475  Traderight 14 [2013] NSWSC 211, [3]. 
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communication to those advisors in connection with these proceedings; and 
documents recording communications between Professor Burton and the OMB 
Parties’ legal advisors concerning the draft reports or preparation of those draft 
reports for the dominant purpose of those legal advisors considering or providing 
comment or advice on those draft reports in connection with these proceedings. 
The BoQ challenged these claims for privilege, contending that they were not made 
in accordance with section 119 of the NSW Evidence Act because, inter alia, it was 
inconsistent for the OMB Parties to rely upon the report and at the same time 
maintain a claim for privilege over the other documents sought, on the basis of the 
exception to the operation of section 119 which is contained in section 122(2) of 
that Act,476 namely: 
Subject to subsection (5), this Division does not prevent the adducing of 
evidence if the client or party concerned has acted in a way that is inconsistent 
with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence because it 
would result in a disclosure of the kind referred to in section 118, 119 or 120. 
After reviewing a number of authorities, Ball J determined that it was appropriate, 
when deciding whether the exception in section 122(2) had been enlivened, to adopt 
the approach taken by White J in New Cap when dealing with a similar question in 
respect of section 122(1). That approach was encapsulated in the following 
statement by White J in New Cap: 
The question is not merely whether it could be said that the privileged materials 
were used in such a way that they could be said to influence the content of the 
report, but whether it could be said that they influenced the content of the report 
in such a way that the use or service of the report would be inconsistent with 
maintaining privilege in those materials, such as, where it would be unfair for 
the party to rely on the report without disclosure of the materials.477 
Of particular interest to White J was identifying the proper role of parties’ legal 
representatives in the preparation of an expert report. His Honour considered that 
there was indeed a positive role to play in influencing the admissibility or form of 
the report, rather than its substance.478 His Honour concluded that:  
                                                        
476  Ibid [7]-[8]. 
477  New Cap [2007] NSWSC 258, [53]. 
478  Ibid. 
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Likewise, privileged communications between an expert and the party’s 
lawyers have influenced the content of the report, in the sense of its form, 
although not in the sense of the formulation of the substantive opinions 
expressed by the expert. Likewise, privileged communications between an 
expert and the party’s lawyers whereby material information is provided to the 
expert in the form of assumptions or documents may well influence the content 
of the report.  
However, an expert’s report is required to state what materials and assumptions 
are relied on. Use of a final report, which refers to such materials and 
assumptions, is not inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality in the 
communications which produced the final report.479 
Applying that reasoning to the matter before him, Ball J found that there was 
nothing in the Burton Report that suggested the conclusions stated by Professor 
Burton were not her own or were based upon material other than that disclosed in 
her report.480   
In reaching this conclusion, his Honour frankly emphasised the court’s heavy 
dependence upon parties’ legal advisors ‘to ensure that any opinion expressed by 
an expert is an opinion the expert holds for the reasons that the expert gives and that 
the expert otherwise complies with the Expert Witness Code of Conduct’,481 which 
requirement was ‘reinforced by the acknowledgment that the expert is required to 
give concerning the code’.  
The decision in Traderight No 14 amounts to this: by reason of implied duties of a 
party’s lawyers and the express acknowledgments of an expert made in accordance 
with the Expert Witness Code of Conduct, a court will presume, absent evidence to 
the contrary, that communications between lawyer and expert have not affected the 
substance of an expert report and that such communications may remain the subject 
of a valid claim for legal professional privilege despite reliance by the party on that 
report.  
This is, in certain circumstances discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis, a 
dangerous assumption.  
                                                        
479  Ibid. 
480  Traderight 14 [2013] NSWSC 211, [23]. 
481  Ibid. 
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C Summary of expert related privilege in relation to the Uniform Evidence Law 
Uniform Evidence Law applies to all proceedings in New South Wales and the 
Commonwealth before a person or body that is required to apply the laws of 
evidence, with the exception of ancillary processes in the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction and the determination of disputes regarding production of documents 
upon subpoena made by a person other than the producing entity in New South 
Wales.482  The common law applies to determination of privilege claims arising 
outside of these parameters.483  
The Uniform Evidence Law affords privilege to confidential communications 
between clients and third parties and lawyers and third parties and confidential 
documents (whether delivered or not) prepared: for the dominant purpose of the 
client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or 
overseas proceeding or an anticipated Australian or overseas proceedings in which 
the client is or may be or was or might have been, a party. 
Privilege is lost: with the client's consent; if the substance of the document or 
communication is knowingly and voluntarily disclosed; or in a document or 
communication which is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of 
another communication or document that is not privileged. 
Documents created by an expert (other than for the limited purposes now permitted 
by section 118(c) of the Uniform Evidence Law) will only be privileged if the 
dominant purpose for their creation is the provision of professional legal services 
to a client in relation to an existing or anticipated Australian proceeding; will lose 
privileged status if: the substance of the document is disclosed to another person; 
or their content is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of another 
communication or document that is not privileged (such as an expert report that has 
been disclosed in proceedings –– however, absent some lacuna established in 
                                                        
482  See pages 119-124 above. 
483  See n 398 above. 
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respect of such a disclosed expert report, service of the report will not waive 
privilege in such communications and documents). 
IV The ‘Orthodoxy’ at Common Law 
A The Position 
By reason of the discussion above in the context of the Uniform Evidence Law, it is 
clear that the common law continues to apply to the determination of privilege 
claims not governed by the Uniform Evidence Law including, as discussed in 
greater detail above, in procedures before bodies not bound to apply the rules of 
evidence. The only exception to this would appear to be bodies whose legislative 
framework expressly excludes the operation of the rules of evidence and the right 
to maintain claims for privilege, such as under the Crime Commission Act 2012 
(NSW).484  
In Trade Practices Commission v Sterling,485 Lockhart J attempted to define the 
various classes of documents to which litigation privilege attached at common law. 
These relevantly included: 
(e)  Communications and documents passing between the party's solicitor 
and a third party if they are made or prepared when litigation is 
anticipated or commenced, for the purposes of the litigation, with a 
view to obtaining advice as to it or evidence to be used in it or 
information which may result in the obtaining of such evidence.486 
As previously foreshadowed, it is important to note that litigation privilege at 
common law does not extend to documents which are not communicated to the 
client or the lawyer of the client, and do not reveal communications between the 
expert and the client, or between the expert and the lawyer for the client.  
As to the meaning of ‘dominant purpose’, the same considerations as identified by 
Branson J in Sparnon v Apand (discussed above) apply. Similarly, the meaning of 
                                                        
484  See sections 23 and 39 of that Act. 
485  Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244. 
486  Ibid 245–246. 
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the phrase ‘when litigation is anticipated’ is relevantly explained in Mitsubishi 
Electric Australia Pty Limited v Victorian WorkCover Authority. 
At common law, the loss of privilege was explained with, perhaps deceptive, 
succinctness by Mason and Brennan JJ (as they then were) in Attorney-General for 
the Northern Territory v Maurice & Ors (1986) 161 CLR 475 in the following 
terms: 
A litigant can, of course, waive his privilege directly through intentionally 
disclosing protected material. He can also lose that protection through a waiver 
by implication. An implied waiver occurs when, by reason of some conduct on 
the privilege holder's part, it becomes unfair to maintain the privilege. The 
holder of the privilege should not be able to abuse it by using it to create an 
inaccurate perception of the protected communication … In order to ensure 
that the opposing litigant is not misled by an inaccurate perception of the 
disclosed communication, fairness will usually require that waiver as to one 
part of a protected communication should result in waiver as to the rest of the 
communication on that subject matter ... Hence, the implied waiver inquiry is 
at bottom focused on the fairness of imputing such a waiver.487 
Accordingly, at common law, legal advice privilege and litigation privilege can be 
waived either intentionally or impliedly. Where implied waiver is alleged, the court 
will be required to consider whether waiver has taken place by reference to the 
fairness of depriving the other party access to the material in all the circumstances 
of the case. The substance of the decision in Maurice is discussed in some detail in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
B Creation and loss of litigation privilege at common law – some illustrations 
regarding expert evidence 
In Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Southcorp Limited,488 
Lindgren J considered in a reasonably comprehensive manner, the way in which 
common law privilege attaches (or does not attach) to documents and 
communications typically generated during the course of an expert’s retainer. His 
Honour relevantly stated: 
I will apply the following principles which I did not understand to be in dispute: 
                                                        
487 Attorney General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 487–488. 
488  Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Southcorp Limited [2003] FCA 804 (‘Southcorp’). 
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1.  Ordinarily the confidential briefing or instructing by a prospective 
litigant’s lawyers of an expert to provide a report of his or her opinion 
to be used in the anticipated litigation attracts client legal privilege... 
2.  Copies of documents, whether the originals are privileged or not, where 
the copies were made for the purpose of forming part of confidential 
communications between the client’s lawyers and the expert witness, 
ordinarily attract the privilege... 
3.  Documents generated unilaterally by the expert witness, such as 
working notes, field notes, and the witness’s own drafts of his or her 
report, do not attract privilege because they are not in the nature of, and 
would not expose, communications... 
4.  Ordinarily disclosure of the expert’s report for the purpose of reliance 
on it in the litigation will result in an implied waiver of the privilege in 
respect of the brief or instructions or documents referred to in (1) and 
(2) above, at least if the appropriate inference to be drawn is that they 
were used in a way that could be said to influence the content of the 
report, because, in these circumstances, it would be unfair for the client 
to rely on the report without disclosure of the brief, instructions or 
documents; cf Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice… 
5.  Similarly, privilege cannot be maintained in respect of documents used 
by an expert to form an opinion or write a report, regardless of how the 
expert came by the documents… 
6. It may be difficult to establish at an early stage whether documents 
which were before an expert witness influenced the content of his or her 
report, in the absence of any reference to them in the report...489 
Lindgren J’s approach has been widely followed by courts applying the common 
law test to claims for privilege over expert-related documents490 and, on occasion, 
by way of apparent mistake, by courts that ought to have applied the corresponding 
tests under the Uniform Evidence Law.491  
However, policy considerations articulated by the courts in respect of the existence 
and loss of privilege at common law are marked by inconsistencies. For example, 
in Interchase Corporation Limited (in liquidation) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty 
Limited (No 1), Thomas J of the Supreme Court of Queensland, applying the 
                                                        
489  Ibid [21]. 
490  Watkins as litigation guardian for Watkins v State of Queensland [2007] QCA 430, [13]-[14] (Jerrard J), 
[92]-[94] (MacKenzie J); Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 33, [44] (Derham AsJ); Temwell 
Pty Ltd v DKGR Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 948, [7]-[8], [12] (Ryan J). 
491  Integral Energy Australia v Eds (Australia) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 971, [3] (Einstein J); Gourmet Gate 
Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Holding AG [2004] NSWSC 768, [28] (Einstein J); Ryder v 
Frohlich [2005] NSWSC 1342, [10]-[11] (Barrett J). 
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common law test to an issue regarding claims for privilege over the contents of draft 
reports prepared by an expert, said: 
[A]n expert is a third person from whom the client, represented by a solicitor, 
hopes to obtain an advantage … The solicitor is deliberately converting the 
expert into a witness. The community has some interest in ultimately being 
able to ensure (through the courts) that this process is not abused. It is desirable 
that the rules be such that the courts, or the adversary, be able to explore fairly 
fully the circumstances of the formation of the opinion...I would hold that in 
general … documents generated by the expert and information recorded in one 
form or another by the expert in the course of forming an opinion are not a 
proper subject for a claim of legal professional privilege.492 
In respect of the same issue and also applying the common law, Harper J of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria in Linter Group Limited v Price Waterhouse (a firm), 
said: 
Just as a Judge ought never to allow publication of a draft of a judgment, in 
part because it is necessary to preserve the freedom to change his or her mind 
on further reflection about the case, so experts should not be inhibited by fear 
of exposure of a draft from changing their minds when such change is 
warranted by the material before the expert.493 
Despite the tenet that ‘there is but one common law’,494 the disparate approaches 
taken in these decisions cannot readily be reconciled.495  
C Summary in relation to the common law 
The common law test for privilege and its loss applies to: all proceedings in New 
South Wales and the Commonwealth before a person or body that is not required 
to apply the laws of evidence (provided that privilege has not been expressly 
abrogated by statute); ancillary processes in Commonwealth courts that are required 
to apply the laws of evidence; the determination of claims for privilege in New 
                                                        
492  Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Limited (No 1) (1999) 1 Qd. R 141, 
164. 
493  Linter Group Limited v Price Waterhouse (a firm) [1999] VSC 245, [16]. 
494  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
495  In Filipowski v Island Marine Limited & Anor [2002] NSWLEC 177, Lloyd J intimates that the decision 
in Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Limited, op cit, can be explained 
other than by reference to principles regarding privilege because ‘the position in Queensland at that time 
was governed by the operation of O 35 r 5(2) of the Queensland Supreme Court Rules which says that a 
document consisting of a statement or report of an expert is not privileged from disclosure’ ([at 18]). A 
close examination of Interchase suggests that this is not the case and the rule did not apply to the 
documents the subject of the application (see Interchase, 159-160 (Thomas J)). 
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South Wales courts that are required to apply the laws of evidence where the 
application is in relation to documents produced pursuant to a subpoena and the 
applicant is not the entity producing those documents. 
The common law affords privilege to: confidential communications between clients 
and third parties and lawyers and third parties made, confidential documents but 
only to the extent exposing confidential communications made or prepared when 
litigation is anticipated or commenced, for the purpose of litigation for the dominant 
purpose of the client being provided with legal advice or evidence to be used or 
information which may result in the obtaining of such evidence. 
Privilege is lost if the substance of the communication is exposed or in 
circumstances in which it is unfair to deprive the other party of access to the 
material. 
V The Locus of the Remaining Discrepancy  
In many of the cases referred to above, despite a court’s failure adequately to 
grapple with the anterior question of whether the common law or Uniform Evidence 
Law test for the existence or loss of privilege applies, the ultimate decision was not 
demonstrably incorrect. This is because, once Esso conclusively resolved the 
disparity between the ‘sole purpose’ and the ‘dominant purpose’ tests, the common 
law and Uniform Evidence Law approaches are quite similar, save in one key 
respect. As intimated above, the common law approach to the existence of privilege 
is focused only upon communications and not documents which are not in the 
nature of, or record, communications. In Commissioner of Federal Police v 
Propend Finance Pty Limited,496 McHugh J said: 
This point, however trite it may seem, is fundamental to the determination of 
the present appeal. Much of the confusion present in the case law arises from 
a failure to apply it. Legal professional privilege is concerned with 
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communications, either oral, written or recorded, and not with documents per 
se.497 
By contrast, section 119 of the Uniform Evidence Law protects both 
communications and documents (whether delivered or not) that satisfy the other 
criteria.  
In the context of expert witnesses, this distinction may be critical. In respect of 
category 3 of the taxonomy of expert-related documents identified by Lindgren J in 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Southcorp Limited,498 namely: 
‘documents generated unilaterally by the expert witness, such as working notes, 
filed notes, and the witness's own drafts of his or her report, do not attract privilege 
because they are not in the nature of, and would not expose, communications’, 
where the common law applies, absent direct evidence that a draft report or other 
document generated by the expert was in the nature of, or would expose a 
communication made for the dominant purpose of the client receiving legal advice, 
privilege cannot be maintained in such a document. Indeed, whether a document 
falling within these categories could ever constitute or expose such a 
communication is itself a matter of controversy –– in Ryder v Frohlich,499 Barrett J 
stated: 
The point made here is that privilege can only attach to documents which 
embody communication between the expert and the litigant by whom the 
expert is retained (or the litigant's lawyer). A draft report prepared by the 
expert is not, of its nature, such a communication. It may be that the draft report 
is, in fact, given or sent by the expert to the litigant ot the litigant's lawyer, but 
that does not change its character as something prepared by the expert which 
is not intended to be a means of communication with the litigant or lawyer.500  
whereas in New Cap Reinsurance,501 White J stated: 
It was submitted that the fact of the draft reports being communicated did not 
change the fact that the purpose of their creation was not that they be 
communications between the expert and the client, or between the expert and 
the lawyers for the client.  
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I doubt that this would be a proper ground for rejecting a claim for privilege at 
common law in respect of the communication of a draft report to the lawyers 
for the client. I would infer that the draft reports were produced for the purpose 
of being communicated in that way. A document brought into existence by the 
expert for the purpose of being communicated to the client's lawyer for the 
purposes of the litigation would be privileged on any view of the authorities at 
common law, provided they have the necessary quality of confidentiality.502 
Other judges have been less likely to accept an inference of the nature adverted to 
by White J. In Tavcol v Verbeet,503 McDougall J said: 
Further, but only if the position is to be analysed according to the common law, 
there is another reason why there would be no privilege in the draft report. This 
is because [here his Honour quotes Lindgren J's third category, discussed 
above]. I accept that there may be cases where a draft expert report might 
expose communications of the relevant kind. However, there is no evidence 
that the draft report of Mr Hines would fall into that category, rather than into 
the more general category to which Lindgren J referred.504  
The result of the foregoing can be summarised in this manner: many documents 
typically generated by an expert in the course of an engagement (such as working 
notes, field notes and draft reports) are substantially less likely to be the subject of 
a successful claim for privilege if challenged in circumstances in which the common 
law applies than in corresponding situations where the Uniform Evidence Law 
applies.  
The common law continues to apply not only in fora which do not apply the laws 
of evidence, but to all ancillary processes in federal courts and to the determination 
of privilege claims made in New South Wales courts regarding access to documents 
produced pursuant to subpoenas but only where the party objecting to access is not 
the producing party.  
This means that, after the passage of more than two decades since the enactment of 
the Uniform Evidence Law in New South Wales and the federal jurisdiction, the 
answer to the question of whether a draft expert report is privileged may differ 
depending upon the forum of the proceedings and the time and by whom in a single 
set of proceedings at which the relevant objection is made. As intimated by Kirby J 
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in the quote that opened this chapter, this state of affairs is manifestly unsatisfactory 
and the complexity of the issue only serves to accentuate the desirability of reform 
regarding the availability of legal professional privilege to documents relating to 
expert witnesses, a topic discussed in the remaining chapters of this thesis.    
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CHAPTER 4 – THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND THE 
ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The consequences for the plaintiff when Mr Richards attempted, during 
Mr Dohrmann’s evidence, to shift the basis for Mr Dohrmann’s opinions to 
that expressed in the third version that I described above, were catastrophic. 
Mr Richards did not reveal his role in the third version of the report during the 
trial, but the deceptive and misleading nature of his conduct, which was 
attributed to the ‘plaintiff’s legal team’, was revealed once Mr Dohrmann was 
cross-examined. 
Dixon J in Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and 
Consultancy Services Pty Ltd505 
I Overview 
Chapter 2 of this thesis suggested that much of the recent angst regarding the 
position of the party-engaged expert within common law judicial systems can be 
explained as the product of a form of imagined nostalgia –– a phenomenon that 
appears to have a certain fin de siècle recurrence and force. The reality is that the 
problems associated with the use of the party-engaged expert have been widely 
canvassed and endured for centuries such that, much like the Churchillian refrain 
on democracy, its use can perhaps be described as constituting the ‘worst 
[approach], except for all the others’. Indeed, this appears to have been Judge 
Foster's advice from 1897 ‘the supposed evils of the present system are much 
exaggerated, and to a great extent imaginary that they are not to be cured by any 
remedy that has been or seems likely to be devised, and … on the whole, it is best 
to “let well enough alone”’.506 
A threshold question therefore, is whether discussion of reforming the law with 
respect to the party-engaged expert is even warranted.  
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This chapter seeks to answer that question by exploring the two problems of party-
engaged experts identified in Chapter 2: the issue of ‘bias’; and the paradigm of 
expert exceptionalism. 
Not only does the only existing survey of the Australian judiciary on expert 
evidence suggest that the presence of ‘bias’ to some degree is a common feature of 
the Australian legal system, but a number of reported decisions highlight the 
practical difficulties faced by triers of fact (be they judge or jury) in assessing the 
degree to which expert opinion evidence is or may be materially affected by such 
bias.   
The paradigm of expert exceptionalism, manifested in this context by the practice 
of ‘expert shopping’ is something notoriously difficult to identify in practice 
because the veil of legal professional privilege will typically extend around 
communications with and documents produced by experts such that the visibility 
of interactions between parties and their experts to courts and opponents will only 
become evident upon the occurrence of an extraordinary event, such as a party 
seeking to change a disclosed expert. English courts have developed rules around 
such circumstances and protocols more likely to flush out such practices. On the 
whole, these practices are currently unchecked by formal rules in New South Wales 
and the federal jurisdictions.  
A common thread to many problems associated with the use of party-engaged 
experts is the role of the lawyers in the engagement and management of the experts 
and their involvement in the settling of expert reports. It is at each of these instances 
that documents and communications the subject of legal professional privilege are 
generated and under the current orthodoxy (such as it is) discussed in Chapter 3, 
most of such documents and communications remain protected even after service 
of the relevant expert report in proceedings. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the role of lawyers in connection with the party-engaged expert and 
the shortcomings of the current approach to assessing claims for waiver of privilege 
over communications and documents generated in exchanges between experts and 
lawyers.   
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II The Problem of Expert ‘Bias’ 
A Judicial Perspectives 
In 1999, Ian Freckleton, Prasana Reddy and Hugh Selby published the work 
‘Austalian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: An Empirical Study’507 
(‘Judicial Perspectives’). Judicial Perspectives centres upon a survey of Australian 
judicial officers conducted in mid-1997 regarding their experiences of expert 
evidence. The authors indicate that the response rate to the survey was such that 
approximately 60% of all trial judges across Australia participated in the survey, 
thus suggesting the collection of meaningful data.508 This figure excludes 
magistrates, who were the subject of a separate survey.509 
A key aspect of the survey related to the ‘problems posed by expert evidence’. The 
authors of Judicial Perspectives commented on the responses to this issue in the 
following manner: 
Judges were asked in the survey whether they had encountered a number of 
problems that could impact upon the utility of expert evidence. Two thirds of 
those who answered the question (68.10% n=158) reported that they 
‘occasionally encountered’ bias on the part of experts, while just over a quarter 
(27.59% n=64) reported that they encountered this phenomenon ‘often’… This 
latter statistic is in some ways more significant. If bias is so prevalent that over 
a quarter of judges meet it ‘often’, this has ramifications for the functioning of 
the civil and criminal trial processes, especially if the bias is not readily 
detectable and measurable.510  
To interpolate, this suggests that approximately 95.69% of participating Australian 
judges experience bias by expert witnesses to the extent that it could impact upon 
the utility of the evidence given by such witnesses at least occasionally. Further, as 
set out below, a number of the respondents appeared to be somewhat circumspect 
regarding the use of the word ‘bias’ and these responses should be viewed in that 
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light. This is indicative of the presence of a systemic problem with the party-
engaged expert witness. 
As to the usage of the term ‘bias’, the authors stated: 
A number of judges cavilled at the term ‘bias’, linking it with deliberate 
disingenuousness and locating the source of frequent disagreements amongst 
experts in other factors. One respondent commented that experts tend to favour 
the party calling them, but that to call this propensity ‘bias’ was too strong a 
use of the term. A similar view was expressed by another respondent: ‘I have 
never found an expert who has put forward a view which he/she does not 
genuinely hold, for the sake of merely supporting a case. Some views become 
untentable, but not because of “bias” in the sense of a desire to further the case 
dishonestly’. Another intepreted ‘bias’ as a 'dishonest attempt to support the 
party calling the expert'.511 
Certain individual responses to the survey are also revealing, with one respondent 
stating: 
I suspect that the expert says what she/he believes the party paying for the 
report/evidence wishes to read/hear.512 
and another: 
[b]ias is almost inevitable given that the expert is paid by one party and only 
called if his/her evidence helps the party's case.513 
and yet another: 
[m]any experts are predictable in the sense of it is easy to know in advance 
what tack they will take. They are honest, but not necessarily objective.514 
It appears that, had the term ‘lack of impartiality’ been used in lieu of ‘bias’, the 
responsiveness may have been greater still. Nevertheless, when asked to rate the 
most serious problem with expert evidence, judges consistently identified ‘bias’.515 
This, out of a field containing (in descending order of frequency): bias; failure to 
prove bases of expert opinions; poor examination-in-chief; poor cross-examination; 
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difficult language used by the expert; other; exceeding parameters of expertise; and 
non-responsiveness by expert to questions.516 
Not only was ‘bias’ identified with the most frequency in response to this question, 
but that frequency (85 respondents, equating to 34.84% of the total), was more than 
double that of the next most-identified problem, namely ‘failure to prove bases of 
expert opinions’ (34 respondents, equating to 13.93% of the total).517  
Judicial Perspectives was published shortly after the introduction of the first 
Federal Court Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses but before the introduction of 
mandatory codes for experts within various other Australian jurisdictions.518 In 
addition to the usage of such codes, the authors of Judicial Perspectives 
recommended the introduction of a mandatory declaration to be given by party-
called experts so as to emphasise the requirement of independence.519 In relation to 
expert independence, they concluded that: 
The challenge is to address the culture amongst experts prepared to do forensic 
work that has tolerated a preparedness among a percentage of experts to 
compromise their objectivity and neutrality. Then, conceding that the culture 
will never be entirely eliminated, the task is to create checks and balances 
within the functioning of the litigation system to counteract what survives of 
the culture.520 
The reliability of the methodology adopted by and the conclusions expressed in 
Judicial Perspectives has been questioned.  
In ‘Judging Surveys: Experts, Empirical Evidence and Law Reform’,521 Gary 
Edmond was particularly concerned about the efficacy of Judicial Perspectives' 
approach to the issue of bias amongst expert witnesses. He stated: 
Perhaps the most revealing dimension in the treatment of bias is the fact that 
judges were actually asked about it. The authors appear to believe that bias is 
a stable, tangible, observable quality and that their questions will produce 
consensus around its meaning and distribution. We can be confident that these 
assumptions are intended because the Report does not treat the judicial 
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responses ironically. That is, it makes no inquiry into what bias is or how it 
might be that judges consider themselves capable of ascertaining whether an 
expert is biased.522 
Pausing there, it should be noted that Judicial Perspectives does recognise some 
difficulty about the usage of the word ‘bias’.523 In fact it suggests that many 
respondents were concerned that the term betokened deliberate dishonesty. In this 
sense, it might be considered that the study under-, rather than over-emphasises the 
incidence of judicial concern over partisan behaviours by experts. 
Nevertheless, Professor Edmond considers that the assumptions underpinning the 
conclusions expressed in Judicial Perspectives are ultimately ‘self-defeating - 
especially in relation to the reform agenda’,524 rhetorically noting: 
…if judges are able to identify incidents of bias and we can rely upon their 
observations, then why should we (or they) regard bias as a serious problem. 
This leads to something of a paradox. If judges can identify bias then 
presumably they can deal with it. Alternatively, if they are unable to identify 
bias, or experience difficulty ascertaining it, then on what grounds can we rely 
on the judicial responses (to various questions in the survey)?525 
Nice though it may be, such a summation may not appropriately encapsulate the 
real issue. The expert so biased that his or her testimony must be ignored entirely is 
a rare (though extant, as discussed below526) creature. The danger of the approach 
in Judging Surveys is that it appears to set up the notion that ‘unbiased expertise is 
attainable’ as a straw man: 
[f]or those who believe in the possibility of obtaining unbiased expertise the 
presence of bias may represent a very serious threat to legal institutions and 
social order. However, once we adopt more theoretically and empirically 
plausible models of expertise such simplistic models of bias and objectivity 
become both less tenable and less threatening. Only when we recognise that 
strong forms of objectivity are unattainable can we begin to craft more 
pragmatic means of identifying forms of expertise which are understood as 
adequate for the purposes of legal decision making.527 
The actual problem, as articulated by judges, is, by contrast, the more subtle and 
complex problem of evaluating competing expert opinions (which, by definition are 
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beyond the expertise of the decision-maker) where either or both is influenced to 
some opaque degree by bias.528  
By way of example, in Knight v Stocken,529 a medical negligence case, Simpson J 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was faced with a situation in which the 
plaintiff’s only expert to ‘directly inculpate the defendant in any breach of duty’ 
was an inherently problematic witness. The difficulty of assessing such evidence, 
despite an awareness of potential bias, is illustrated by her Honour’s reasoning, 
which included the following passage: 
It is always difficult to assess the opinions of competing expert witnesses. In 
this case the task was made more than usually difficult. I am bound to disclose 
that Dr J. was as aggressive a witness as I have ever observed, particularly 
when consideration is limited to professional witnesses. She was combative, 
and, it seemed to me, perceived herself to be sparring with counsel who cross-
examined her. She sought to score points…530 
But it was not so much the aggression, as the potential lack of objectivity that most 
concerned Simpson J: 
I did not gain the impression that she saw her role as attempting to assist the 
court to come to the correct result, or to inform the court on matters within her 
expertise. Rather, she appeared to see herself as advancing or defending a 
position. The extent to which her evidence can be relied upon suffered as a 
result. That is not solely because of her aggressive manner, but because I 
concluded that her aggressive manner bespoke an absence of the requisite 
objectivity which the court relies upon expert witnesses to display. Without 
that objectivity an expert witness’ credibility is diminished.531  
The result was that her Honour was forced to attempt to ‘make a fair evaluation’ of 
the evidence, ‘disregarding the manner in which it was given’.532 Such an approach 
is self-evidently difficult and that difficulty is also illustrated by one of the seminal 
cases regarding the admissibility of evidence given by an expert witness who cannot 
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claim to be wholly independent, namely that of Fagenblat v Feingold Partners Pty 
Ltd,533 discussed later in this chapter.  
B Manifestations in Caselaw – some examples 
A rare example of the exhibition of bias so patent that the trial judge had little 
difficulty in substantially disregarding all evidence given by an expert witness can 
be found in the case-study within Justice Cooper’s article referred to above in 
Chapter 2.534  The article references the English case of Cala Homes (South) Limited 
v Alfred McApline Homes East Limited,535 in which a Mr Goodall was called to give 
expert testimony on matters related to architecture. In the course of the proceedings, 
Mr Goodall was confronted with an article that he had previously written titled ‘The 
Expert Witness: Partisan with a Conscience’.536 The content of the article is so 
astonishing to the contemporary practitioner, that it is worth quoting in detail: 
…the man who works the Three Card Trick is not cheating, nor does he incur 
any moral opprobium, when he uses his sleight of hand to deceive the eye of 
the innocent rustic and to deny him the information he needs for a correct 
appraisal of what has gone on. The rustic does not have to join in; but if he 
chooses to, he is ‘fair game’. 
If by an analogous ‘sleight of mind’ an expert witness is able to present the 
data that they seem to suggest an interpretation favourable to the side 
instructing him, that is, it seems to me, within the rules of our particular game, 
even if it means playing down or omitting  some material consideration. 
‘Celatio veri’537 is, as the maxim has it, ‘suggestio falsi’538, and concealing what 
is true does indeed suggest what is false, but it is no more than a suggestion, 
just as the Three Card Trick was only a suggestion about the data, not an 
outright misrepresentation of them.  
Mr Goodall admitted that he had approached the writing of his expert report from 
the perspective of a ‘hired gun’.539 Unsurprisingly, the judge did not appreciate 
being posited in the role of the ‘innocent rustic’ and Mr Goodall’s evidence was 
given little weight.540 
                                                        
533  Fagenblat v Feingold Partners Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 454. 
534  See n 234 above. 
535  Cala Homes (South) Limited v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Limited [1995] EWHC Ch 7. 
536  Quoted in Cooper, above n 234 207. 
537  Namely, the ‘concealment of truth’. 
538  Namely, the ‘suggestion of deceit’. 
539  Cooper, above n 234, 209. 
540  Ibid. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 149 
In other cases, the fact of bias is evident from the outset but the manner in which 
the bias should be taken into account when receiving and weighing the evidence of 
the expert becomes challenging. Some of the difficulties faced by a trial judge in 
evaluating the impact of bias on expert testimony are demonstrated in the case of 
Fagenblat v Feingold Partners Pty Limited.541 Here, the plaintiff sought to rely upon 
expert accounting evidence given by a Mr Borsky. That approach was impugned 
by the defendant on two key bases relating to the potential bias of Mr Borsky, 
namely: that Mr Borsky had been previously involved in the preparation of accounts 
for the firm the subject of the dispute; and that Mr Borsky was the brother-in-law 
of the plaintiff.  
Pagone J, who delivered judgment at first instance, found that Mr Borsky was not 
disqualified from giving expert evidence merely by reason of these facts and 
provided that he otherwise satisfied the criteria for the giving of expert evidence.542 
However, his Honour considered that these facts should be taken into account in 
determining the weight to be accorded to Mr Borsky’s evidence.543 His Honour 
stated: 
Experts do have duties to the Court to be independent … [t]he risk that such 
duties might be breached permit a testing of the partiality of a witness so that 
the Court may assess the assistance that can be gained from the expert evidence 
which is given … [t]he reason for these duties, however, stem (sic) from the 
need to ensure that the evidence which is before the Court is useful in the sense 
of being probative and reliable.544 
The conclusion reached by Pagone J was that ‘[i]t is for the Court to assess the value 
of evidence. It is easy to conceive of instances of expert evidence where partiality 
could have no conceivable impact upon the reliability of the expert evidence 
tendered’.545  
Ironically, having articulated the appropriate test, his Honour failed to apply it and 
in fact appears to have misplaced confidence in Mr Borsky’s assessments based 
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upon his impugned relationship with the parties rather than upon any specialised 
qualifications or training. Upon appeal, Pagone J’s finding that issues as to the 
partiality of experts go to weight rather than admissibility, was upheld.546 However, 
Pagone J’s ultimate findings in the case were set aside. Ormiston JA, with whom 
Chernov and Eames JJA agreed, stated: 
Mr Borsky was not exactly an outsider in this dispute and, despite the fact that 
the judge felt that his expert opinion was not infected by his relationship to the 
respondent and his wife, the very factual issue here in dispute is one about 
which one should be especially cautious in accepting the conclusions of a 
witness of this kind, whatever may fairly be said about the reliability of his 
professional opinion. But, in any event, Mr Borsky’s impressions were simply 
not relevant. 
… 
The difficulty in the present case is that the learned judge chose to ignore the 
actual events which later occurred, and yet he not only relied on certain 
evidence which could relate only to a period after 30 June but indeed placed 
heavy store on it. That evidence was the evidence of Mr Borsky and what the 
judge described as his ‘special factual knowledge’.547 
In such circumstances, in contrast to the position articulated in Judging Surveys, it 
cannot be reliably argued that an ability to identify bias equips a judge with the 
means of addressing it.  
Judging Surveys is especially critical of the notion expressed in Judicial 
Perspectives that adherence to a mandatory form of ‘experts’ declaration’ may 
ameliorate some of the problems identified: 
[t]his highly idealised - or, to adopt the authors’ terminology, ‘positivist’ - 
approach implies that a declaration will change a partisan culture they associate 
with expert witnesses. It also implies that experts are generally inattentive to a 
range of existing ethical, legal and professional obligations.548 
Once again, this perhaps overstates the degree of faith reposed by Judicial 
Perspectives in such a declaration.549 
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Judging Surveys concludes that the imposition of such a declaration will achieve 
little other than the entrenchment of ‘an existing symbolic order’: 
How will the reforms change expert culture? … Once we accept (along with 
the authors at various places in the Report) that experts frequently and 
legitimately disagree, then the culture of partiality becomes highly suspect as 
an analytical tool. This seems to be confirmed by the difficulties determining 
whether a particular expert is biased, whether intentionally or not. We can 
always allege that an expert is biased. Usually, such an allegation will involve 
attributing various forms of interest or alignment. Proving that an expert is 
actually biased in a way that ought to change the status of their evidence may 
be harder.550 
Indeed, this latter acceptance appears to go some way towards recognising that 
‘bias’, ‘partisanship’ or a ‘diminishment in objectivity’, howsoever it is labelled, 
can affect and infect expert evidence in a manner that makes it fundamentally more 
difficult for the trier of fact to ascertain the extent of its influence over the opinion 
expressed. This tends to contradict the force of the author's argument with respect 
to the ‘paradox’ inherent in Judicial Perspectives.  
But even if the conclusions expressed in Judicial Perspectives are flawed from a 
methodological perspective, where does this leave the status of expert evidence 
within the Australian civil and criminal trial systems? As Professor Edmond is 
quick to state, to debunk Judicial Perspectives is not to ‘suggest that as it stands (or 
stood) everything is rosy, or that certain types of expert practice, perhaps including 
forms of partisanship, do not cause acute problems for legal practice’.551 
Where then, lies evidence as to the extent of expert partisanship affecting the 
Australian justice system? Absent a further comprehensive study of judicial 
attitudes since the publication of Judicial Perspectives, or a more wide-ranging 
analysis of the kind advocated by Professor Edmond in Judging Surveys,552 we are 
left with the potentially imperfect and now somewhat outdated conclusions 
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expressed in Juidicial Perspectives which (perhaps unreliably) concludes that there 
is a problem that warrants redress.   
But there are other sources –– the best available evidence of the existence of expert 
witness partisanship in the criminal and civil justice systems in Australia appears to 
be reported decisions that expressly identify the issue and its effect on the 
determination of matters the subject of the decision. In referring to such decisions, 
it is important to be mindful, not only of the rhetorical paradox regarding the 
identification of bias referred to in Judging Surveys,553 but also to the significant 
number of proceedings that settle before hearing and delivery of judgment554 and 
those cases in which biased conduct is not identified because the veil of legal 
professional privilege is not pierced by reason of there being no evident lacuna in 
an expert report or testimony or it not being identified by the other party or court.555 
Accordingly, it may be inferred that references to partisanship of expert witnesses 
in reported decisions understate the presence and extent of partisan experts 
operating within the system. 
In Wood v R,556 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal considered, in the 
context of Gordon Wood’s appeal against conviction for the murder of Caroline 
Byrne, expert testimony given by Associate Professor Cross at the original trial and 
once again in light of a book published by Associate Professor Cross after the trial 
but, somewhat extraordinarily, whilst the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal 
was pending. McClellan CJ at CL, with whom Latham J and Rothman J relevantly 
agreed, found that the content of Associate Professor Cross’s book was such that it: 
                                                        
553  See n 525 above. 
554  Reliable statistics in this area are lacking. A 2005 case-study using the District Court of New South Wales 
suggested that figures from 2002 identified an overall pre-trial settlement rate of 71 per cent: David 
Spencer, ‘The Phenomenon of the Vanishing Civil Trial’ (2005) 8(2) ADR Bulletin 2. The 2015 Annual 
Review published by the Supreme Court of New South Wales identified that of the 518 cases listed for 
court-annexed mediation, 51 per cent settled at mediation and a further 27 per cent of cases were noted 
as "still negotiating" at the conclusion of the court-annexed mediation. The Court does not keep records 
of private mediations or matters settled after court-annexed mediation. Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, ‘2015 Annual Review’ (Supreme Court of New South Wales, 2015) 32 
<http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.,gov.au/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Reviews%20Stats/
Annual_Review_2015.pdf>.  
555  See the discussion in Chapter 3. 
556  Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581. 
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makes plain that he approached his task with the preconception that, based on 
his behaviour [disclosed to him by police], as reported after Ms Byrne had died, 
the applicant had killed her. He clearly saw his task as being to marshal the 
evidence which may assist the prosecution to eliminate the possibility of 
suicide and leave only the possibility of murder.557 
The case constitutes a striking example of a matter in which the relevant expert 
evidence ‘was critical to the Crown case … because, without it, the Crown could 
not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Ms Byrne had committed suicide’558 and 
yet it was this expert evidence that was the product of an expert who: 
…took upon himself the role of investigator and became an active participant 
in attempting to prove that the applicant had committed murder. Rather than 
remaining impartial to the outcome and offering his independent expertise to 
assist the Court he formed the view … that the applicant was guilty and it was 
his task to assist in proving his guilt.559 
In the circumstances of this case, it was the performance of lectures by the expert 
in question and the publication of a book regarding his role in the proceedings that 
constituted ‘fresh evidence’ upon which the Court of Appeal based its conclusion 
that: 
if the book and speech had been available to the defence and the extent of 
A/Prof Cross' partiality made apparent, his evidence would have been assessed 
by the jury to be of little if any evidentiary value on any controversial issue.560  
It is evident that during the course of the hearing at first instance, a subpoena was 
served on Associate Professor Cross. It is unclear from the available judgment 
whether production of any material the subject of that subpoena was resisted on the 
grounds of legal professional privilege although it is inferred in any event that the 
manner in which Associate Professor Cross collated material responsive to that 
subpoena involved the adoption of questionable practices: 
A/Prof … resisted production of the material. When the material was finally 
produced, A/Prof Cross claimed that a prior ‘crash’ of his hard drive meant 
that not all of the material subpoenaed could be produced. He went on to 
explain that as a consequence of this ‘crash’ he had needed to edit the recovered 
emails (278 of "about 30,000") to put them into ‘readable’ form … Following 
this A/Prof Cross admitted that in order to obtain leverage to enable him to 
claim a larger fee for the provision of the emails, he copied them onto a disc 
                                                        
557  Ibid 617. 
558  Ibid 628–629 (Latham J). 
559  Ibid 625 (McClellan CJ at CL). 
560  Ibid. 
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that he was aware there would be trouble reading, expecting the applicant's 
solicitor to have to contact him again at which point he could request more 
money.561 
It is also clear that certain relevant emails passing between Associate Professor 
Cross and those who had engaged him were not made available until the Court of 
Appeal proceedings,562 once again suggesting that only limited production had been 
made in the original proceedings out of a total body of material that was germane 
to the findings of the jury. 
Lest it be considered that the involvement of Associate Professor Cross in the 
prosecution case in Wood v R constituted an extreme and unique instance of 
circumstances in which the independence of an expert may be eroded by over-
involvement in a party’s assembly of a case (or defence), the decision of Austin J 
in ASIC v Rich563 provides a similar (if less spectacular) example. 
In ASIC v Rich, Paul Carter, a forensic accountant employed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers was not only involved in the decision making process of 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) to commence 
proceedings against four former directors of the failed corporation ‘One.Tel 
Limited’ (proceedings ‘in which he then was proferred as an expert witness’564) but 
also, the PricewaterhouseCoopers ‘team, but not Mr Carter personally, continued 
to have a role in assisting ASIC in connection with the proceedings, in 
circumstances where the arrangements to prevent the flow of information from 
them to him were neither adequate nor wholly effective’.565  
These difficulties were of such a magnitude that Austin J refused to admit into 
evidence an expert report prepared by Mr Carter for ASIC, noting that ‘this is not a 
case where particular propositions can be identified and excised with surgical 
precision … [the problem] has affected the entire process of formation of the 
opinions ultimately expressed in [the Carter] Report’, the essence of which was ‘the 
                                                        
561  Ibid 622–623. 
562  Ibid 624. 
563  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 53 ACSR 110. 
564  Ibid 192. 
565  Ibid. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 155 
probably unconscious use of excluded material and a consequent failure to state the 
full and real factual basis and reasoning process’.566 
In Wood v R and ASIC v Rich, the potential lack of objectivity of the expert in 
question was so pervasive as to militate against the placing of any weight upon the 
evidence of that expert.  However, on occasion, an expert’s lack of objectivity may 
be capable of determination not from extensive accounts of involvement in a party’s 
case, but from the merest piece of evidence. Universal Music v Sharman567 
concerned claims by the applicants that the respondents had, through use of their 
developed technology, infringed copyright in a number of recordings.  
Two of the expert witnesses called by respondent parties were Professor Ross, a 
Professor of Computer Science at the Polytechnic University in Brooklyn New 
York,568 and Dr Clarke. 
The presiding judge, Wilcox J, considered that Professor Ross was ‘obviously well 
qualified to give expert evidence in this case’.569 However, the cross-examination of 
Professor Ross caused his Honour to lose confidence in him. The event in question 
involved the production of a draft report prepared by Professor Ross which depicted 
communications between Professor Ross and his instructing solicitors. Wilcox J’s 
judgment includes the following account: 
Professor Ross initially wrote the words: ‘The Altnet TopSearch Index works 
in conjunction with the Joltid PeerEnabler to search for Gold Files’. The 
solicitor crossed out this sentence on the draft and suggested a substitute 
sentence: ‘TopSearch searches its own Index file of available Altnet content 
and PeerEnabler is not needed or used for this, other than to assist in the 
periodic downloading of these indexes of available content’. Professor Ross 
replied: ‘I was not aware of this, even after our testing. But if you say it is so, 
then fine by me’. He left the solicitor’s words in the draft. 
                                                        
566  Ibid 205. 
567  Universal Music v Sharman (2005) 220 ALR 1. 
568  Ibid 57. 
569  Ibid. 
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Professor Ross responded to this line of cross-examination by relying on a 
recollection that he was not comfortable with the solicitor’s proposed wording and 
took it out of his report, upon which:570 
Mr Bannon … showed Professor Ross the email showing the solicitor’s 
response to his ‘fine by me’ reaction. The solicitor said: ‘Keith, we want to try 
to avoid you being exposed to criticism so how about’. The solicitor then 
suggested the sentence that appears in Professor Ross’ final report.571  
Wilcox J concluded that ‘Professor Ross was prepared seriously to compromise his 
independence and intellectual integrity’ and accordingly, his Honour ‘formed the 
view it might be unsafe to rely upon Professor Ross in relation to any controversial 
matter’.572  
Dr Clarke fared even more dismally, with Wilcox J noting that, in respect of certain 
expert witnesses proferred by the parties, he ‘was compelled to form an adverse 
view about the objectivity or intellectual integrity of the witness’, singling out Dr 
Clarke ‘whose evidence on behalf of the Altnet parties was little more than a 
partisan polemic’.573  
The judgment of Wilcox J does not expressly reveal the circumstances in which the 
communications between Professor Ross and his instructing solicitors came to be 
exposed to the solicitors for the applicants. Presumably, it was the result of either a 
notice to produce served on the relevant respondent entity or a subpoena issued to 
Professor Ross. However, the primary position under either the common law or 
Uniform Evidence Law tests for the existence of legal professional privilege would 
have afforded protection to those communications because, inter alia, they were 
clearly communications made for the dominant purpose of the client being provided 
with professional legal services in connection with anticipated or commenced legal 
proceedings.574 The lack of a published interlocutory hearing on the issue of 
privilege and the statement by Wilcox J that it was not until cross-examination that 
                                                        
570  Ibid. 
571  Ibid. 
572  Ibid. 
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574  See discussion at pages 124-133 above.  
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his view of Professor Ross was shaken575 also suggest that the disclosure of the 
relevant communications in this matter by the respondents was inadvertent.  
Irrespective of how the material in question came to light in this case, the 
assumptions that would typically be applied by the courts upon service of an expert 
report such as that of Professor Ross, were here not borne out. This is the very 
species of case that makes dangerous the assumption articulated by Ball J in 
Traderight No 14 that, absence evidence to the contrary, a court will presume that 
communications between a lawyer and an expert have not affected the substance of 
the expert’s report.576  
A further example of the manner in which a failure by an expert and a client’s legal 
representatives to adhere to codes of conduct has, when combined with the 
application of legal professional privilege, the ability to conceal material evidence 
is contained in Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty 
Limited & Ors.577 In that case, the plaintiff’s engaged expert witness and legal 
counsel were the subject of extensive criticism by the court in connection with 
conduct that only came to light in the course of examination of that expert.  
The case concerned a damages claim in respect of injuries sustained by Ms 
Hudspeth when she fell whilst cleaning a toilet block. It had transpired that the 
expert had prepared a report dated 9 April 2010, in which he had initially written: 
Ms Hudspeth said that she had not previously seen any evidence of vandalism 
or missing soap dispensers during the few months over which they had been 
installed.578 
This statement was consistent with the content of a discussion between Ms 
Hudspeth and the expert occurring shortly after his engagement.579  
The report was served on the other parties on this date. However, this paragraph 
was inconsistent with instructions that the expert had been given by Ms Hudspeth’s 
                                                        
575  Universal Music v Sharman (2005) 220 ALR 1, 57. 
576  See note 481 above.  
577  Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd & Ors (No 8) [2014] VSC 567. 
578  Ibid [47]. 
579  Ibid [104], [129]. 
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legal representatives.580 The plaintiff’s solicitor, upon becoming aware of this on or 
about 30 June 2010, spoke to an assistant to the expert who, at the solicitor’s 
request, amended the paragraph to read: 
Ms Hudspeth said that she had previously seen evidence of vandalism on the 
soap dispensers during the few months over which they had been installed, to 
which she had advised her employer.581 
In doing so, the assistant over-wrote the existing electronic version of the report and 
the revised report was re-issued to the plaintiff’s solicitor who served it on the 
parties on 1 July 2010 as an ‘updated report’ (still bearing the date 9 April 2010 and 
the expert’s signature) but without identifying the nature of the amendments or basis 
upon which the amendments were made.582 When this came to light in the 
circumstances set out below, the court found that the affixing of the expert’s 
signature in respect of the ‘updated report’ constituted a representation that the 
expert had read and authorised the report. However in the facts that transpired, the 
court found that representation in this case to be false.583 
The second version of the report did not find its way into all agreed bundles and 
reference copies for the purposes of the trial, such that, when the plaintiff’s senior 
counsel came to examine the expert witness in chief, he did so by reference to the 
amended report, but the expert witness had in front of him only the initial report. 
The confusion was compounded by the fact that the defendants had not until that 
point, realised that there were two different versions of the same report.584 
Dixon J’s judgment includes the following comments and extract from the 
transcript: 
Mr Dohrmann [the expert] then gave his evidence in chief by reading from his 
report until the following exchange occurred: 
WITNESS:      Ms Hudspeth said that she had not previously seen any 
evidence of vandalism"  
                                                        
580  Ibid [49]-[53]. 
581  Ibid [52]. 
582  Ibid [54]. 
583  Ibid [127]. 
584  Ibid [63]. 
  
 
SJD Thesis – Andrew Stuart Murray 
Page | 159 
MR RICHARDS [Senior Counsel for the plaintiff] :       I beg your 
pardon, read that again, please? --- ‘Ms Hudspeth that [sic] said she had 
not previously seen any evidence’   
Try again, please, I think the word ‘not’, 4.24? --- ‘Ms Hudspeth said 
that she had not previously seen’ - - 
Is the word ‘not’ there? --- The word ‘not’ is in the one I'm reading 
from.  It's in this copy here.  This may not be the time but if I can - I 
will eventually have recourse to my notes on that point… 
This passage of transcript does not fully reveal the drama of the moment. For 
the plaintiff, this was a devastating turning point in her fortune in the trial. It is 
now apparent that Mr Richards was referring to the second version of Mr 
Dohrmann’s report in leading his evidence but Mr Dohrmann was reading from 
the first version of the report. Each was unaware that the version in possession 
of the other existed.585 
As a consequence of the above exchange, the plaintiffs were required to provide to 
the other parties a complete copy of the expert’s file.586 This disclosed the existence 
of a third report –– a supplementary report prepared by the expert at the request of 
the plaintiff’s senior counsel on or about 12 November 2012 (that is, during the 
course of the trial). The expert gave the following explanation of this report in the 
course of cross-examination: 
COUNSEL:     Did you understand that he was requesting you to alter your 
report? --- No, he wasn't.  He wouldn't do that.  He wanted me to take those 
instructions, they are factual instructions, they are from the plaintiff ultimately, 
being her statement, and suggested that I might prepare an amended report 
which I did. 
So you prepared a third report? --- I did, in which - - - 
For what purpose?  What were you going to do with this third report? --- I was 
awaiting directions on that point.  I was just told to prepare it.  I didn't know 
where it was going to be done.  I believe nothing was done with it.  It corrected 
the errors around the facts of the order of events.587 
The court did not accept the expert’s explanation. The court made adverse findings 
in respect of the conduct of both senior counsel for the plaintiff and the expert. In 
respect of the plaintiff’s senior counsel, Dixon J said: 
The consequences for the plaintiff when Mr Richards attempted, during 
Mr Dohrmann’s evidence, to shift the basis for Mr Dohrmann’s opinions to 
that expressed in the third version that I described above, were catastrophic. 
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Mr Richards did not reveal his role in the third version of the report during the 
trial, but the deceptive and misleading nature of his conduct, which was 
attributed to the ‘plaintiff’s legal team’, was revealed once Mr Dohrmann was 
cross-examined.588 
In respect of conduct of the expert, Dixon J made the following findings: 
When Mr Dohrmann explained that given he had provided the third version to 
the legal team, he felt it was not for him to mention it in his evidence if 
Mr Richards didn’t go to it, he demonstrated that he was not adhering to the 
Expert Code of Conduct when giving his evidence in chief… It revealed that 
Mr Dohrmann [sic] not assisting the Court impartially on matters relevant to 
his expertise. He was acting as an advocate for the plaintiff. Mr Dohrmann was 
advocating for the plaintiff by his acquiescence in Mr Richards’ forensic 
tactics. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances where it would be proper for 
an expert to engage in forensic tactics.589 
Absent the discrepancy between the first and second reports and the confusion 
between expert and senior counsel during the expert’s examination in chief, it is 
difficult to see how the third report and the revelations regarding the lack of 
impartiality of the expert would have come to light. This species of conduct is one 
that is preserved by the current orthodoxy with respect to the application of legal 
professional privilege to expert evidence and the inability of other parties to be able 
to access all communications and documents exchanged between an expert and 
those instructing the expert unless a discrepancy such as the one that emerged 
during evidence in chief in this case, occurs. 
It should also be noted that each of Wood v R, ASIC v Rich, Universal v Sharman 
and Hudspeth took place after and in spite of the introduction of expert witness 
codes of conduct in the jurisdictions within which they were decided. This suggests 
that the existence of codes of conduct for expert witnesses is not itself a sufficient 
deterrent to the problem they seek to address. The efficacy of related approaches, 
such as that of a declaration to be given by experts, as proposed proponents of 
reform,590 could be impugned for the same reason. 
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III ‘Witness Shopping’ and the Paradigm of Expert 
Exceptionalism 
None of the above considerations, which deal with the difficulties posed by expert 
witness bias, squarely address the paradigm of expert exceptionalism,591 namely, the 
tendency of parties to call only experts supportive of their case and thereby ‘shop’ 
for the appropriate expert to engage. This is because, absent circumstances in which 
a party is required to change experts mid-engagement, the courts have no visibility 
over the number of experts canvassed or engaged by a party and absent service of 
a report by an expert, the opposing party has no means of piercing the veil of 
privilege on the grounds of ‘fairness’ or any other criterion for the reasons set out 
in Chapter 3.  
Apart from statements expressing opprobium at the practice of ‘expert witness 
shopping’, there is scant Australian authority on the issue itself.  
In Succar v Bankstown City Coucil,592 Pepper J sitting in the Land and Environment 
Court made the following comments when hearing an application on the part of the 
Council to vacate a hearing date on the basis that it needed to brief a new expert 
witness. Her Honour stated: 
It must be remembered that an expert witness’ paramount duty is to the Court 
and not to the party engaging the expert … [c]learly a party who engages in 
‘expert witness shopping’ in order to obtain the services of a witness willing 
to provide evidence favourable only to that party risks compromising the 
impartiality of that expert evidence.593 
In Richard Williams & Anor v Chief Executive, Department of Environment and 
Resource Management,594 a matter before the Land Court of Queensland, the 
respondent government agency, during the course of proceedings, ceased to engage 
its first nominated hydro-geological expert, Mr Lait and substituted a new expert, 
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Dr Evans. Henry J, with whom MacDonald P agreed, gave consideration to this 
conduct in the context of an application for a costs order by the appellants: 
…the respondent's silence below and in this court as to why it abandoned use 
of Mr Lait as its expert is telling. There might sometimes be instances where 
an engaged expert provides evidence so lacking in expert reasoning, 
foundation or other necessary quality that the witnesss should not be relied on. 
But if that were the case in respect of Mr Lait it could readily have been 
revealed in explanation of his abandonment. It was not. Absent explanation, 
the obvious inference may have been even more safely drawn: Mr Lait's expert 
conclusion … did not suit the case the respondent wanted to run.595  
Dr Evans had previously been engaged by the respondent, leading to the further 
comment from Henry J: ‘[t]he department's pre-existing dealings with Dr Evans no 
doubt meant it did not have to "shop" far to find another expert instead of Mr Lait 
but shop it must have’.596 The conduct of the respondent in this regard was a factor 
in the Court ordering that the respondent pay a certain proportion of the appellant's 
costs on an indemnity basis.  
In England, prescriptive mandatory regulations in some jurisdictions are directed 
towards discouraging the practice of expert shopping. For example, the Pre-Action 
Protocol for Personal Injury Claims597 contains the following requirement: 
7.3 Before any party instructs an expert, they should give the other party a list 
of the name(s) of one or more experts in the relevant speciality whom they 
consider are suitable to instruct. 
This creates a mechanism by which subsequent changes of expert by a party can be 
identified by its opponent and appropriately addressed in the course of the 
proceedings. A comparable mechanism does not exist in the New South Wales or 
Federal jurisdictions.  
In the English case of Ricky Edwards-Tubb v JD Wetherspoon Plc,598 the plaintiff 
had, under an earlier iteration of the same rule, notified the defendant of three expert 
witnesses proposed to be relied upon.599 However, expert evidence later served by 
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that party was from a witness (Mr Khan) not appearing on that list and that evidence 
made reference to an earlier medico-legal consultation (involving a Mr Jackson) 
that the plaintiff had participated in.600 This suggested to the defendant the 
possibility of ‘expert witness shopping’ on the part of the plaintiff. The defendants 
applied for disclosure of the earlier report from Mr Jackson, despite it being 
admittedly subject to legal professional privilege.601 
At first instance, the Deputy District Judge, relying on the need for the parties under 
the protocol to obtain leave of the Court to rely upon an expert witness opinion, 
granted an order permitting the claimant to rely on Mr Khan on the condition that 
the report of Mr Jackson be disclosed.602 On appeal, the presiding judge discharged 
the condition ‘because it impermissibly overrode privilege’ in the report of Mr 
Jackson.603 The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal.  
In delivering the leading judgment, Lord Justice Hughes relied heavily on an earlier 
decision of the same court in the matter of Beck v Ministry of Defence,604 a case in 
which the defendant had lost confidence in an expert witness it had engaged and 
sought to have the claimant examined by a further medical expert. The other party 
refused and the Court held that it was appropriate to condition the grant of leave on 
the disclosure of the first expert's report, despite the associated abrogation of 
privilege in that report, stating: 
The answer in this case, and in any case where a situation similar arises is…that 
the permission to instruct a new expert should be on terms that the report of 
the previous expert be disclosed. Such a course should prevent the practice of 
expert shopping and provide a claimant in the position of Mr Beck with the 
reassurance that the process of the court is not being abused. In this way justice 
will be seen to be done.605 
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Lord Justice Hughes agreed, despite the effect of imposing the condition of 
disclosure essentially amounted to a forced waiver of privilege in the earlier expert 
report,606 stating: 
An expert who has prepared a report for court is different from any other 
witness. The expert's prime duty is unequivocally to the court. His report 
should say exactly the same whoever instructed him. Whatever the reason for 
subsequent disenchantment with expert A may be, once a party has embarked 
on the pre-action protocol procedure of co-operation in the selection of experts, 
there seems to me no justification for not disclosing a report obtained from an 
expert who has been put forward by that party as suitable for the case …it is 
appropriate for the Court to exercise the control afforded by [the rule requiring 
approval for reliance upon expert evidence] in order to maximise the 
information available to the court and to discourage expert shopping.607   
There are no comparable authorities in Australia and, as set out above, no 
comparable mechanism by which expert witness shopping practices of a litigant 
could be regularly identified and addressed.  
It is contended that such is the self-evident nature of the conditions that give rise to 
the paradigm of expert exceptionalism and so difficult would objective evidence of 
its pervasiveness be to reliably gather, an approach to reform addressing the issue 
of biased conduct of expert witnesses should also seek, insofar as is reasonably 
practicable, to address the practice of expert witness shopping. Such reform options 
are discussed in Chapter 5. 
The English position discussed above is also interesting insofar as it demonstrates 
a willingness in that jurisdiction to manage the issue of ‘expert witness shopping’ 
(at least in cases where other parties are on notice of a proposed change of expert) 
through a process akin to waiver of privilege –– that is, the price to be paid for 
changing experts is the disclosure of prior reports of the original expert. The use of 
privilege (or the removal thereof) in this manner is discussed in Chapter 5 and 
suggested as a potentially appropriate means of returning a number of the problems 
in this area, which are created by the adversarial system, back to the adversarial 
system for resolution. 
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Finally, it should be noted that although there exists scant statistical evidence about 
the conduct of parties in engaging experts to ‘take them out of play’ –– a practice 
made possible by the unusual status of the expert witness who is privy to 
confidential information,608 Judicial Perspectives contains a finding that ‘over a 
quarter of judges’ responding to the survey ‘had heard cases in which … a key 
expert had been retained by one side just to make the expert less available as a 
witness for the other side’.609 Somewhat candidly, a number of respondent judges 
admitted to adopting that practice whilst practising as solicitors or barristers.610    
IV The Role of Lawyers in the Deployment of Expert Evidence  
Courts have traditionally been sceptical over the involvement of lawyers in the 
preparation of expert evidence. In Whitehouse v Jordan,611 Lord Denning MR 
stated: 
…their joint report suffers to my mind from the way it was prepared. It was 
the result of long conferences between the two professors and counsel in 
London and it was actually ‘settled’ by counsel. In short, it wears the colour of 
special pleading rather than impartial report. Whenever counsel ‘settle’ a 
document, we know how it goes. ‘We had better put this in’, ‘We had better 
leave this out’, and so forth. A striking instance is the way in which Professor 
Tizard's report was ‘doctored’. The lawyer blacked out a couple of lines in 
which he agreed with Professor Strang that there was no negligence.612 
Despite this, and a similar element of scepticism amongst Australian judges,613  the 
orthodox view in Australia is that solicitors should be involved in the preparation 
of an expert report.  
                                                        
608  See the discussion at the end of Chapter 2 regarding the application of the ‘no property in a witness’ rule 
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610  Ibid. 
611  Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650. 
612  Ibid 655 quoted in Freckleton, Reddy and Selby, above n 7, 42. 
613  Judicial Perspectives contains the following commentary in respect of judicial views on lawyers' 
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In Harrington-Smith (on behalf of the Wongatha People) v Western Australia (No 
7),614 Lindgren J stated: 
Lawyers should be involved in the writing of reports by experts: not, of course, 
in relation to the substance of the reports (in particular, in arriving at the 
opinions to be expressed); but in relation to their form, in order to ensure that 
the legal tests of admissibility are addressed.615 
In Traderight 14, Ball J went further, relevantly stating: 
It is common for a party’s legal advisors to communicate with an expert 
retained by the party for the purpose of giving instructions and commenting on 
the form of the expert’s report. In some cases, those advisors may test tentative 
conclusions that the expert has reached and in doing so may cause the expert 
to reconsider his or her opinion. In some cases, the legal advisors may suggest 
wording to be included in the report which expresses in admissible form an 
opinion stated by the expert in an inadmissible form. The court depends heavily 
on the parties’ legal advisors to assist experts to address properly the 
questions asked of them and to present their opinions in an admissible form 
and in a form which will be readily understood by the court. Equally, the court 
depends heavily on the parties’ legal advisors to ensure that any opinion 
expressed by an expert is an opinion the expert holds for the reasons that the 
expert gives and that the expert otherwise complies with the Expert Witness 
Code of Conduct.616 
This reliance, in the cases of Sharman and Hudspeth, was misplaced. Absent 
voluntary disclosure (deliberate or inadvertant) by a party, the only circumstances 
in which communications of the nature referred to in Sharman and Hudspeth will 
be revealed to the other party is where there is a lacuna in the report served by the 
expert that cannot be explained by the contents of the report itself and which lead 
to a line of enquiry that discloses the relevant communications. Where no such 
lacuna is present, it is unclear how another party will persuade a court that service 
of the report is inconsistent with the maintenance of privilege in anterior 
communications, given the decisions in Traderight 14 or New Cap. In effect, these 
                                                        
Nearly one in five judges (17.80%, n=42) on the other hand thought it happened "often", one respondent 
dryly commenting "I cannot imagine any other reality in an adversarial system of justice." Another 
respondent commented, "Sometimes I wish they had because one hopes that then some consideration 
would have been given to its impact, what was being proved by it, what was relevant etc." Many judges 
in the comment section indicated that they were in a poor position to answer the question as they simply 
saw a product and were not equipped by what transpired in the course of the trial to know how the product 
came to be in its ultimate shape’. Ibid 42. 
614  Harrington-Smith (on behalf of the Wongatha People) v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424. 
615  Ibid 427. 
616  Traderight 14 [2013] NSWSC 211, [23]. 
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decisions rely upon an interpretation of the doctrine of waiver that is dependent 
upon the existence of such a lacuna. 
The formulation of the test for waiver of privilege in the circumstances of the 
Uniform Evidence Law, being the circumstances that most typically arise in 
connection with determination of privilege claims regarding expert witnesses, was 
most succintly set out by Brereton J in ML Ubase: 
…I do not accept that ‘a proper understanding of the communication or 
document’ involves an appreciation of the manner in which the opinions 
contained in the document have been formed over time, or the iterations and 
evolutions through which they have passed. The test is concerned with the 
comprehensibility of the primary communication or document: if it can be 
completely or thoroughly understood without more, then access to the related 
communications or documents is not reasonably necessary.617 
The same considerations apply where the test falls to be determined by reference to 
the common law, because absent a clear and relevant lacuna within the expert report 
itself, it cannot be said that there is any inherent unfairness in a party relying upon 
a final expert report without disclosing all communications between the expert and 
the instructing solicitors.618   
Given the inevitability of lawyers’ involvement in the preparation of expert 
evidence, the manner in which courts approach the issue of waiver of legal 
professional privilege in these circumstances is of critical importance.  
V Waiver and the Trouble with Maurice 
The decisions regarding waiver of privilege on the grounds of ‘fairness’ under the 
common law test or, where the Uniform Evidence Law applies, pursuant to section 
126, namely: 
If, because of the application of section 121, 122, 123, 124 or 125, this Division 
does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or the contents 
of a document, those sections do not prevent the adducing of evidence of 
                                                        
617  ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577, 593. ML Ubase was relied 
upon by Heerey J in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] 
FCA 323, [5], however the original decision was later impugned by Brereton J himself in Carbotech 
[2008] NSWSC 1151 although not in respect of this approach (see discussion in Chapter 3). 
618  See discussion at page 134 above.   
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another communication or document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a 
proper understanding of the communication or document. 
rely fundamentally upon the decision of the High Court in Attorney-General (NT) 
v Maurice (‘Maurice’).619  
Despite spending a considerable amount of judicial ink identifying the need to read 
section 126 of the Uniform Evidence Law on its own terms and not merely 
superimpose atop it the fairness test from Maurice, Sackville J in Towney v Minister 
for Land and Water Conservation for New South Wales620 then stated: 
This is not to deny that there is likely to be considerable overlap between the 
considerations relevant to the common law test governing waiver of legal 
professional privilege and those relevant to the test for loss of client legal 
privilege, specified in s 126. For example, as [Maurice] makes clear, an 
important factor in determining whether the privilege has been impliedly 
waived under the common law is whether it would be misleading for a party 
to refer to or use certain privileged material, yet insist that the remainder of the 
privileged material should remain protected…621 
Further, it is clear that Maurice forms the basis of much of the reasoning adopted 
by White J in New Cap, which governs the position of waiver under the Uniform 
Evidence Law.622 
This thesis contends that Maurice is a fundamentally inapt vehicle through which 
to discuss and decide the issue of waiver of privilege in the context of expert 
evidence.  
Maurice concerned the issue of whether service of a ‘claim book’ by claimants in 
an application for recognition of Aboriginal land rights had the effect of waiving 
                                                        
619  Attorney General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475. It is Maurice that is relied upon by Lindgren J in 
ASIC v Southcorp in establishing his fourth proposition regarding privilege in an expert brief or 
documents referred to in an expert report ‘Ordinarily disclosure of the expert's report for the purpose of 
reliance on it in the litigation will result in an implied waiver of the privilege in respect of the brief or 
instructions or documents referred to in (1) or (2) above, at least if the appropriate inference to be drawn 
is that they were used in a way that could be said to influence the content of the report, because, in these 
circumstances, it would be unfair for the client to rely on the report without disclosing the brief, 
instructions or documents’ (at [21]). However the references to the respective judgments from Maurice 
such as are contained in ASIC v Southcorp are incorrect and the other cases relied upon in support of the 
proposition, namely, Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83, 96–98 (Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ); Instant 
Colour Pty Ltd v Canon Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 89, (BC9506842) 51 (Nicholson J); Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 89, [46] (Nicholson J) each trace the 
origins of their holdings to Maurice. 
620  Towney v Minister for Land and Water Conservation for New South Wales (1997) 147 ALR 402. 
621  Ibid 413. 
622  New Cap [2007] NSWSC 258, [40], [46]. 
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legal professional privilege in relation to the source materials that had been used to 
prepare the book, despite those materials not forming part of the book or being 
mentioned in it.  
As to the concept of a ‘claim book’, Mason and Brennan JJ in their joint judgment 
characterised it as having as its ‘closest analogy’,623 a pleading but unlike a 
conventional pleading, it ‘contains a substantial amount of historical and 
anthropological information’.624 Their Honours pointed out that ‘[t]he inclusion of 
this material should not undermine the protection of the privilege. A claim book is 
not treated as evidence of the facts alleged in it’.625  
The gravamen of the decision of Mason and Brennan JJ is that no prejudice could 
arise because, inter alia, the claim book ‘never found its way into evidence’ and 
‘the respondents have not sought to reveal beneficial parts while keeping injurious 
parts hidden’.626  
Likewise, Gibbs CJ found that, ‘so long as the claim book was not used in any other 
way, it is impossible’ to identify any requisite unfairness that could operate to 
require disclosure of the sources of the statements contained within it.627 His Honour 
went further, though, to state that had the claim book been admissible as evidence 
‘the appellant would have been entitled to test its accuracy and weight, and since 
that could hardly be done unless it was known on what sources it was based, 
considerations of fairness might have required those sources to have been 
produced’.628  
Deane J stated: 
If the claim book had been actually used as evidence on the prior hearing, a 
real question would have arisen about whether, by so using it, the Aboriginal 
                                                        
623  Attorney General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 489. 
624  Ibid. 
625  Ibid. 
626  Ibid. 
627  Ibid 483. 
628  Ibid. 
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claimants had waived any right to assert legal professional privilege in the 
source materials upon which it was based.629  
Dawson J appears to have taken a fundamentally different course to reach a similar 
conclusion.630  
A claim book in the nature of the subject-matter of Maurice is in no sense analogous 
to an expert report. It is clear from the foregoing that the former does not constitute 
a statement of evidence in respect of its contents whereas the latter is 
quintessentially, a statement of evidence of opinion, proferred as such, for the 
purpose of being relied upon by the trier of fact.  
Accordingly, to the extent that the reasoning adopted from Maurice posits an expert 
report in the position of the claim book, the reasoning cannot be considered sound, 
because of the discrepancy between a claim book and an expert report; and, on the 
other hand, to the extent that the more general statements of principle from Maurice 
are adopted in the context of determining whether service of an expert report waives 
privilege in communications and documents relevant to its creation, the comments 
of the plurality in Maurice would support a view that fairness requires the disclosure 
of such communications and documents because an expert report would be itself 
evidence upon which the party serving it intends to rely.631 The ‘self-regulation’ 
inherent in the caselaw regarding waiver in the context of expert evidence (ie. that 
the report is required to identify all evidence upon which the opinion is based) is, it 
is contended, anathema to the adversarial system because it deprives parties of the 
means of testing the conclusiveness of such a proposition. 
Further, and more fundamentally, the concepts of the party-engaged expert, or even 
expert evidence in general, do not form part of the factual matrix or decision 
reached in Maurice. At no time could the High Court in that case have considered 
itself to be articulating a test for the discoverability of communications between a 
                                                        
629  Ibid 492. 
630  Ibid 497. ‘The basis upon which the claim book would have become evidence is not entirely clear, but 
the proceedings were informal and no doubt such a course was permissible. It is plain, however, that if 
what was alleged in the claim book did not give rise to a waiver of privilege with respect to the documents 
which lay behind it, then the conversion of the allegations into evidence would not have done so’. 
631  For example, ibid 483 (Gibbs CJ), 489 (Mason and Brennan JJ) and 492 (Deane J).  
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lawyer and an expert engaged by that lawyer. It is contended that courts’ habitual 
reliance upon Maurice in the context of expert-related communications and 
documents is unsound for the very reason that it lies at the intersection of two 
anomalies within the legal system –– the anomaly that treats as admissible evidence 
of opinion and the anomaly that treats as inadmissible, documents and 
communications that may otherwise be relevant to facts in issue. To rely upon a 
case such as Maurice in this context runs the risk of failing to appreciate that 
problems raised at the juncture of these anomalies cannot necessarily be resolved 
by simple application of conventional approaches to their constituent elements, 
devised in isolation to one another. 
Maurice remains a golden thread of sorts, ostensibly binding together decisions 
regarding the circumstances in which service of an expert report affects privilege 
inhering in documents and communications created in the course of that report's 
creation and almost universally relied upon as a means of excluding disclosure of 
expert witness related communications and documents. It is considered for the 
reasons set out above that Maurice does not form a sound basis for the making of 
such decisions and, particularly in light of revelations such as those contained in 
Sharman or Hudspeth, a means of circumventing the continued application of 
Maurice regarding waiver in this context should be seriously considered. This issue 
is further addressed in Chapter 5.  
VI Criteria for Reform 
The foregoing analysis suggests the desirability of reform to ameliorate the effects 
of bias amongst experts and instances of expert shopping, despite the lack of 
statistical data regarding the incidence of these issues. Indeed, this was a conclusion 
expressed by the NSWLRC Report in these terms: 
What is difficult, however, is to determine the extent of adversarial bias … 
Although it is not possible to quantify the extent of the problem, in the 
Commission’s view it is safe to conclude that adversarial bias is a significant 
problem, at least in some types of litigation. Measures that would reduce or 
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eliminate adversarial bias, therefore, are likely to have potential benefits, even 
if the extent of those benefits cannot be accurately determined.632  
It is further contended that the inherent unsoundness of the treatment of questions 
of legal professional privilege in the context of expert evidence, together with the 
differential application of tests for privilege, discussed in Chapter 3, also strongly 
militate in favour of reform. The locus of the latter issues also indicates that the 
reform should be directed towards the issue of privilege rather than be based upon 
an extension of existing rules of a self-regulatory nature (eg. additional or modified 
guidelines or requirements for mandatory statements to be given by experts). 
Focusing upon the removal or modification of legal professional privilege, as 
suggested in Chapter 5 of this thesis, re-opens the problem, which is, to a large 
extent, the product of the adversarial system, to that adversarial system for 
resolution by allowing other parties the opportunity to test the conclusiveness of the 
expert opinion against the documents and assumptions with which the expert was 
briefed and communications between the expert and those who instructed him or 
her made during the course of the engagement. 
Taken together, the observations in the preceding chapters suggest a number of 
criteria for success of any reform which is to be worth undertaking, namely the need 
for such reform to: 
1.  address bias conduct of expert witnesses;633 
2.  address the paradigm of expert exceptionalism, expose the 
practice of expert-shopping and the deliberate conflicting of 
potential expert witnesses;634 
3.  not rely upon codes of conduct or similar self-executing 
statements by the experts themselves;635 
                                                        
632  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 74. 
633  In response to the considerations discussed at pages 65-69 and 143-160 above. 
634  In response to the considerations discussed at pages 74-76, 102-106 and 161-165 above. 
635  In response to the considerations discussed at pages 84-87 and 160 above. 
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4. be capable of operating within the adversarial system of justice 
that is entrenched within New South Wales and the federal 
jurisdictions; 
5.  be capable of harmonised application irrespective of whether the 
common law or Uniform Evidence Law applies;636  
6.  not require a distinction to be drawn between ancillary processes 
and hearings, so as to overcome the problems of the differential 
application of rules identified in Chapter 3; and 
7. not require the relevant triers of fact to review the impugned 
material (without disclosure to other parties) in order to make a 
ruling as to admissibility.637  
Finally, any recommended reforms need to be consistent with overriding principles 
of case management638 and, accordingly, not impose unnecessary burdens on 
litigants or the courts in terms of time and cost. That is, not to fall foul of the very 
considerations that this thesis identifies in Chapter 3 as providing the impetus for a 
renewed focus upon the role of party-engaged experts within a common law legal 
system.   
Some proposals for reform, measured against the above criteria are discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
  
                                                        
636  In response to the considerations the subject of Chapter 3. 
637  In response to the considerations discussed at pages 128-129. 
638  That is, the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in proceedings (see section 56 of the Civil 
Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)) and, in the case of the Federal Court in civil proceedings: ‘to facilitate the 
just resolution of disputes: (a) according to law; and (b) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as 
possible’ –– see section 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1975 (Commonwealth). 
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CHAPTER 5 – SOME BASES FOR REFORM 
 
 
… [W]hatever be the criticism of expert witnesses, which has in fact been 
expressed in one form or another for at least 100 years if not far longer, the 
remedy has not been seen in denying the right of such witnesses to give 
evidence; rather it has been seen in devising court rules and protocols which 
will ensure that experts will try to be independent and that courts will not 
unnecessarily suffer the opinions of experts who may be thought to be in one 
camp or the other.  
  Ormiston JA in FGT Custodians Pty Limited v Fagenblat639  
 
I Overview 
This concluding chapter will consider three alternative methods for reforming the 
law so as to ameliorate the effects of the current unsatisfactory orthodoxy with 
respect to legal professional privilege and expert evidence. Undoubtably, there are 
other options for reform. However, these three have been put forward on the basis 
that they appear capable of satisfying the criteria for reform identified at the 
conclusion to Chapter 4 above.  
The three alternative reform methods discussed are: firstly, requiring courts and 
tribunals that hear expert witness testimony to mandate the use of court appointed 
or jointly engaged experts; secondly, abolishing legal professional privilege (in 
whole or in part) insofar as it relates to experts engaged by parties; and thirdly, to 
adopt a hybrid model of waiver and protection similar to that adopted in other 
jurisdictions within Australia, but with certain key amendments. The proposal for 
law reform is then discussed and perceived criticism of the proposal arising from 
the discussion of the other models below, addressed. 
                                                        
639 FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33, [12]. 
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II Transcending the Adversarial System 
The first two options canvassed, namely, the adoption of a court appointed expert 
regime or a jointly engaged expert regime, have long been within the power of the 
court and the subject of considerable debate –– particularly since the Lord Woolf 
reports of the late 20th century, as discussed in Chapter 2. These options seek to 
resolve some of the difficulties posed by the party-engaged expert by withdrawing 
the expert from adversarial processes. 
A The Court Appointed Expert 
Courts applying the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘UCPR’) and 
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Commonwealth) (‘FCR’) have long had express powers 
to appoint their own witness.  
Pursuant to r 31.20(2), a court applying the UCPR is empowered, inter alia, to issue 
a direction: providing for the engagement and instruction of a parties’ single expert 
in relation to a specified issue; or a direction providing for the appointment and 
instruction of a court-appointed expert in relation to a specified issue. 
Subdivision 5 of Division 2 of Part 31 of the UCPR contains more prescriptive rules 
for courts engaging their own experts, including rule 31.52 which prohibits, except 
by leave of the court, a party adducing evidence of any expert on any issue arising 
in proceedings where a court-appointed expert has been appointed in relation to that 
issue. Corresponding powers are exercisable by a court applying the FCR.640 
Although the machinery for the use of court appointed experts has existed for some 
time,641 it is used infrequently. An apparent irony contained in the findings of 
Judicial Perspectives is that there was ‘strong in-principle support’ for the use of 
                                                        
640  See rules 5.04(3)(14) and (17); and the effect of Rule 23.01(1) enabling a party to apply for the 
appointment of a court expert and Rule 1.40, entitling the court to make orders of its own volition. 
641  For example, the 1975 Federal Court Rules of Evidence contained Rule 706 which stated, inter alia, ‘The 
court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why an expert 
witness should not be appointed and may request the parties to submit nominations…’. Quoted in John 
Basten, ‘The Court Expert in Civil Trials - A Comparative Appraisal’ (1977) 40 Modern Law Review 
174, 181. The author goes on to state that despite being approved in January 1975, there were ‘so far … 
no reported cases of significance to indicate its usefulness in the federal courts’.  
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court-appointed experts but ‘only a few respondents had ever appointed expert 
witnesses’.642 Judicial Perspectives went on to report that: 
It was apparent, though, that the usage of court-appointed experts … troubled 
some judges who had not used them because of the inroads it was perceived 
that they would make upon the role of the judge as ‘ring-keeper’ within the 
adversarial model. Mostly, though, judges said that they had not used court-
appointed experts either because they had not been asked to do so by the 
advocates appearing for them or because they had determined such a course 
not to be necessary.643 
The survey responses indicated that of the judges who had the power to appoint 
experts, ‘81.88% (n=122)’ had not used the power.644 Of those that had used the 
power, ‘4.70% (n=7)’ had done so once in the preceding five years, ‘8.05% (n=12)’ 
had done so more than once and less than five times in the preceding five years and 
‘5.37% (n=8)’ had done so more than five times in the commensurate period.645  
Judging Perspectives also found that: of the judges who had appointed an expert, 
‘69.23%, n=27’ considered that doing so had been ‘helpful’; ‘28.21%, n=11’ 
considered it had been ‘very helpful’; and only one respondent stated that the 
exercise had been unhelpful.646  
A number of the considerations (for and against) the use of the court-appointed 
expert are discussed in Chapter 2, in the context of the warring tracts of American 
jurists William Foster and Learned Hand. The issue was also the subject of 
extensive consideration by Lord Woolf in both the Access to Justice Interim Report 
and Access to Justice Final Report. In the interim report, Lord Woolf was 
reasonably vocal in advocating for broader usage of court appointed experts by the 
courts.647 In his final report, Lord Woolf noted: 
Since the publication of the interim report, resistance to my proposals on single 
experts has remained particularly strong, and it is clear that the idea is 
anathema to many members of the legal profession in this country who are 
reluctant to give up their adversarial weapons.648 
                                                        
642  Freckleton, Reddy and Selby, above n 7, 8. 
643  Ibid. 
644  Ibid 101. 
645  Ibid. 
646  Ibid. 
647  Lord Woolf, above n 5, 186–187, 192. 
648  Lord Woolf, above n 9, 140. 
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Lord Woolf concluded that it would not be ‘appropriate to specify particular areas 
of litigation where a single expert should or should not be used’649 and opined that 
a single court appointed expert would not be appropriate in all proceedings, 
particlarly noting that in ‘some large, complex and strongly contested cases where 
the full adversarial system, including oral cross-examination of opposing experts 
on particular issues, is the best way of producing a just result’.650  
Coming down on the side of William Foster, writing extra-judicially, Justice 
Michael Kirby whilst on the High Court questioned the ‘justness’ and 
‘appropriateness’ of adopting court appointed experts.651 In his paper, ‘The Judicial 
Review of Expert Evidence: Causation, Proof and Presentation’, Justice Kirby 
refers to his experiences as a trial lawyer, during which he came to the following 
conclusion: 
in the case of cardiac catastrophes, there was a well-known list of physicians 
who would offer their opinions that coronary occlusion was never caused or 
precipitated by unusual effort. On the other hand, there was a list, equally long, 
of physicians who held that such cardiac catastrophes were often, if not 
invariably, related to some external or internal effort associated with work. The 
witnesses were equally impressive… Most importantly, I quickly came to the 
view that virtually all of them were speaking with complete sincerity, personal 
neutrality and integrity. They were doing so by reference to their individual 
experience and to a mass of conflicting research and scientific data. This was 
not a case of fraudulent evidence or evidence motivated by self-interest, in the 
hope of building a forensic practice. It was simply a difference, deeply held of 
medical aetiological opinion.652 
The concern being that, in such an equation, the adoption of a court-appointed 
expert from one or other of these backgrounds could possibly determine the 
outcome of the case in circumstances in which other reasonably held conclusions 
were available.653 Justice Kirby concluded that ‘[w]ith all its imperfections, 
committing a contested issue to an independent decision-maker, obliged to choose 
from the logic of the case and the evidence between contesting experts, seemed a 
                                                        
649  Ibid 141. 
650  Ibid.  
651  Michael Kirby, ‘The Judicial Review of Expert Evidence: Causation, Proof and Presentation’ (at the Law 
in the World of Science and Technology) 2 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/formerjustices/kirbyj/kirbyj_expert.htm#_ftn9
>.  
652  Ibid 3. 
653  Ibid.  
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better soluton than evading the problem by appointing a court “expert”’.654 Such a 
view was also espoused by an anonymous judicial respondent in Judicial 
Perspectives who stated ‘in cases of controversy between experts, it is usually 
because they come from different schools. Any court expert is likely also to come 
from one of the 2 “schools”’.655  
A separate problem is articulated by Professor George Hampel, a former justice of 
the Supreme Court of Victoria, who has opined that in the interests of finding a 
suitably qualified expert to be appointed by the court, approaches to issues in 
dispute concerning newer or alternative technologies or procedures could be unduly 
limited: 
Such experts would be chosen from a pool of the established, conservative 
members of the professions, often resistent to new developments and 
approaches in their field. Consider a senior member of the Royal College of 
Surgeons as a court-appointed single expert in a case where it is contended that 
alternative medicine provides a sound conclusion to a medical problem.656 
In Tyler v Thomas,657 Branson J sitting as part of the Full Court of the Federal Court, 
noting ‘the limited case law on the circumstances in which the discretionary power 
of a court to appoint a court expert should be exercised’ set out some broad 
principles gleaned from available authorities.658 These principles emphasised the 
importance of the appointment as being consistent with the purpose of ‘ensuring 
the just, efficient and cost-effective management of litigation’, and that ordinarily, 
the appropriate time for appointing a court expert ‘is well before trial so that the 
parties have adequate time to give consideration to the report … and to make a 
decision on whether they wish to challenge any part of that report’.659  
Curiously, her Honour also suggested that it would be an improper exercise of the 
discretion for a court to appoint an expert if ‘principally motivated by a desire to 
avoid difficulties … perceived to attend the assessment of conflicting expert 
                                                        
654  Ibid. 
655  Freckleton, Reddy and Selby, above n 7, 103. 
656  George Hampel, ‘A Case Against Single Experts’ November/December 2013(119) Precedent 15, 15. 
657  Tyler v Thomas (2006) 150 FCR 357. 
658  Ibid 365. 
659  Ibid. 
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evidence’,660 this being a common raison d’etre for the engagement of a court-
appointed expert.661   
In addition to the criticisms of the court appointed expert discussed above, it is self-
evidently the case that use of a court-appointed expert as a means of seeking to 
circumvent the shortcomings of the party-engaged expert (including the paradigm 
of expert exceptionalism), is potentially problematic because, to the extent that the 
parties do not themselves also seek to adduce evidence from a party-engaged expert, 
there are limited means of adducing evidence of opinions that may be valid but 
contrary to those held by the court appointed expert.  
The corollary is similarly problematic –– where parties are forced or otherwise find 
it desirable to engage their own experts in addition to that of the court appointed 
expert, the total cost of the litigation is increased and the process runs the risk of 
falling foul of the overriding purpose of case management.662  
Indeed, the approach of courts to the grant of leave for a party to rely upon evidence 
from a separate expert after the engagement of a court appointed expert is currently 
set at a reasonably low threshold. Brereton J in In the matter of Optimisation 
Australia Pty Ltd663 said, in response to an application for leave to adduce evidence 
of an expert other than the court appointed expert in that case: 
The facility to appoint a Court expert is … a highly beneficial one. However, 
the risk that attends appointment of a Court expert, at least if parties are 
precluded from adducing their own expert evidence, is not only that trial by 
judge becomes trial by expert … but even more importantly, that error by the 
expert may go unexposed. The beauty of the adversarial system in this respect 
is that the competing opinions of two experts enable each other to be tested and 
refined so as at to least (sic) reduce the scope for error. If the Court relies solely 
on a Court expert, except where the parties are content with that approach, it 
runs the risk that error –– even serious error –– might not be exposed.664  
                                                        
660  Ibid 368. 
661  In the circumstances of the case it may have been that her Honour was commenting on the timing of the 
appointment rather than the bearing of this issue on the appointment per se. However, this is not clear 
from the face of the judgment.  
662  See note 638 above. 
663  In the matter of Optimisation Australia Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 2072. 
664  Ibid [5]. 
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As a consequence of this reasoning, Brereton J stated that the court ‘should be 
relatively ready to grant leave to adduce evidence from a separate expert’ where 
‘some arguable basis is shown to challenging the report of a single expert’.665 It is 
contended that the establishment of an ‘arguable basis’ to challenge an expert 
opinion will not be, in cases where a party is able to find a suitably qualified expert 
contradictor, a difficult threshold to meet. These considerations appear largely to 
defeat the attractiveness of the court appointed expert as a means of resolving the 
problems engendered by the adversarial system.  
Further, where the expert makes a fundamental error and has his or her conduct 
impugned in a manner that is relevant to the outcome of the proceedings, an issue 
arises to the appellable nature of such an error and even if an appeal is successful, 
the appellate court may have little choice other than remitting the matter to be re-
heard given the likely lack of any competing factual consideration evaluated by the 
judge at first instance in such circumstances which is capable of being substituted 
for the impugned findings.666 
Finally, where the apppointment of an expert by the court is made over the objection 
of either or both of the parties, the freedom of parties to conduct the litigation 
(within the confines of the rules and the overriding objectives of case-management) 
in the manner they see fit is hindered in a manner that has the capacity to work 
substantial injustice.667  
The mere fact that the court appointed expert will not always be an appropriate 
means of adducing expert evidence in proceedings means that it cannot in all 
circumstances operate as an alternative to the party-engaged expert, with the effect 
that it does not constitute a solution to overcome the problem posed by the 
application of the doctrine of legal professional privilege to communications with 
and documents created by party-engaged experts.  
                                                        
665  Ibid [6]. 
666  See for example, the comments of McClellan CJ at CL (with whom Latham and Rothman JJ agreed) 
Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581, 615–616, 626–627.  
667  For example, where the court’s appointment is not suitably qualified or is itself biased in favour of a 
particular theory or school of thought that may not be widely accepted within the relevant discipline. 
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B Parties’ joint engagement of an expert  
It was with some of the criticisms referred to above, at least in part, in mind, that 
the NSW Law Reform Commission in its 2005 report on expert evidence 
(‘NSWLRC 2005 Report’),668 placed particular emphasis on expanding the scope for 
litigants to make use of provisions for parties’ jointly engaged experts.  
In explaining the distinction between a court appointed expert and a jointly engaged 
expert, the NSWLRC 2005 Report said: 
A joint expert witness and a court-appointed expert are similar in that neither 
has been engaged by only one of the conflicting parties, and thus, in each case, 
the expert is free from adversarial bias. 
…Under this regime, the expert is not the court’s witness. The expert is the 
parties’ witness, to deal with as is expedient in their respective interests. It is 
necessary and appropriate that the parties, rather than the court, should have 
control and management of the process. And it is fundamental that, in the first 
instance at least, the parties should be precluded from calling other expert 
evidence on the same question.669 
As with court appointed experts, there is ample machinery in the UCPR and FCR 
for the use of jointly-engaged experts.670 And, as with court appointed experts, 
reliance upon jointly-engaged experts carries with it a number of disadvantages. A 
number of these disadvantages were recognised in the NSWLRC 2005 Report itself, 
including: that the cost and time benefits of jointly-engaged experts may be illusory 
because the parties would probably engage their own ‘shadow’ experts to assist 
them in briefing the jointly-engaged expert and preparing for cross-examination; 
and that jointly-engaged experts may also be inapt where divergent opinions on 
matters the subject of expert evidence would be justified.671  
To these may be added the concerns expressed above regarding the effect of the 
courts’ willingness to permit further expert evidence when an arguable basis for 
challenging a court appointed expert’s evidence is established, error by the expert 
on the right to appeal and on options available to appellate courts other than 
                                                        
668  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9. 
669  Ibid 117,119. 
670  See UCPR, Subdivision 4 of Division 2 of Part 32; FCR, rules 5.04(3)(17). 
671  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 109. 
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remittal, as well as the more fundamental issue of, absent consent of the parties as 
to the identity, brief and instructions to be provided to the expert, requiring 
agreement over matters that may not readily be capable of such. 
Once again, the use of jointly-engaged experts cannot be seen as appropriate in all 
circumstances. This was also recognised by the NSWLRC 2005 Report which noted 
that even the most enthusiastic supporters of the concept ‘did not seek to argue that 
they should be used in all cases’,672 with the consequence that the report proposed a 
series of amendments to the UCPR to empower courts to make orders for jointly-
engaged experts ‘in appropriate circumstances’.673  
As with the concept of the court appointed expert, this innate lack of universality 
means that the option cannot adequately address the problems associated with 
expert evidence and legal professional privilege because circumstances in which 
party-engaged experts will be used will continue to arise in the vast majority of 
instances. It is contended, therefore, that any proposal for reform should be directed 
towards addressing the deployment of expert evidence within the confines of the 
adversarial system. 
III Abolition of the Privilege 
A Abolition in Toto 
Lord Woolf's Access to Justice Interim Report opined that:  
most of the problems with expert evidence arise because the expert is initially 
recruited as part of the team which investigates and advances a party’s 
contentions and then has to change roles and seek to provide independent 
evidence which the court is entitled to expect.674  
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, Lord Woolf’s lament in relation to the problem of expert 
witness bias was discussed, as was his view that the issue is widespread within the 
                                                        
672  Ibid 110. 
673  Ibid. 
674  Lord Woolf, above n 5, 182. This was the effect of the findings in the matters of Wood v R (2012) 84 
NSWLR 581 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 53 ACSR 110 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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common law world. At the conclusion of his interim report, Lord Woolf 
recommended that ‘once an expert has been instructed to prepare a report for the 
use of a court, any communications between the expert and the client or his advisers 
should no longer be the subject of legal privilege’.675 
In his Access to Justice Final Report, Lord Woolf clarified his intention around this 
interim recommendation in the following terms: 
My intention was to prevent the suppression of relevant opinions or factual 
material which did not support the case put forward by the party instructing the 
expert.676  
Lord Woolf then went on to note the criticism that the recommendation had 
received and the notion that the ‘expert must be free to submit drafts to clients and 
their legal advisers, so that factual misconceptions can be corrected’677 and further 
noted the argument that a ‘great deal of time could be wasted if all these documents 
were disclosable’678 and the approach could be overcome by lawyers ‘avoiding 
written communication in favour of off the record conversations’.679  
Pausing there, it is interesting to note that these objections are practical and not 
grounded on any notion of some inherent inviolability of the doctrine of legal 
professional privilege. In any event, Lord Woolf accepted that such a reform ‘would 
not be realistic’ but instead provided an alternative recommendation to the effect 
that ‘privilege should not apply to the instructions given to experts’.680  This revised 
recommendation was to the effect that an expert report would not be admissible 
unless annexing all written instructions and a note of all oral instructions.681  
                                                        
675  Lord Woolf, above n 5, 192.  
676  Lord Woolf, above n 9, 144. 
677  Ibid. 
678  Ibid. 
679  Ibid. 
680  Ibid. 
681  Ibid 145. 
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Such an approach is not now novel in New South Wales or the Federal jurisdictions, 
given that the expert witness codes of conduct require similar attestations to be 
made.682 
But was the apparent outcry against Lord Woolf’s interim approach and his 
subsequent modification of recommendations associated with expert witnesses 
justified? If it is accepted that, as Thomas J opined in Interchase, ‘[a]n expert is a 
third person from whom the client, represented by a solicitor, hopes to obtain an 
advantage’ and is being deliberately converted into ‘a witness’,683 should any 
entitlement to privilege remain, particularly in light of the string of cases referred 
to above in Chapters 4, in which the prospect of bias was not sufficiently brought 
to light despite the existence of the relevant code of conduct? 
Is the fact of an expert misconceiving some of the facts in a draft report,684 or feeling 
constrained in an ability to change his or her mind after having submitted one, 
despite the relevant codes recognising and being highly prescriptive in terms of 
what should be done in such cases,685 a sufficient rationale for maintaining the cloak 
of privilege over draft reports and communications in relation thereto which are not 
in the nature of ‘instructions’? It is contended that, unlike the posited judge in Linter 
Group who may change his or her mind part-way through writing a judgment, the 
circumstances of the expert’s change of mind may (and are quite likely to be) 
material to an understanding of the basis of the final opinion expressed by that 
expert and the weight to be given to each aspect of that opinion and should be 
amenable to exploration by way of cross-examination, particularly where there are 
competing evidentiary scenarios proffered by the parties. By contrast, the judge is 
                                                        
682  See the discussion of the codes in Chapter 2. 
683  Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Limited (No 1) (1999) 1 Qd. R 141, 
164. 
684  Lord Woolf, above n 9, 145. 
685  Linter Group Limited v Price Waterhouse (a firm) [1999] VSC 245, [16]. For example, Section 4(1) of 
the Expert Witness Code of Conduct appearing in Schedule 7 to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 
(NSW) states: ‘Where an expert witness has provided to a party (or that party’s legal representative) a 
report for use in court, and the expert thereafter changes his or her opinion on a material matter, the expert 
must forthwith provide to the party (or that party’s legal representative) a supplementary report…’.  
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merely required to ensure that his or her reasons adopted are adequately exposed in 
the judgment delivered by reference to the evidence finally adopted.  
Evidence law already contains a basis for the rejection of evidence that is not 
relevant to a fact in issue in proceedings.686 Indeed, the ‘relevance rule’ is the 
touchstone and gateway through which all other evidence must pass.687 The primacy 
of the rule is exhibited by the terms of section 56 of the Uniform Evidence Law, 
which simply states: 
56   Relevant evidence to be admissible 
(1)   Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a 
proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. 
(2)   Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible. 
In Festa v The Queen688 Gleeson CJ stated: 
If evidence is of some, albeit slight, probative value, then it is admissible unless 
some principle of exclusion comes into play to justify withholding it from [the 
Court’s] consideration.689 
The relevance rule could constitute a far sounder basis for excluding from evidence 
the draft expert report that proceeds upon a factual misconception or which 
represents a thought that the expert has since renounced where the misconception 
or renounced opinion is of no relevance to the final conclusion reached. And to the 
extent that such issues could not be brought within the exclusionary rule regarding 
relevance suggests, to the contrary, that the misconception or change of mind was 
necessarily relevant to the fact in issue and hence an improper subject for 
concealment. Unless a draft report were amenable to disclosure by removal of the 
privilege, the circumstances under which these types of evaluation could take place 
would not arise.  
                                                        
686  See, for example, Part 3.1 of the Uniform Evidence Law.  
687  The relevance rule is referred to as the ‘general inclusionary rule’ in the introduction to Part 3.1 of the 
Uniform Evidence Law. The balance of Chapter 3 of the Uniform Evidence Law concerns exceptions to 
that inclusionary rule.   
688  Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593. 
689  Ibid 599. 
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For these reasons, the abolition altogether of legal professional privilege in 
communications with, or documents created by, experts warrants consideration and, 
it is contended, should not be so lightly treated as to be considered ‘unrealistic’.690  
Like the Lord Woolf Final Report, the NSWLRC 2005 Report considered but 
dismissed approaches to the problems of expert evidence that rely upon disclosure 
of all communications with experts. It did so in less than two pages.691 Although 
confirming that ‘submissions were divided on whether it is desirable for the law to 
require disclosure of all communications between the party and the expert’, the 
report does not in fact identify any submissions in favour of such disclosure. It 
identifies the arguments against disclosure in the following terms: 
A number of submissions argued that the privilege serves important policy 
purposes and should be retained: it is important, and useful both to the 
administration of justice and to the parties, that the parties should be able to 
obtain confidential expert advice as they prepare their cases.692 
The NSWLRC 2005 Report quotes a submission from the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants to the effect that ‘to create a regime which requires the production of 
all iterations of instruction may discourage legal advisors or their clients from 
seeking appropriate advice in a timely manner’.693 It also quotes a submission from 
law firm Freehills, that the result of requiring such disclosure ‘is an unnecessary 
cutting-down of privilege and likely to increase the discovery burden on parties 
with little real benefit’.694 Evidentiary support in respect of these submissions (if 
any) is not identified in the report. Likewise, the NSWLRC 2005 Report relies upon 
a generalised assertion that the introduction of a compulsory disclosure requirement 
‘would be easily circumvented, for example, by using oral rather than written 
communications’.695  
                                                        
690  Compare Lord Woolf, above n 9, 144. 
691  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 89–90. 
692  Ibid. 
693  Ibid. 
694  Ibid 90. 
695  Ibid.  
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Ultimately the NSWLRC 2005 Report adopts and identifies with the conclusion 
adopted by the earlier Australian Law Reform Commission report into the federal 
justice system,696 namely: 
The view is widely held that narrowing the scope of legal professional 
privilege adds to the documentary burden of litigation without any necessary 
improvement in the quality of the evidence before the court. The Commission 
considers that, in most circumstances, it would be unfair to expose experts to 
cross-examination on the contents of draft reports (which may be no more than 
‘preliminary musings’ of the expert). Experts often modify their views as they 
carry out more work.697 
Respectfully, it is difficult to countenance the possibility of an increase in the 
administrative burdens of litigation as being a fundamental argument against law 
reform directed to ensuring that courts and other triers of fact are able properly to 
evaluate expert evidence by accessing all documents relevant to the formation of 
the expert’s opinion. This is especially the case having regard to the fact that the 
NSWLRC 2005 Report elsewhere concluded that: 
Although it is not possible to quantify the extent of the problem, in the 
Commission’s view it is safe to conclude that adversarial bias is a significant 
problem, at least in some types of litigation. Measures that would reduce or 
eliminate adversarial bias, therefore, are likely to have potential benefits, even 
if the extent of those benefits cannot accurately be determined.698 
However, any argument in favour of the abrogation of the privilege, even if limited 
to the context of expert evidence, needs to contend with public policy reasons for 
the existence of the privilege.  
In chapter 1 of this thesis, the Benthamite approach to privilege (namely, the 
complete abolition thereof) is considered and rejected as being unsound.699 To deny 
completely a person the opportunity confidentially to communicate with an expert 
in circumstances in which the opinion of such expert is relevant to that person's 
prospects of success, for fear of having such communication later revealed and 
potentially used against the person, appears at least as inimical to the justice system 
                                                        
696  Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System’ 
(89, Australian Law Reform Commission, 2000). 
697  Ibid [6.84]. 
698  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 74. 
699  See page 44 above. 
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as it does where a solicitor is posited in the place of such expert. To quote again 
Lord Chancellor Brougham in Greenough v Gaskell: 
…if the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own 
legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not 
venture to consult any skilled person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor 
half his case. If the privilege were confined to communications connected with 
suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one could safely 
adopt such precautions as might eventually render any proceedings successful, 
or all proceedings superfluous.700 
Once it is accepted that a lawyer may be unable to advise a client adequately in the 
absence of expert assistance in relation to factual issues upon which the client’s 
position depends, it is difficult to see the involvement of such an expert as an 
eventuality that should sit outside the fabric of the privilege that would otherwise 
arise. Indeed, there is no inherent vice in the expert’s involvement at this stage 
because the opinion of the expert informs the advice to the client and not the 
decision of a third party trier of fact. It is, rather, when the expert is engaged for the 
purpose or potential purpose of giving evidence in proceedings or anticipated 
proceedings that the problem arises.  
The complete abrogation of client legal privilege in the context of experts does not 
appear capable of being reasonably justifiable for the reasons set out above and the 
legitimate purpose of consulting an expert other than in the context of anticipated 
litigation is now recognised both at common law701 and in the amended section 
118(c) of the Uniform Evidence Law.  
B Partial Abrogation 
If its complete abrogation in the context of experts cannot be justified, the issue 
then becomes what, if any, limitation of the privilege should be considered. If all 
communications are not to be made available, should service of an expert report 
require the disclosure of all drafts of that report or any other expert reports within 
the possession of the party? 
                                                        
700  See n 144 above. 
701  See n 207 to n 209 above regarding the effect of the decision in Pratt Holdings. 
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The NSWLRC 2005 Report gives consideration to, but ultimately rejects, the 
mandatory disclosure of all expert reports obtained by a party. After canvassing 
similar provisions adopted in Queensland and South Australia, the proposal is 
rejected on two bases, namely: that it could readily be circumvented by parties 
avoiding written communications until they have ascertained the approach likely to 
be taken by the expert; and that it could encourage parties only to approach 
witnesses ‘at the extreme ends of the spectrum’.  
The first of these two conclusions, although possibly a truism, does not seem to 
have probative value. If a party wishes to conduct discussions with an expert and 
not to make a record of those discussions, it is free to do so and would also need to 
prevail upon the expert to do the same. That is a matter for the party. The fact that 
some parties or experts may choose to act in this way should not affect an approach 
to reform that would require disclosure of draft reports.  
The second consideration appears based upon one submission to the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission by a Queensland based ‘organisation that provides 
expert witnesses’. The submission was that the Queensland experience, in light of 
its disclosure rules, ‘tends to encourage the parties to obtain reports only from 
experts where they are absolutely sure of the opinion the expert will provide’.702 No 
evidentiary basis for the submission is identified. The submission is also at odds 
with the observations of the Honourable Geoffrey Davies, formerly a judge of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland (as opposed to a representative of an organisation 
that advocates for expert witnesses). Geoffrey Davies’ submissions are discussed 
below in the context of a proposed ‘hybrid model’. 
But even if disclosure of expert reports obtained by parties (including drafts thereof) 
were to be mandated, triers of fact and opposing parties would still be unable to 
reach any conclusions that might otherwise be available regarding the number of 
witnesses approached and the extremity of the position adopted by the witnesses 
who had actually prepared reports for use in the proceedings. That is, whilst the 
                                                        
702  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 92. 
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disclosure of draft reports of experts that had prepared reports for the purpose of 
proceedings might assist in the identification of bias on the part of such experts, the 
solution would not address the paradigm of expert exceptionalism.  
IV A Hybrid Model 
A The South Australian Approach 
The conclusions expressed in the NSWLRC 2005 Report, rejecting wider disclosure 
rules, were reached despite the following counterveiling argument raised (extra-
judicially) by Justice Geoffrey Davies, quoted in the NSWLRC 2005 Report in the 
following terms: 
In some jurisdictions reports obtained from experts, intended for use in 
litigation, have been made disclosable. This has resulted in greater frankness 
between parties though, if the existing system of party appointed experts were 
to be retained, it would be vastly improved if parties were obliged to disclose 
not only the reports of experts whom they proposed to call but also those of 
other experts whom they had engaged but did not intend to call and the names 
and addresses of those other experts whom they had approached for an opinion 
but did not intend to call.703 
The approach advocated by Justice Davies approximates, to an extent, the current 
system in place in South Australia. 
Rule 160(1) of the South Australian Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (‘SASC 
Rules’) requires parties to serve on every other party to the action a copy of each 
expert report in the party's possession relevant to the subject matter of an action 
(whether the party intends to rely on it at the trial or not) (‘SA Disclosure Rule’).704 
The first iteration of the SA Disclosure Rule was introduced in 1987.705  
                                                        
703  G Davies, ‘Expert Evidence: Court Appointed Experts’ (2004) 23 Civil Justice Quarterly 367 quoted in 
NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 92. 
704  SASC Rules, rule 160(1) ‘A party must, before the relevant time limit–(a) obtain all expert reports that 
the party intends to obtain for the purposes of the trial of the action; and (b) serve on every other party to 
the action a copy of each expert report in the party’s possession relevant to the subject matter of an action 
(whether the party intends to rely on it at trial or not) not previously served on that party. Exception–This 
rule does not apply to reports obtained, or to be obtained from a shadow expert (see rule 161(1))’. 
705  Kenneally v Pouras [2003] SASC 394, [11] (Gray J). 
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The rationale for the SA Disclosure Rule was discussed in Piber Pty Limited v AW 
Baulderstone Pty Limited by Mullighan J in the following terms: 
No longer may a party withhold from the other party or parties a report of an 
expert even though he does not intend to call that expert or to rely on the report 
in some other way. The policy of the rule is for full disclosure so that all matters 
relating to expert evidence are known to all parties and their experts well before 
the trial … A consequence is that disclosure of an expert's report which in some 
respect is unfavourable to a party, may advance the case of the other party. 
Tactical withholding of reports is no longer permissible. Such a policy may be 
clearly discerned from the rule and is consistent with the purpose of expert 
evidence, namely to assist the court with respect to matters which are not 
within the knowledge or experience of ordinary people. 706 
The initial version of the rule also required disclosure of, amongst other things, 
‘notes made by another person of an expert’s opinion’. That more expansive 
definition was removed in 1994. However, the balance of the rule remained intact.707 
The clear intent of the SA Disclosure Rule to abrogate, to the extent of the rule, legal 
professional privilege otherwise inhering in reports required to be served, is stated 
in rule 160(10): 
For the avoidance of doubt, an expert report (including a summary expert 
report) served under this rule is not subject to legal professional privilege and 
may be the subject of questions at trial and, if otherwise admissible, may be 
tendered in evidence at trial. 
Importantly, a further feature of the SASC Rules not only serves to protect an 
appropriate class of communications between parties and experts, but also assists 
the court and other parties to make an assessment of the extent to which the 
paradigm of expert exceptionalism may be in operation in any given set of 
proceedings. This is the concept of the ‘shadow expert’ referred to in rule 161 of 
the SASC Rules. 
                                                        
706  Piber Pty Ltd v AW Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1992) 163 LSJS 380, 382. 
707  Kenneally v Pouras [2003] SASC 394, [11]. The rule was also accompanied by a practice direction 
(Practice Direction 46, which required, amongst other things, upon request by a party on whom an expert 
report had been served, ‘a list of all conversations in which the expert has taken part with any party, any 
legal representative of a party or any other expert consulted in relation to the matter relevant to the 
opinions expressed in the report …and copies of all notes made by or on behalf of the party or by or on 
behalf of the expert concerning any of the conversations referred to in such a list)’. This requirement was 
removed in the current practice direction (Practice Direction 5.4). 
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A party is still entitled to communicate confidentially with an expert for the 
purposes of obtaining legal advice and such communications will not be amenable 
to the operation of the SA Disclosure Rule, provided that the party engages that 
expert as a ‘shadow expert’ in accordance with the rules. 
Rule 161(1) defines a shadow expert as an expert who: 
(a)  is engaged to assist with the preparation or presentation of a party’s case 
but not on the basis that the expert will, or may, give evidence at the 
trial; and 
(b)  has not previously been engaged in some other capacity to give advice 
or an opinion in relation to the party’s case or any aspect of it.  
The issue of the expert initially obtained to give advice, being converted into a 
witness, as discussed above, is circumvented by the operation of rule 161(2) which 
makes clear that a shadow expert will not be regarded as such unless ‘at or before 
the time the expert is engaged’, the expert gives a certificate to the effect that: 
(a)  the expert understands that it is not his or her role to provide evidence 
at the trial; and 
(b)  the expert has not been previously engaged in any other capacity to give 
advice or an opinion in relation to the party’s case or any aspect of it. 
Rule 161(4) requires that a party who engages a shadow expert must serve on the 
other parties a copy of the certificate procured pursuant to rule 161(2) and also 
notify them of the engagement, date of engagement and name, address and 
qualifications of the shadow expert. This requirement, whilst preserving privilege 
inhering in communications between the party and the shadow expert, addresses to 
some extent the paradigm of expert exceptionalism by giving visibility to the other 
litigants of the number and nature of expert witnesses engaged by a party.  
Additionally, this process also thereby militates against the ‘Croesus litigant’ 
possibility referred to in Chapter 2, namely, the possibility of a litigant engaging 
and thereby conflicting out all potentially damaging experts in a field –– a situation 
made possible by the ‘no property in an expert’ rule also finding an exception in the 
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case of an expert witness who has been privy to confidential information.708 Whilst 
not preventing expert witness shopping or the ‘rich litigant’ possibility entirely, it 
permits at least visibility over the number of witnesses engaged to give evidence or 
as ‘shadow witnesses’ and for other parties to make appropriate submissions to the 
court in this regard.  
A lacuna in the SASC Rules lies in the possibility of informally obtaining the view 
of the expert without a report coming into existence, in which case the expert would 
arguably not be a shadow expert and the party would not be obliged to give 
disclosure of the engagement unless an unsolicited report were to be received 
(which scenario appears to have had some precedent).709 The SASC Rules do not 
permit the transitioning of a shadow expert to an expert entitled to give evidence in 
the proceedings. 
As to whether the rules capture, and require production of, draft reports prepared 
by an expert other than a shadow expert, some guidance was provided by the 
Supreme Court of South Australia in connection with an earlier formulation of the 
rules in Harris Scarfe Limited (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In liq) & Ors 
v Ernst & Young & Ors (No 6), in which Bleby J drew the following distinction: 
The definition of ‘expert report’ in r 38.01 has, as its primary meaning, a 
‘written report’.  To be a report it must be something other than what the expert 
has written for his own edification or as part of the process of forming his 
opinion.  Any professional accustomed to writing opinions will often prepare 
or amend or discard drafts before being satisfied with the version to be 
produced for the client’s consumption.  Drafts of that nature are not 
reports.  They report to no-one.  In the sense in which ‘report’ is used in r 
38.01, it means an account prepared for the benefit of others, not merely for 
the benefit of the author. 
However, where a report is prepared for discussion as representing the author’s 
then present or even tentative view, and is made available to the client for 
discussion, even though it may not necessarily be intended as the final report, 
it is still a report.  If it is in writing it is a written report.  If it contains or 
includes the opinion of the expert it is required to be delivered to other parties 
in accordance with the requirements of r 38.01.710  
                                                        
708  See pages 102-105 and 165 above. 
709  Turner v Eastern Sydney Area Health Services [1999] SASC 1, [23] and [25] (Wicks J); Kenneally v 
Pouras [2003] SASC 394, [16]-[25] (Gray J). 
710  Harris Scarfe Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (in liq) & Ors v Ernst & Young & Ors (No 6) 
[2006] SASC 148, [26]-[27] (Bleby J). 
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Accordingly, draft expert reports prepared for the purpose of communicating with 
a party or solicitor will generally fall within the scope of the SA Disclosure Rule. 
An interesting corollary is that draft expert reports not being prepared for the 
purpose of being communicated to the party or solicitor would in any event, fail at 
least the common law test for the establishment of legal professional privilege and 
thereby be susceptible to disclosure upon the application of a party.711  
The South Australian approach, as reflected in the SA Disclosure Rule and the 
shadow expert regime, at least, represents something of a comprehensive solution 
for the problem of expert evidence and legal professional privilege because it has 
the potential to address both the issue of expert bias and the paradigm of expert 
exceptionalism.  
In Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority,712 Donaldson MR stated: 
…whilst a party is entitled to privacy in seeking out the ‘cards’ for his hand, 
once he has put his hand together, the litigation is to be conducted with all the 
cards face up on the table…713 
This statement does not even represent the current orthodoxy with respect to expert 
evidence because, as discussed in Chapter 3, privilege can be maintained over draft 
expert reports and communications passing between solicitors, parties and experts, 
absent some lacuna in the expert report relied upon that suggests regard has been 
had to other material. The basis of the attractiveness of the adoption of a hybrid 
model based upon the SA Disclosure Rule, is that it would not only reflect the ‘cards 
face up’ ideal espoused in Naylor, but would also, in the context of expert evidence 
only, allow other parties and hence the court to see the ‘discard pile’ and draw any 
relevant inferences therefrom. 
B A Proposal for reform 
If the SA Disclosure Rule were to be modified to create a hybrid model that required 
the production not only of draft expert reports but all communications with experts 
                                                        
711  Ibid [28] (Bleby J). See also pages 133-137 above. 
712  Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 353. 
713  Ibid 360. 
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other than shadow experts but containing other important safeguards (‘Proposed 
Disclosure Rule’), it would provide a solution to the problem of expert evidence 
and legal professional privilege that satisfies the criteria discussed at the conclusion 
of Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
That is, it would provide a means of disclosing expert bias and also a means of 
exposing the presence of the paradigm of expert exceptionalism. It would be 
capable of resolving the differential application of the tests for the existence of 
privilege currently adopted under the Uniform Evidence Law and the common law 
because it would abrogate such privilege in the context of experts other than 
‘shadow experts’, a term perhaps better restated as ‘advisory experts’. Also, by that 
same distinction, it would represent a departure from a test of waiver based upon 
the adoption of the principles set out in Maurice, which are contended, for the 
reasons set out in Chapter 4, to be unsound. 
Further, unlike solutions involving reliance upon a court appointed expert, or a 
jointly engaged expert, it is a solution that is capable of applying to all 
circumstances in which expert witnesses are deployed and it strikes a balance 
between maintaining the privilege (in the case of the advisory expert procedure) 
and providing a level of disclosure that can be utilised by other parties in the context 
of the adversarial system, to hold experts and parties engaging them to account. 
The implementation within New South Wales and the federal jurisdiction of an 
approach to expert evidence based upon the adoption of the Proposed Disclosure 
Rule discussed above could be effected by the creation of a succinct statement of 
rules encompassing the Proposed Disclosure Rule that courts, tribunals and other 
triers of fact could adopt. 
One such statement, which is by no means conclusive or exhaustive of the 
possibilities, is as follows:   
(1)  Subject to rule (2), a party must, upon service of each expert 
report that the party intends to rely upon for the purposes of 
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the proceedings, make available for inspection by each other 
party: 
 (a) a copy of each expert report and each draft expert report 
in the party's or the expert’s possession relevant to the 
subject matter of the proceedings (whether the party 
intends to rely on it at the trial or not) and not previously 
served on each other party or made available for 
inspection; and 
(b)  a copy of all documents and communications in 
connection with the proceedings exchanged with the 
expert upon whose report the party proposes to rely, as 
are in the party's or the expert’s possession and not 
previously served on each other party or made available 
for inspection. 
 (2) A party is not required to comply with rule (1) in connection 
with reports prepared by or documents or communications 
exchanged with, an advisory expert.  
(3) A party who wishes to adduce evidence in proceedings from an 
expert engaged as an advisory expert must: 
(a)  notify each other party of the party's intention to do so 
within 14 days of the date on which the expert is engaged 
to prepare evidence; and 
(b)  comply with rule (1) in connection with that expert, as 
though the expert had never been engaged as an advisory 
expert. 
(4) For the purposes of rules (2) and (3), an advisory expert is an 
expert: 
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(a) who is engaged to assist with the preparation or 
presentation of a party's case but not on the basis that the 
expert will, or may, give evidence at the trial;  
(b) who has not previously been engaged in some other 
capacity to give advice or an opinion in relation to the 
party's case or any aspect of it; and 
(c) the existence and identity of whom has been notified in 
writing to all other parties within 21 days of the date on 
which the expert was first engaged or the proceedings 
commenced (whichever is the later). 
A number of likely criticisms of such a rule may be inferred from the foregoing 
discussion in relation to the other options for reform. In particular, the adoption of 
such a rule is likely to be considered as giving rise to an increased administrative 
and documentary burden, increasing the costs of litigation. Similarly, it is likely to 
be viewed as encouraging parties to adopt two sets of experts for the purpose of 
proceedings, also increasing litigation costs. 
It is contended that such criticisms do not appropriately militate against the 
adoption of the rule. Any perceived increased ‘documentary burden of litigation’ 
arising from adoption of a Proposed Disclosure Rule,714 is ameliorated to an extent 
by the obligation consisting only of making available for inspection the documents 
required to be disclosed, not in providing each other party with copies of such 
documents. It would be up to each party to decide whether to avail itself of the 
opportunity and whether to make copies of any or all of the documents disclosed in 
the process. Presumably it would only do so where it considered a disclosed 
document to be of potential benefit in the litigation. 
The adoption of the Proposed Disclosure Rule would also remove from court 
processes applications for disclosure, such as notices to produce or subpeonas, 
                                                        
714  See discussion at page 187 above. 
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engendering costs savings for the parties and the ability of courts to deploy 
resources to other disputes and overcome the problematic practice, currently 
adopted, of judges who may be the ultimate triers of fact, inspecting documents 
over which a claim for privilege is made in order to determine their status.715 
The nature of the ‘additional’ burden posed by such a requirement is also somewhat 
illusory given that experts are required by codes of conduct to identify all 
information upon which their conclusions are reached.716 The expert (and the 
solicitors engaging the expert) should already be collating such communications as 
may be relevant to the opinion ultimately reached for disclosure pursuant to these 
requirements. It would be difficult to assert that the extension of the obligation to 
communications that may ultimately not be considered, at least by the expert, to be 
material to the conclusions reached, is such a substantial additional burden as negate 
the benefits of the rule. Indeed, it could be contended that the adoption of the 
Proposed Disclosure Rule would prompt parties to be more thoughtful about their 
communications with an engaged expert and potentially reduce parties’ ‘unthinking 
reliance on expert evidence’.717 
It could also be said that adoption of such a model would increase the cost of 
litigation by making it desirable for parties to engage both an advisory expert and 
an expert witness. Although it would be more costly to obtain both an advisory 
expert and a conventional expert, as is consistent with the features of the adversarial 
system in which the case is run, such forensic decisions lie with the party and the 
manner in which it wishes to run its case. Further, as proposed in the formulation 
set out above (and unlike the provisions in South Australia), there is provision in 
the Proposed Disclosure Rule for an advisory expert to transition into an expert 
witness, the price being susceptibility of all communications to disclosure. It would 
be open to a party to engage an expert initially as an advisory expert and convert 
the expert into a witness once the party has greater certainty about the likely opinion 
                                                        
715  See pages 128-129 above. 
716  For example, in the Expert Witness Code of Conduct which form Schedule 7 to the UCPR clauses (d), 
(e), (f), (g) and (h).  
717  Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 160, [23] (Sackville J). 
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to be given by the expert. The advantage that such a process would have over the 
current system, apart from the disclosure of communications and draft reports in 
the case of a transition, is that the initial engagement would still be required to be 
disclosed, thereby enabling other parties to make appropriate submissions regarding 
the operation of the ‘paradigm of expert exceptionalism’, possible instances of 
expert shopping and the practice of ‘conflicting out’ expert witnesses.   
Finally, it could be said that adoption of the Proposed Disclosure Rule would 
constitute an unjustifiable inroad into the public policy rationale behind the doctrine 
of legal professional privilege. As set out above, this should not be the case given 
the ability of parties to take advantage of the ‘safe harbour’ provisions regarding 
advisory experts.  
Taking into account its satisfaction of the criteria for reform identified in Chapter 
4, the responses to the criticisms referred to above and recognition by law reform 
bodies that ‘measures that would reduce or eliminate adversarial bias … are likely 
to have potential benefits, even if the extent of those benefits cannot accurately be 
determined’,718  it is contended that the opportunity for courts, tribunals and other 
triers of fact in the New South Wales and federal jurisdictions to adopt the Proposed 
Disclosure Rule would be an appropriate response to the problems that lie at the 
intersection of the law relating to expert evidence and legal professional privilege. 
  
                                                        
718  NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 9, 74. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Legal professional privilege operates as an important exception to the principle that 
any evidence which is relevant to a fact in issue in proceedings, is admissible. 
Likewise, expert evidence is an exception to the rule that opinion evidence is 
inadmissible as a basis for proving the truth of the proposition about which the 
opinion is expressed and requires, as one of its guiding principles, that the expert 
owe a paramount duty to the court.  
The current orthodoxy which lies at the intersection between the doctrine of legal 
professional privilege and the law with respect to expert evidence, creates a 
tendency to work injustice that cannot readily be resolved or alleviated by the strict 
application of the law with respect to each of these concepts as it has independently 
developed. For example, to continue, as courts have, to apply principles derived 
from cases such as Attorney General (NT) v Maurice to the waiver of legal 
professional privilege in the context of the party-engaged expert has engendered 
lines of authority which, it is contended, are not apt to expose contraventions of 
guidelines and codes of conduct by expert witnesses, a number of which have come 
to light only in extraordinary circumstances.719    
The inherent tension between the doctrine of legal professional privilege and the 
role of the party-engaged expert witness –– the first institutionalising the 
concealment of communications and documents and the second, mandating that the 
output of the expert transcend the partisan circumstances of its creation –– tends to 
generate something of an irreconcilable dynamic, perhaps exacerbated by the 
conditions in which trials are run in this era of ‘mega-litigation’. This unsatisfactory 
state is further confused by the uncertainties attendant upon the status of the ‘basis 
rule’ at common law and under the Uniform Evidence Law, the disharmonies of 
application between the common law and Uniform Evidence Law tests for the 
existence and waiver of legal professional privilege in the context of expert 
                                                        
719  See for example the discussion of the cases of Wood, Sharman and Hudspeth in Chapter 4. 
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evidence and the differential operation of the relevant tests at various stages of 
proceedings in New South Wales and federal courts, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
There must be at least a grain of truth in the pronouncement of Judge Learned Hand 
back at the turn of the 20th Century that: 
[t]here can be, in my opinion, no legal anomaly which does not work evil, 
because, forging an illogical precedent, it becomes the mother of other 
anomalies and breeds chaos in theory and finally litigation.720 
It is also true that the adoption of the Proposed Disclosure Rule identified in 
Chapter 5 would, in effect, require the creation of a further anomaly, departing as it 
does from the current orthodoxy discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, it is 
contended that the Proposed Disclosure Rule may address the criteria for reform 
identified at the conclusion of Chapter 4 and overcome the fundamental problem 
posed by the application of legal professional privilege to expert evidence.  
By requiring the disclosure of communications with, and draft reports prepared by, 
an expert engaged for the purpose of giving evidence in proceedings –– material 
that may otherwise be the subject of a claim for legal professional privilege –– 
competing litigants are permitted the opportunity to form a view as to the role (if 
any) such material had in shaping opinions finally expressed by the expert. The 
timely disclosure of such material may militate against the recurrence of such 
conduct as was exposed in Wood, Sharman and Hudspeth as constituting partisan 
behaviour on the part of the expert. 
Further, by mandating the disclosure of each expert engaged by a party (whether in 
the capacity of an advisory expert or not), the Proposed Disclosure Rule also allows 
other litigants some transparency as to the identity and number of experts engaged. 
This would provide some opportunity, currently lacking, to seek appropriate redress 
through the court or tribunal in respect of attempts at ‘expert shopping’ or 
engagement in the ‘Croesus litigant’ practice of attempting to ‘knock out’ by way 
of conflicting all or key experts within a field. 
                                                        
720  Hand, above n 239, 52. 
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Importantly, the Proposed Disclosure Rule would not rely upon an extension of 
existing expert witness codes of conduct or guidelines, or other self-executing and 
self-regulating means of promoting transparency on the part of party-engaged 
expert witnesses –– including the expert witness declaration, favoured by the 
authors of Judicial Perspectives –– the efficacy of which has been questioned.721 
The sanction for non-compliance with an expert code of conduct is the potential 
inadmissibility of the evidence given by the defaulting expert,722 whereas the 
sanction for non-compliance with a disclosure requirement that has the force of a 
court order lies in the realm of contempt.723  
The Proposed Disclosure Rule would also, by reason of its capacity for consistent 
application irrespective of whether the relevant law of the forum in which disclosure 
would be made is the Uniform Evidence Law or the common law, overcome the 
remaining differences associated with the two regimes and negate the existing 
inconsistencies between the test to be applied during ancillary processes and at 
hearing.724 Further, by providing other parties with the means critically to evaluate 
all material provided to an expert witness, the Proposed Disclosure Rule may assist 
in overcoming the practical consequences of any lingering uncertainty over the 
scope of the ‘basis rule’ in the context of admissibility of expert evidence.725  
In Chapter 5, a number of potential counter-arguments to the efficacy of the 
adoption of the Proposed Disclosure Rule are considered. On the whole, it is 
contended that such adoption would not fall foul of the overriding principles of case 
management for the reasons there stated, but also because it would remove a tier of 
intelocutory process from administration by the courts (namely the issue of 
subpoenas and notices to produce to experts and parties). The adoption of the 
Proposed Disclosure Rule would also overcome the unsatisfactory practice of 
requiring those who may be the ultimate triers of fact in proceedings to review the 
                                                        
721  See for example, the discussion at pages 84-86 and 160. 
722  See for example, rule 31.23(3) and (4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). 
723  See for example Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306, 312-313 
(Beaumont J). 
724  See the discussion in Chapter 3. 
725  See the discussion at pages 91-94. 
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very documents over which a claim for privilege is made in order to make a ruling 
in the case of a disclosure application.726  
Overall, the Proposed Disclosure Rule is contended in this thesis to be one means 
by which the worst tendencies of the combined operation of the doctrine of legal 
professional privilege and the role of the party-engaged expert witness are 
ameliorated and the genuine policy rationales for each, to a reasonably practicable 
extent, retained. There are undoubtably others. 
Finally, lest it be thought that the irony of a lawyer impugning experts for holding 
divergent opinions has escaped notice, it is appropriate to conclude with some 
further words from Judge William Foster, spoken at the conclusion of the 19th 
century: 
It is certainly true that there are and always will be differences of opinion 
among experts of the highest character … [b]ut concerning this alleged 
misfortune, it seems hardly becoming for the legal profession to indulge in 
severe criticism, since there is no profession so strongly characterised by 
differences of opinion on any subject, – lawyers as well as judges constantly 
disagreeing, and the latter not infrequently overruling one another’s decisions. 
Yes, it is a visible truth that doctors, as well as lawyers and ministers of the 
Gospel do disagree. It would be marvellous and deplorable if they did not. If 
there were no disagreement investigation and experiment would cease; and 
science, literature and art would sink to a dead level of stupidity and laziness.727  
 
  
                                                        
726  See the discussion at pages 128-130 above. 
727  Foster, above n 1, 186. 
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